RUSSIA 

AND THE GREAT WAR 



GREGOR ALEXINSKY 



RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 






RUSSIA AND THE 
GREAT WAR 



GREGOR ALEXINSKY 

Ex-Deputy to the Duma 



Translated by 

BERNARD MIALL 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 






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" Petrograd, 12 January. — At Lemberg the con- 
valescent Russian soldiers, blinded by vitriol, which 
was flung in their faces by the Germans, offer a pitiful 
spectacle. With bandaged features, they move in 
Indian file, holding on to a cord, and led by a guide " 
(Telegram published in the journal L Humanitc, 
January 13, 1915). 

TO THESE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS, 

AND TO OTHER VICTIMS OF THE WAR, 

WHICH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE DID NOT DESIRE, 

I RESPECTFULLY DEDICATE THE 

PRESENT VOLUME 

THE AUTHOR 



PREFACE 

The success obtained with the British public by 
my work on " Modern Russia," of which the 
second edition followed the first in the space of 
ten months, has inspired me with courage once 
more to address my readers in a book devoted 
to my country. 

The subject of this new book is " Russia and 
the Great War." But in writing it I wished 
not merely to write a book for the moment ex- 
clusively, of value only for to-day, and of no 
interest to-morrow. It is not the external and 
dramatic aspect of the great war waged by Russia 
and her Allies that interests me the most. On 
the contrary, my readers will find in my pages 
neither descriptions of battles nor tragic or 
picturesque narratives of the incidents of battle. 
My aim has been something quite different from 
this. I wish to inform my English readers con- 
cerning the principal phenomena of Russian life 
before the war, and to explain the relations be- 
tween these phenomena and the war itself. 



8 PREFACE 

What were the events of international poli- 
tics which preceded the war, and what causes 
forced Russia to take part in it ? What was the 
internal situation of Russia on the eve of the 
war ? Can we say that the Russian people, or 
its Government, or both together, desired this 
war? How was the war received by society, 
and by the popular masses in Russia, and what 
was the attitude of the various nationalities and 
political parties of my country toward the world- 
war? Why did certain of the Russian "revo- 
lutionaries " and Socialists experience a strange 
dread of the victory of Russia, and even express 
a desire that she should meet with defeat? In 
what manner did the Governments of the countries 
at war with Russia seek to exploit, to their own 
profit, the hatred of the Russian revolutionaries 
for Tsarism ? Why does the Russian soldier fight 
better when opposed to the Austrians, Germans, 
and Turks, than he fought during the war with 
Japan? What prospects will lie open before 
Russia at the end of the war ? What may Europe 
expect from Russia, and Russia from Europe, 
after the demolition of the Prussian militarism 
which threatens both Russia and Europe ? 

Here are the numerous questions which I deal 
with in the present volume, and which I seek 



PREFACE 9 

to answer. In my arguments and expositions 
I have sought always to remain objective and 
impartial, so far as that is possible in the phase 
of the human tragedy through which we are 
passing. Each of my assertions is based on facts 
and supported by documents. I do not wish 
to trouble the minds of my readers by clamorous 
indignation ; I prefer to convince their minds 
by an objective analysis. For, in the words of 
a Russian writer — 

Words and illusions perish ; facts remain. 

G. A. 
April 1915. 



CONTENTS 

PART I 
BEFORE THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire 
after the Russo-Japanese War. The movement towards 
the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The 
economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near 
East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The 
confidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist . . 19 

CHAPTER II 

I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian 
Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or de- 
fensive ? — II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry 
between Germany and England. The Anglo-Franco- 
Russian eniente and its political character . . -32 

CHAPTER III 

I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League.— II, The Turco- 
German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her 
conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- 
stantinople and the Dardanelles . . . -47 

11 



12 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

PAGE 

I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The 
commercial exchange between these two countries. The 
success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated 
by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs \ 
Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The 
necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. 
Why was not the Russo-German economic entente 
realized ? ....... 59 

CHAPTER V 

I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic 
progress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. 
The policy of the Government. Recent success of the 
liberative movement. The poHtical strike and the popular 
demonstrations of July 1914 in Petersburg . . -74 



CHAPTER VI 

I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The 
revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military 
expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan 
of 1914. Its strategical and military destination . . 82 



CHAPTER VII 

I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. — II. The military forces of Russia 
compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The 
Russian Navy . . . . . . -95 



CHAPTER VIII 

I. Did Russia desire the war ? The two Russias, popular and 
governmental. The pacific tendencies of the Russian 
peasants and working-men. — II. Official Russia and its 



CONTENTS 13 



PAGE 



attitude towards the Austro-German coalition. The poHtical, 
military, and ideological recoil of the Russian Government 
from the Austro-German expansion. — III. The war and the 
Revolution. The Russian reaction and the Prussian . 105 



PART II 
IN THE BLOODY FRAY 

CHAPTER I 

I. The diplomatic documents and the political reality. The 
opinion of a little Chinese scholar and a great European 
scientist. — II. The international tension in July 191 4 and 
the question of responsibility. The Austro-German aggres- 
sion and the part played by Russia. Could Russia have 
anticipated the war ? . . . . . -123 

CHAPTER II 

I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted 
with an unexpected war. — II. The session of the Duma. 
The agreement between the majority of the parties and 
representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote 
for the military credits . . . . '134 

CHAPTER III 

I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures 
taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures; the 
new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of 
alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the 
war . . . . . . . .155 



14 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

PAGE 

I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nation- 
alities of the Russian Empire before the international war. 
— II. The Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles 
become Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — 
IV. The Ukraine.— V. Finland.— VI. The position of the 
Jews. Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist 
problem in the Baltic Provinces . . . -179 

CHAPTER V 

I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries 
and Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this 
dread. The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. 
Why is the propaganda resulting from this apprehension 
erroneous and harmful ? — II. The German, Austrian, and 
Turkish Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian 
revolutionaries. The noble reply of certain of these latter 
to the agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. 
Russian revolutionaries in the French Army . . 229 

CHAPTER VI 

I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. 
The " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." 
— II. The rural communes and co-operative associations 
in the campaign against the misfortunes produced by the 
war. — III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — 
IV. The Press in Russia during the war . . . 258 

CHAPTER VII 

I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present 
war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol 
and its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason 
in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting 
better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he 
fought against Japan. The " liberation idea " and the war . 277 



CONTENTS 15 

PART III 
AFTER THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the 
problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. 
The possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. 
Are they necessary to Russia ? . . . . 297 

CHAPTER II 

I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and 
the destruction of Prussian Imperiahsm. — II. The defeat 
of Germany is to the advantage of the German revolu- 
tionaries and the Socialists of Germany and of all 
Europe ........ 306 

CHAPTER III 

I. Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from 
the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to 
the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian 
monarchies? — II. The intrigues of the Russian reaction- 
aries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a 
separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance 
of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these 
intrigues are to be disarmed . . . . -312 

CHAPTER IV 

I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in 
Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national 
question after the war. — III. The role of the French and 
English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for 
liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? . 322 



16 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER V 

PAGE 

I. Russia and England, Their economic relations. The neces- 
sity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — II. The 
intellectual relations between Russia and England. Con- 
cerning certain " deviations " of English sympathies . 343 



PART I 
BEFORE THE WAR 



Russia and the Great War 



CHAPTER I 

I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire 
after the Russo-Japanese War, The movement towards the 
Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic 
interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. 
— II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The con- 
fidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist. 

I 

The war with little Japan marked a decisive 
moTnent in the contemporary history of the ex- 
ternal policy of the great Russian Empire. To 
be more precise, it constituted first a check and 
then a change in the direction of this policy. 
Before the war the Russian eagle had hovered 
in full liberty above the Asiatic Orient, continu- 
ally extending its wings over new territories, until 
at length the Pacific Ocean was attained. But 
the Rising Sun of the young Japanese Empire 
was to scorch its pinions. Its flight toward the 
Far East was suddenly arrested, and as early as 
1906, at a secret meeting of the leaders of the 
Russian Government, one of these latter declared 

19 



20 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

that after the debacle occasioned by the Russo- 
Japanese War, the Empire of the Tsars must per- 
force renounce the old aggressive energy of 
its customary external policy, in order to 
" assume a more prudent and more conciliatory 
attitude." 

Thus there ensued a period of arrest in the 
march of Russia toward the Far East, and the 
Muscovite bear found himself at the parting of 
the ways, like the hero of a popular Russian 
legend. Which was the road to follow ? Should 
he continue to tread the ancient track? But the 
yellow sun of Japan was still visible on the 
Eastern horizon. Or would it be better to return 
toward the West? Behold the black eagle of 
Gennany, with its beak of steel, and always on 
the alert ! 

Doubtless the best and simplest policy would 
have been to remain at home, to seek no new 
adventures, whether to East or to West. But 
unhappily man does not always adhere to the 
best or the simplest solution. And the historical 
past had left Russia a heavy burden in the shape 
of an inheritance of military and diplomatic ties^, 
and alliances and counter-alliances, whose auto- 
matic action might well result in dragging Russia 
into an external conflict, or in forcing her to 
involve both friends and enemies in such a con- 
flict. " Moreover, there were forces in the interior 
of the country which would not willingly bow 



BEFORE THE WAR 21 

to the necessity of modifying the tone of the 
State's external policy. There were several 
groups among the higher ranks of the aristocracy 
and the Army for whom the lesson of the Russo- 
Japanese War passed almost unperceived, and who 
were eager to take their revenge upon the field 
of battle — but on what field was a matter of in- 
difference. There were groups of capitalists, 
moreover, who would not be content with a patient 
and peaceable effort to regenerate the great home 
market, which was nevertheless capable of yield- 
ing them a greater revenue than all the Man- 
churias and Persias of the world together. They 
hankered after foreign markets, which were to 
be conquered by brute force. 

" The East China railway should have created 
new markets for us, and have connected Europe 
and the East by a trade route. The Russo- 
Japanese War destroyed these hopes. The railway 
has lost 700 versts of its best and most pro- 
ductive portion ; we have lost the port of Dalny 
(Talienwan), which was equipped to perfection. 
We cannot hope great things from the exporta- 
tion of our merchandise to Southern Manchuria, 
where the Japanese are the masters. Our trade 
with Mongolia is equally in a stagnant condi- 
tion. . . . Our position in the Far East being 
compromised as a result of the war, the eye 
naturally returns toward the West, and above all 
to the Near East. A series of Chambers of 



22 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Commerce has been established— Anglo-Russian, 
Russo-Belgian, and so forth. At the same time 
companies have been formed for the exporta- 
tion of general merchandise, and especially for 
export to the Balkans. . . . But, notwithstand- 
ing the simultaneous efforts of the Government, 
and the commercial and industrial circles, the 
exportation of manufactured articles is increasing 
far too slowly. Our position in the Near East 
is weak. In the West there is nothing to hope 
for. ' Friendly ' Germany is pushing us toward 
Asia, but in Persia our affairs are in a bad way, 
and threaten to grow still worse in the future- 
thanks to the German competition. We have 
lost the market of the rich southern portion of 
Manchuria, and the market offered by its northern 
portion is poor and unstable. Foreign compe- 
tition is successfully driving us out of Mongolia. 
Hence the tendencies which are now apparent 
among us, which demand the employment of 
armed force, that we may retain possession of 
these markets ; so that we find ourselves on the 
eve of new colonial adventures. ... In a 
word, the historical phase which was passed 
through before the Revolution is about to be 
renewed." 

Such is the description of the political situa- 
tion of Russia in Eastern Asia after the Russo- 
Japanese War, in respect of the economical 
basis of that policy, as it appeared to a worthy 



BEFORE THE WAR 23 

Russian economist whose book was published in 
191 I .» 

But while a few small political and economic 
circles hoped for a continuation of the old orien- 
tation of the foreign politics of Russia— that is, 
the continuation of the march toward the Far 
East — there were others— and among them were 
many Liberals— who insisted that Russia should 
concentrate her attention and her energies on 
regions less remote, notably on Asia Minor, the 
shores of the Black Sea, and the Balkans. It 
must be admitted that this tendency is founded 
on interests and considerations of an important 
nature. Russia is one of the " granaries of the 
world." Her foreign trade consists above all 
in the exportation of cereals. 

" A glance at the statistics of our cereal exports 
will show that their centre of gravity since the 
year 1896 lies in the ports of the south. During 
the last twelve years the part played by the 
regions of the south, south-east, and south-west 
in the foreign trade of Russia has been still 
further enlarged. In 1909, 76 per cent, of all 
the wheat, 91 per cent, of all the barley, 53 per 
cent, of all the rye, and 83 per cent, of all the 
maize exported from Russia was exported from 
the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov." = 

' See the great economic work of M, A. Finn-Yenotaevsky 
Sovremenno'ie Kliozidistvo Rossiyi ("The Modern Economy of 
Russia"), Petersburg, 191 1, pp. 408-12. 

^ Ibid. pp. 425-6. 



24 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Cereals are the principal article of Russia's 
foreign trade. The ports of the Black Sea are 
the chief outlets for the foreign export of Russian 
grain. From this you can judge the importance 
of the Eastern Question, the question of the 
Dardanelles, etc., for the whole of Russia, from 
the point of view of her economic interests. 

Add to these the problem of the commercial 
relations existing between Russia and Germany, 
which are connected by a highly developed com- 
mercial exchange, the nature of which I shall 
presently explain. Finally, consider the position 
of Germany and Russia on the Baltic, which is 
the second-* great route of the foreign trade of 
Russia, and which is really in the possession of 
the powerful German Navj, and you will readily 
perceive that the economic interests of Russia 
in the West are far greater than in the Far East, 
and that Russia cannot completely ignore what 
is passing in Asia Minor, in the Balkans, and on 
her western frontiers. 

II 

Certain Russian politicians were even of 
opinion that Russia ought resolutely to abandon 
the old direction of her military and diplomatic 
policy, which looked toward the Asiatic Orient, 
and that this policy should confine itself to 
Europe and the Balkans. This opinion was dis- 
puted by the supporters of the Asiatic policy. 



BEFORE THE WAR 25 

One of these latter, Baron Rosen, who had been 
Russian Amhassador in Belgrade, Tokio, and 
Washington, and who was a colleague of M. 
Witte at the time of the negotiations with Japan 
which took place at Portsmouth, published, in 
191 3, a very interesting confidential memoir 
dealing with this subject, of which the issue was 
withdrawn from circulation — it is said by order 
of the Government. I believe my readers will 
feel grateful to me for quoting the essential por- 
tion of this memoir.' 

" After the check occasioned by the last war," 
writes M. Rosen, " and the defeat of our entire 
policy 'in the Far East— a policy qualified as a 
mere adventure by people who did not realize 
the vast importance to Russia of her interests in 
those regions, a policy which deserved that 
epithet only because it was not in time supported 
by all the forces of the State— the idea seems 
firmly to have rooted itself in the mind of the 
public that Russia should once more seek the 
centre of her political interests in Europe." 

M. Rosen does not share this opinion. He 
does not believe that Russia has any historic 
mission in the Near East ; he does not consider 
the " Slav idea " to have any real basis ; he is 
not of opinion that it corresponds with the real 

^ A detailed account of this memoir, with many quotations, 
was published in the French review Le Correspotidant, Septem- 
ber 19 1 3. 



26 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

interests of Russia. So far the defence of the 
" Slav idea " has had none but neg^ative and 
harmful results for Russia. It dragged the coun- 
try into the war of 1877-8, which cleared the 
ground for the Revolution ; it was the cause of 
the estrangement between Germany and Russia 
in the time of Bismarck, and the dissolution of 
the alliance of " Three Emperors " which guaran- 
teed the western frontier of Russia. Finally, says 
M. Rosen, it " also pushed us to the conclusion 
of an alliance with France which has involved 
us in interests entirely foreign to Russia : namely, 
the French desire to be revenged for Sedan and 
the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and, of late years, 
the Anglo-German antagonism, which will be the 
ground on which the coming European war will 
be fought." 

For M. Rosen " the great Slav ideal " is merely 
the " verbal gymnastics of writers and orators 
of the Slavophile camp *' . . . devoid of any real 
foundation. 

" All undertakings inspired by this idea— as, 
for example, the Slav Bank, the exhibitions of 
Russian products, the Russian libraries in Slav 
countries, etc., either remain in the condition of 
mere projects, or drag themselves through a 
miserable existence. ... In the domain of 
material civilization, Russia has no need of the 
Slav world, nor the Slav world of Russia. In 
the Slav States of the Balkans our industry, which 



BEFORE THE WAR 27 

has at its disposal a vast home market defended 
by extremely high protective tariffs, could only 
at a loss compete with the Austro-German indus- 
tries ; as for the Slavs of the south, their com- 
mercial relations with the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, their neighbour, will always be more 
advantageous than their relations with distant 
Russia. 

" From the intellectual standpoint, the Slavs 
of the Balkans (and still more those of Austria), 
despite a somewhat factitious Germanophobia, 
evidently prefer — and this is very natural — to tap 
directly and at first hand the Western sources, 
and principally those of Germany. ... As for 
the sympathies of the Austrian Slavs, which we 
are told are irresistibly pro-Russian, it is only 
too obvious that their flirtations with us have 
one sole object, and that essentially a selfish one : 
it is, to flaunt before the Austrian Government 
the bogy of Pan-Slavism under Russian hege- 
mony, in order to obtain from it the desired con- 
cessions. . . . Our continual advances, in the 
press and in the speeches of certain amateur poli- 
ticians, toward the Austrian Slavs, have in the 
end impelled Austria to retort by very undesir- 
able and even dangerous advances to our own 
' Mazeppists,' ' Ukrainophiles, and other ele- 
ments hostile to the Russian Empire, which enter- 

' The supporters of the policy inaugurated by the famous 
Cossack hetman Mazeppa. 



28 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

tain treiacherous dreams of the dismemberment 
of Russia." 

Baron Rosen pronounces in favour of an 
understanding with Austria. 

" The only cause of armed conflict with Austria 
that can be foreseen is precisely the opposition 
which we are offering to her Balkan policy. . . . 
This antagonism is the cause of a state of affairs 
very dangerous for us, thanks to which, every 
time any disturbance occurs in the Balkan 
Peninsula, arises the possibility that Austria will 
intervene as the Power chiefly interested by reason 
of her geographical position, and for us the possi- 
bility of a conflict with her, and therefore of a 
European conflagration." 

Russia, M. Rosen holds, ought to reconcile 
herself to the Austrian penetration of the 
Balkans. 

" Austria, like Germany, is passing through a 
period of growth. . . . The only possible outlet 
is indicated by her geographical position ; rejected 
by the Germanic Confederation, she has turned 
her eyes toward the Slav south. The movement 
of Austria toward the Slav south does not clash 
with the real interests of Russia. On the other 
hand, Austria will meet with complications which 
should sufficiently make her aware of the value 
of amicable relations with Russia." 

An alliance between Russia and Germany ap- 
peared to M. Rosen to be even more necessary. 



BEFORE THE WAR 29 

Allied with France and England, Russia finds 
herself in a camp hostile to Germany. M. Rosen 
believes that the entire responsibility of this 
hostility falls, not upon Russia but upon Erance 
and England. " In the forefront of the causes 
of this reciprocal hostility we see the irreconcil- 
able antagonism between France and Germany, 
founded on the French idea of revenge for Sedan 
and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. To this cause 
has been added, of late years, another, which is 
the Anglo -Germanic antagonism founded on com- 
mercial, industrial, and colonial competition, and 
rivalry in the matter of naval armaments. These 
two motives are absolutely alien to the vital 
interests of Russia." 

During the first twenty years which followed 
the war of 1870-71, France was so weak and 
Germany so powerful, that, " thanks to the 
enormous disproportion of the forces at their 
disposal, war was for one of the parties a super- 
fluity and for the other an impossibility." Such 
a situation M. Rosen regards as ideal, and he is 
greatly disturbed by the fact than an alliance with 
Russia has re-established the equilibrium of 
forces. It is true that during those twenty years 
Germany enjoyed a hegemony in Europe, and 
that to-day she wishes once more to achieve 
that hegemony. But this tendency of Germany 
toward hegemony is dangerous only to Western 
Europe, not to Russia, says M. Rosen, who finds 



30 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

it " absolutely impossible to comprehend " how 
the German domination in Europe can be opposed 
to the interests of Russia, which is rather an 
Asiatic Power. " By abandoning to Germany 
supremacy in the Western portion of Europe, and 
by dissociating herself completely from all rival- 
ries between European Powers based on interests 
purely European, Russia would assure herself of 
the security of her western frontier, and would 
have her hands free for the accomplishment of 
her mission in Asia." 
r To yield Europe to the Prussian Moloch and 
to take Asia in exchange — such, according to M. 
Rosen's opinion, is the supreme national duty of 
Russia. Such an alliance with Germany would 
be the more profitable to Russia in that it would 
enable Germany to undermine the naval supre- 
macy of England, and such a decrease of power 
is in the interests of Russia — so Baron Rosen 
believes. 

Russia's confidence in Erance and England 
rests " on fragile bases," he says, and " the confi- 
dence of Germany is incommensurably more 
precious to us." 

Commenting upon the ideas expressed in M. 
Rosen's memoir, of which we have given a 
detailed summary, a French review remarked 
that these ideas revealed " an atavistic German- 
ism," and that " if it had amused HerrBethmann- 
Holweg to give his advice to the Russian 



BEFORE THE WAR 31 

Ambassador in Berlin, this is the advice he would 
have given." 

Let us now analyse the actual international 
position of Russia before the war, so that we 
may judge whether the Germanophile counsels 
of Baron Rosen did really constitute good advice, 
and whether they corresponded with the true 
interests of the country. 



CHAPTER II 

I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian 
Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or defensive ? 
II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Ger- 
many and England. The Anglo- Franco-Russian entente and 
its political character. 

I 

Despite the lamentations of the supporters of 
her " Asiatic orientation," the recoil of Russia 
from the Far East and her " return " to the West 
was an accomplished fact. This fact confronted 
the Russian State, with the complex problem of 
its attitude toward the other European States, 
and its position in the famous " Concert " of 
Great Powers. To a very appreciable extent this 
position was no doubt determined by the recent 
history of Russia's foreign policy, which has been 
charaicterized by the Franco -Russian Alliance and 
the Anglo -Franco-Russian entente. 

The Franco-Russian Alliance is of a double 
character — financial and politico-military. Doubt- 
less the economic and financial element was pre- 
ponderant at the birth of this strange union of 
the republican democracy of France and the 



BEFORE THE WAR 33 

monarchical autocracy of Russia. Yet we cannot 
deny the importance of the political and military 
considerations which have pushed France into the 
arms of Tsarism. These considerations have 
made themselves felt more especially of late 
years. After Russia's defeat in the war with 
Japan, after the ruin of almost her entire navy, 
and the heavy losses in men and material suffered 
by the army, the military power of Russia was 
gravely compromised. Germany immediately 
profited by this breach of equilibrium, consoli- 
dating her international position, both economic 
and political. One may say, without exaggera- 
tion, that the great misfortunes suffered by Russia 
during the war of 1904-5 brought prosperity to 
Germany. 

In the first place, Germany succeeded in ex- 
ploiting the very embarrassing situation of her 
eastern neighbour in the year i 904, by securing 
from Russia a Customs Treaty highly profitable 
to German trade and industry. At the same time 
Germany was redoubling her efforts to increase 
her military forces, and this increase became most 
rapid immediately upon the enfeeblement of the 
Russian army at the close of the war. In the 
year 1905 the German Empire took a gigantic 
stride in this direction ; for in that year the 
Reichstag voted a Military Law which increased 
the armed forces of the Kaiser, not merely from 
the numerical point of view, but also from that 

3 



34 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of the technical material of war. During the 
seven years that followed the efforts of Germany 
in the direction of preparing for war became 
continually more and more intensive, and France 
was left far behind in the matter of military 
expenditure. 

During these seven years Germany expended 
£300,000,000 on her military forces, while 
France spent only £236,000,000. This repre- 
sents a surplus of £64,000,000 for the period 
of seven years, or more than £9,000,000 annu- 
ally. The use which Prussian militarism has 
made of its supremacy is well known. By 
exploiting the weakness of Russia the Kaiser's 
Government has on several occasions, since the 
year 1904, systematically provoked France. The 
culminating point of this provocation was the 
famous coup d'Agadlr of 191 1, when the Kaiser 
threw into the scales of a diplomatic con- 
versation the weight of a warship, and, by 
means of this cunning stroke of blackmail, 
obtained, without a shot being fired, a consider- 
able portion of the French possessions in the 
Congo. 

In speaking thus of the systematic provoca- 
tion practised by Germany, I do not in the least 
intend to represent France as an inoffensive 
white lamb devoured by a ferocious wolf. 
Modern France is a country like other capitalist 
nations— an armed nation, a nation with a colonial 



BEFORE THE WAR 35 

policy, etc. But in the social and economic 
structure of France there are characteristics which 
render her more pacific and, if I may so express 
myself, more defensive than aggressive Germany. 
France is a country of great financiers on the 
one hand, and of small hoarders on the other. It 
is a country of large and small investors. But 
the investor, the stock-holder, is the most pacific 
type of the modern bourgeois ; which is easily 
comprehensible, for in case of armed conflict the 
investor is the worst sufferer, by reason of the 
fall of securities of all descriptions. The pre- 
dominance of the investor in the bourgeois society 
of France explains the fact that in spite of the 
conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by the Germans — 
in spite of "the wound in her side which France," 
to quote M. Viviani, " has for half a century 
silently endured " — the idea of a war against 
Germany was not really attractive to the French 
mind. The Germans were perfectly well aware 
of this fact. In 1909 the well-known German 
professor and patriot, Herr Delbriick, published 
an article ' in which he demonstrated that it was 
beyond a doubt that the majority of the French 
people did not desire war with Germany, and 
that the idea of la revanche had lost a great 
measure of its power. France is the banker of 
Europe, says Professor Delbriick, and a European 
war might result in the stoppage of the payments 
^ Preussische Jahrbiic/ier, January 1909, vol. 134. 



36 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of interest on her loans, which would be a terrible 
blow to the nation. 

The majority of the bourgeois democrats of 
France were not only opposed to an aggressive 
policy towards Germany, but were even inclined 
to entertain the idea of a Franco -German entente. 
This pacific tendency was supported also by the 
Socialist workers of France, who did their utmost 
to avert the melancholy possibility of an armed 
conflict between their country and Germany, and 
who, as a class, offered the life of that noble 
tribune of the French people, Jean Jaures, as a 
tragic proof of their sincere devotion to the 
propaganda of peace. 

Finally, it is easy to realize that a republican 
State is in general far less adapted to an offensive 
and warlike policy than an absolute or semi- 
absolute monarchy. At all events, M. Marcel 
Sembat, a notable Socialist, and a member of the 
Ministry of National Defence, asserts in cate- 
gorical fashion, in a volume published by him 
shortly before the war, and which created a con- 
siderable sensation, that there is an almost natural 
opposition between the republican ideal and 
offensive warfare. 

" The militarist republic, the Nationalist re- 
public, the warlike republic — we have here not 
a doctrine but a blunder," he writes. » 

' Marcel Sembat, Faites un Roi, sinon ^aites la Paix, Paris, 
1914. 



BEFORE THE WAR 37 

This is not to say that a democratic repubhc 
is incapable of defending itself— the experience 
of the First Republic revealed its defensive capa- 
cities — but the bureaucratic and democratic system 
is undoubtedly less adapted to a policy of aggres- 
sion and international brigandage than an auto- 
cratic and absolutist system. And this is merely 
another argument in favour of democracy. 

The perpetual peril of an armed conflict with 
Germany forced France to seek the surest pos- 
sible of guarantees against this peril. Many 
politicians saw such a guarantee in a Franco- 
German entente. The conferences of Members 
of Parliament held at Basle and Berne were the 
praiseworthy achievement of these men. But 
these very conferences proved that although in 
France the majority of the true democrats sin- 
cerely desired peace and an understanding with 
Germany, public opinion in the latter country was 
not so pacific, and the attitude of the German 
members in respect of their French colleagues 
was somewhat reserved. This explains why the 
French democracy could not risk a radical change 
of foreign policy, or withdraw its diplomatic and 
military contract with Russia. This contract, 
in spite of all its weak and obscure points, 
reptresented, for France, a certain guarantee in 
the event of German aggression. Even those 
Frenchmen who were opposed on principle to 
the alliance with Russia were obliged to accept 



38 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

it in practice, at all events pending the realiza- 
tion of a Franco -German entente. This contra- 
diction between the theoretical negation of the 
Russian alliance and its practical acceptation is 
mentioned, we shall find, in the same work of 
M. Sembat's of which we have spoken. 

"Russia? Russia is of no use to us," writes 
M. Sembat, "and we are no manner of use to 
Russia, save to supply her with money. The 
three weeks of mobilization and the counter- 
attack of Austro -Hungary, favoured by the Polish 
revolt, forbid us to count on her at the beginning 
of the war." ' 

But a few pages farther on M. Sembat says : 
" The Russian alliance has incontestably amelio- 
rated, to the profit of France . . . the ratio of 
the [French and German] military forces."- 

So, with considerable reserve, and almost 
against its will, the French democracy was 
obliged to accept, for the time being, the con- 
tinuation of the policy of the Franco - Russian 
alliance, as a feeble yet necessary guarantee 
against a German invasion. 

II 

The German peril also gave rise to the Anglo- 
French alliance, the basis of which was laid down 
by the Convention concluded in 1904— that is, at 

' Marcel Sembat, Faites im Roi, sinon faites la Faix, Paris, 
1914. ^ Ibid. 



BEFORE THE WAR 39 

a time when the Russian forces were absorbed 
by the conflict with Japan, so that Germany had 
her hands free on her eastern frontier. The de- 
fensive character of the Anglo-French aUiance 
is, I consider, beyond all doubt. It was defensive 
at its birth, and it was still defensive several 
months before the outbreak of the war, as we 
cannot fail to see from the correspondence 
between Sir Edward Grey and the French 
Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, in 
November 191 2, 

" If either Government," wrote Sir Edward 
Grey, " has serious reasons for fearing an un- 
provoked attack on the part of a third Power, 
or any other event which should jeopardize the 
general peace, that Government should immedi- 
ately consult with the other, to determine whether 
they should not take concerted action in order 
to prevent aggression and to maintain peace." 

In reply to this letter, M. Cambon wrote : " I 
am authorized to declare to you that in the event 
of one of our two Governments having grave 
reason to apprehend either the aggression of a 
third Power or any event threatening to the 
general peace, that Government would imme- 
diately consult with the other as to whether the 
two Governments should take concerted action 
with a view to preventing aggression or pre- 
serving peace." ' 

» See the Livre Jamie of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Paris, 19 14. 



40 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

It follows from these documents, which re- 
mained secret until the declaration of war, and 
were published by M. Viviani only during the 
session of the French Parliament of the 4th of 
August, 19 1 4, that the Anglo-French alliance 
was formed by the two contracting Powers, not 
with a view to " hemming in Germany," as the 
latter believed (perhaps quite sincerely), but in 
order to obtain a mutual guarantee against 
Kaiserism. 

For England such a guarantee was even more 
necessary than for France, because Germany 
regarded England as her principal rival. " Our 
future is on the sea," declared Wilhelm II at 
Stettin in his speech of the 23rd September, i 890. 
Hence his preoccupation concerning the augmen- 
tation of the German Navy. A French writer who 
has taken it upon himself to comment upon the 
thoughts expressed by the German Emperor on 
this subject states that " in considering the 
Emperor Wilhelm's ideas relating to the navy one 
must distinguish between two points of view : one 
commercial, the other military. In the first place, 
the Emperor has a very clear conception of the 
great part which sea power plays in the com- 
mercial and industrial developiment of a people. 
It is by sea that one sets forth to conquer the 
markets of the world ; hence the necessity of a 
great mercantile marine, and the importance of 
the old Hansa Towns, Bremen, Hamburg, 



BEFORE THE WAR 41 

Liibeck, and Stettin, and the capital part 
played by the great steamship companies. But 
secondly, those various parts of the globe in which 
the German Empire gains a footing by means of 
its trade are vulnerable points. ... Its fresh 
triumphs, its pacific conquests, excite jealousy, 
create inevitable rivalry, and necessarily provoke 
conflicts. . . . Only one arm will enable a 
country to triumph in struggles of this nature— 
namely, a powerful battle-fleet." ' 

But both forms of German expansion by sea — 
commercial expansion and naval and military 
expansion— result in placing her in competition 
with England. From the commercial point of 
view this competition may be expressed in the 
following figures : 

Exports. In 1907. In 1913. 

Germany ... ^345,000,000 ... ^505,000,000 

England ... ^435,000,000 ... ^535,000,000 

France ... ;j^225, 000,000 ... ^275,000,000 

United States... ^405,000,000 ... ;!^525,ooo,ooo 

Although England still maintains her supre- 
macy in absolute figures, the German exports 
are increasing much more rapidly relatively 
speaking. It is true that the German exports 
are artificially stimulated by means of premiums 
paid by the State to the exporters. Be that as 
it may, the prevailing idea of the German Govern- 
ment is to ensure that German capitalism shall 

^ Jules Arren, Guillaunie II, Ce qu'il dit, ce quHl pense, Paris, 
1 9 II, pp. 159-60. 



42 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

have its "place in the sun," But where is this 
place to be found ? Germany can do no other 
than wrest it away from her neighbours. This 
was done in 191 1, when a large slice of the 
French Congo was obtained for nothing. But 
much more might be obtained from England. The 
attempt must be made. But first of all England's 
naval supremacy must be wrested from her. And 
here Germany sets herself feverishly to build 
battleships and cruisers. England is forced to 
note this move and reply to it, and the Anglo- 
German commercial rivalry becomes a military 
rivalry. And, as I have already stated in my 
book " Modern Russia," " this rivalry appears 
to be the axis of European world-politics." 

The present war has absolutely confirmed this 
idea. The Germans themselves say that England 
is their principal adversary. In 1908 the 
German patriot Professor Delbriick wrote that 
the lesser questions of international politics are 
not solved in and by themselves, but in respect 
of greater antagonisms, and that the Austro- 
Serbian disputes must be adjudged, in the long 
run, in the light of the Anglo-German an- 
tagonism. And now, since the declaration of 
war, another well - known German publicist, 
Maximilian Harden, writes in Zukanft (Octo- 
ber 17, 19 1 4) that the annexation of Belgium 
by Germany is necessary so that she may crush 
England. " Is it not there [in Belgium] that 



BEFORE THE WAR 43 

all German hearts to-day are longing, impetu- 
ously, and in a spirit at times too insulting, for 
a victory over England ? " England is even more 
bitterly hated by the German Jingoes than is 
Russia. In December, 19 14, a Social-Demo- 
cratic ( ! ) German journal admitted, with un- 
heard-of cynicism : " The conflict with Tsarism is 
popular, but what was the meaning of the ancient 
battle-cry ? Never that we were to make war 
with the purely ideological and political object 
of defeating Tsarism. . . . Our political enemy 
is our economic enemy— England." 

Herr Lenard, Professor of Physics in the Uni- 
versity of Heidelberg, delivers himself as follows, 
in a pamphlet published some two or three months 
after the declaration of war : — 

" Away with all considerations relating to what 
is termed English culture. The principal nest, 
the chief academy of all hypocrisy on the banks 
of the Thames, must be demolished to its foun- 
dations, if we would obtain a favourable result." 

Even the German poets expend their lyrical 

fire in hatred of England. The most popular of 

the modern poets in Germany is Ernst Lissauer. 

Why? Because he wrote the " Song of Hatred of 

England." 

Our hatred we will ne'er abate, 
Who know the one and only hate : 
We love as one, we hate as one. 
We have one foe, and one alone- 
England ! 



44 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

In this connection a German critic, speaking 
of the lyric poetry to which the present war has 
given birth, has written : " It is worthy of remark 
that the warHke poetry of Germany knows 
nothing of national hatred of France and Russia. 
France and Russia are adversaries, while Eng- 
land is the enemy.'' 

The aggressive and threatening attitude of 
Germany during the last few years has pushed 
England and France alike toward an understand- 
ing with Russia. But my English readers are 
well aware that the idea of this understanding was 
much debated, and even opposed, by the demo- 
cratic elements in England, which were shocked 
by the concubinage of their free country with 
the despotism of the Tsars. In Russia, too, the 
understanding with England has not everywhere 
been welcomed. The Conservatives and the 
parties of the Right in particular pronounced 
themselves resolutely as against the entente. 

Remember, for instance, the sentiments ex- 
pressed in respect of England by the Russian 
reactionaries during the visit of the French 
Premier to Petersburg, in the summer of 19 12. 
Prince Meschersky, the editor of the ultra-Con- 
servative Grazhdanin, wrote that " close friend- 
ship between Russia and Germany is a more 
advantageous and lasting blessing for France 
than dependence on ever capricious, ever selfish, 
and ever insincere England." And the organ of 



BEFORE THE WAR 45 

the " Black Bands," Zemschina, spoke as follows : 
" In short, England wants to egg us on, and to 
weaken Germany through us, though we may 
have to undergo another war like that of 1 8 1 2 
as a result. But Heaven preserve us from the 
privilege ! It is time for us to give up playing 
the part of the saviours of Europe, and especi- 
ally of England." And M. Menshikov declared, 
in the Novoe Vremya : " I do not see the advan- 
tage to the French and ourselves to be obtained 
by averting war between England and Germany. 
On the contrary, such a war could only be bene- 
ficial both to France and to ourselves. With the 
present preponderance of England's Navy and 
the difficulty of a large descent on her shores, 
such a war is likely to end in the destruction of 
the whole German and half the English Navy. 
Neither France nor Russia would have much 
reason to grieve on that account." And another 
journal— an organ of the " True Russians," the 
Russkoe Znamia, was even more candid in its 
expressions : " Every misfortune suffered by 
England, every weakening of her power, only 
causes joy to Russia ( ! ?) and to pull her chest- 
nuts out of the fire for her is unworthy of the 
Russian people." ' 

' I quote from Darkest J??issm (the issue for the 21st of 
August, 191 2). As for the antipathy of the Russian reactionaries 
for France, it is so well known that I need not enlarge upon 
it here. 



46 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

The Russian Liberals, on the contrary, 
favoured an entente with England. Generally 
speaking, the idea of an Anglo -Franco -Russian 
alliance is supported in Russia by the Liberal 
and Democratic bourgeoisie, while the Right 
opposes to this the ideal of a " Holy Alliance " 
of the three monarchies— the Romanoff, Hapsburg 
and Hohenzollern. But, happily, perhaps, for 
the progress and the democracy of Europe, this 
alliance could not be realized, and the Austro- 
German alliance, which has caused so much 
misery to humanity, was not transformed into 
the Austro-Russo-German alliance, which would 
have caused even more, and would hav^e been far 
more dangerous to Europe. 



CHAPTER III 

I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League. — II. The Turco- 
German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her 
conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- 
stantinople and the Dardanelles. 

I 

The tragic and awful symphony of the world- 
war, now being executed by the formidable 
orchestra of millions of rifles and thousands of 
cannon, had for its prelude the Balkan War, or 
rather the two wars in the Balkans. 

The economic causes of the first Balkan War 
are well known. The Christian nations of the 
Balkans, whose development toward the north 
and west was cut short by the proximity of the 
great European Powers, had only one object : 
to procure outlets on the south and south-east 
of the Balkan Peninsula, through provinces occu- 
pied by the Turks. Among the democratic 
elements of the Balkan States there were those 
who proposed to solve the problem, not by the 
sanguinary means of a war against Turkey, but 
by the creation of a " Republican Federation of 



48 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the peoples of the Balkans and the Near East/' 
which would have comprised Greece, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey, both European 
and Asiatic. 

Two consecutive conferences convoked by all 
the Socialist parties of the Balkans declared 
themseWes of this opinion. But this noble dream, 
whose realization would have assured the Balkan 
States against a war among themselves on the 
one hand and the aggression of Austria or Russia 
on the other, was not realized, because of the 
egoism of the Governments of the Balkan States 
and the brutal and erroneous policy of the Young 
Turks. The manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey 
and the Balkan States, published at the end of 
the year 1 9 1 2, gives the following description of 
this policy : — 

"If we emphasize the grave responsibility of 
the Balkan States in the . . . war, as well as 
in the past, when they hindered the internal trans- 
formation of Turkey — if we accuse European 
diplomacy, which has never desired serious re- 
forms in Turkey, of duplicity — we do not in any 
way wish to belittle the responsibility of the 
Turkish Governments. We denounce them to the 
civilized world, to the people of the Empire, and 
particularly to the Mohammedan masses, without 
whose help they would not have been able to 
uphold their domination. We reproach the 
Turkish regime with the complete absence of real 



BEFORE THE WAR 49 

liberty and equality for the nations— an absolute 
lack of security and of any guarantee of the life or 
the rights and property of the citizens— the non- 
existence of justice and of a well -organized and 
impartial administration. It has upheld a system 
of the most harassing taxation. It has turned 
a deaf ear to all demands of reform that might 
benefit Mohammedan and other peasants and 
workers. It has supported only its feudal sub- 
jects or nomadic tribes armed against the de- 
fenceless agriculturists. By their proverbial 
inertia the Turkish Governments have done 
nothing but provoke and maintain poverty, ignor- 
ance, emigration and brigandage, and massacres 
without number in Anatolia and Rumelia— in a 
word, anarchy, which serves to-day as a pretext 
for intervention and for war. 

" The hope that the new regime would put an 
end to the past by inaugurating a new policy 
has been disappointed. The successive ' Young 
Turk ' Governments have not only continued the 
errors of the past ; they have used the authority 
and the prestige of an apparent parliamentary 
system in order to apply a policy of denationali- 
zation and oppression, together with an exces- 
sive bureaucratic centralization, which has ignored 
the rights of nationalities and the demands of the 
working classes. The members of the new 
regime have in some respects even outdone those 
of the old, which had raised the systematic 

4 



50 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

assassination of political opponents to the height 
of a governmental policy." ' 

There is nothing surprising in the fact that 
the Governments of four Balkan States desired, 
and were able, profiting by the crimes and errors 
of the Turkish Government, to form a military 
league against the latter and to declare war upon 
it. Neither is it surprising that the Russian 
Government lent its aid to the enterprise, per- 
ceiving in it an efficacious means of sapping the 
power of Turkey and opposing to Austria the 
coalized forces of the Balkan League. But if 
Russia assisted in the creation of the Balkan 
League and the first Balkan War, Austria in her 
turn contributed toward the dissolution of this 
League, and to the declaration of the second 
Balkan War, by pushing Bulgaria into a conflict 
with Greece and Serbia, which enabled Turkey 
to recapture Adrianople, and in some degree to 
recoup herself for her losses. The rapid disso- 
lution of the Balkan League was a piece of very 
successful policy on the part of Austria, who 
thenceforward no longer had to face a coalitic 
of four Balkan States, but was able profitab;^ 
to exploit the disagreements created between' 
Bulgaria and her recent allies. 

' S,ee the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Socialists 
of Turkey and the Balkans. To the Working People of the 
Balkans and Asia Minor. To the Labour International. To 
Public Opinion." 1912. 



BEFORE THE WAR 51 



II 



Another factor greatly making for the success 
of the Austro -German policy was the enormous 
and exclusive influence of Germany in Turkey. 
The stages by which this influence was evolved 
are well known. The point of departure was the 
year 1895, when all Europe was thrilled by the 
massacres of the Armenians in Turkey, and when 
the Government of Wilhelm II, alone among the 
Governments of Europe, took the part of Turkey, 
and the German Emperor came forward for the 
first time as the supporter of the old Turkish 
regime. This service was well paid by Turkey, 
who made several important concessions to Ger- 
man capital. 

The same story was repeated in 1905, in con- 
nection with the Macedonian question, when 
Germany refused to take part in a naval demon- 
stration against Turkey, which was designed to 
put pressure on the Sultan's Government in order 
to force it to put into effect the reforms promised 
to Macedonia. Jean Jaures wrote at the time that 
the German Emperor wished to spare the Sultan, 
firstly, because he wished Germany's assistance 
to Turkey to be paid for by various privileges 
afforded to German capital, and secondly, because 
the Sultan was one of the representatives of the 
monarchical idea and of absolute power in 



52 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Europe.' The quays of Constantinople, exploited 
by German concessionaires, the railways of 
Turkey in Asia, built and exploited by German 
capital, together with other concessions and com- 
mercial or undustrial undertakings — ^such was the 
payment in kind which the Germans received at 
the price of the innocent and unavenged blood 
of Armenia and Macedonia. The concession to 
build the Bagdad Railway marked the climax of 
German influence in Turkey, for it opened wide 
the door for German emigration into Asia Minor. 
The activities of Marshal Von der Goltz Pasha 
marked the climax of her political and military 
penetration of Turkey. 

The abolition of the Old Turk regime and the 
beginning of the Young Turk era, which made 
practically no change in the internal life of 
Turkey, left its foreign policy also unchanged : 
German influence continued to be predominant. 
The dispatch of a military Mission, with General 
Liman von Sanders at its head, secured the 
Turkish Army as a docile weapon in German 
hands. Germany regarded Turkey as her 
" private game-preserve," and on the 1 6th of 
January, 1 9 1 3, tTie German Ambassador in Con- 
stantinople, Baron von Wagenheim, publicly de- 
livered a speech threatening Russia, in which he 
said : " Germany will never allow Russia to exert 
pressure on Turkey. Neither now nor in the 
' See his article in LHumanitc, November 27, 1905. 



BEFORE THE WAR 53 

future shall we permit any one to lay hands on 
Anatolia." ' As for the Germans themselves, 
they have laid their hands, not only on Anatolia 
but on many other Turkish provinces. 

Posing as the champion of Turkish indepen- 
dence, Germany in reality deprived the country 
of any independence whatever. And when the 
hour struck Germany cast Turkey to the flames 
without even asking her consent or what was her 
will. For it is a well-established fact that the 
German mercenaries in the service of the Turkish 
Government began hostilities against the non- 
fortified towns of Russia without even warning 
the Turkish Government, which found itself 
confronted by the accomplished fact, and had 
not sufficient courage to refuse to follow down 
the path by which the German officers were 
dragging it. 

Ill 

Before effecting the penetration of the Balkans, 
Germany pushed Austria thither. This is already 
an old story. Having excluded Austria from 
the Kederation of the Germanic States, having 
closed all outlets toward the north, the Prussian 
monarchy pointed out the way to the south, 
toward Salonica and other ports of the Balkans. 

' There was a question of reforms in Armenia. The speech 
was delivered by Herr von Wagenheim at the German Teuton ia 
Club, in Constantinople. 



/ 



54 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT V/AR 

According to the ideas of the German Imperial- 
ists, the march of Austria toward the south, and 
her penetration of the Balkans, was to be the 
prelude to the complete and final triumph of 
German domination over the Balkan Peninsula. 
But in her penetration of the Balkans Austria 
encountered the resistance of the Slav States in 
general, and of the Serbs in particular. The 
legitimate nature of this resistance was not denied 
even by certain elements of Austrian society. For 
instance, the Social-Democratic party (German) 
in Austria, in its manifesto of the i 8th of October, 
191 2, accusing both Italy and Russia of "pre- 
paring for war," at the same time declared : — 

" Austria-Hungary, placed between Russia and 
Italy, is guilty in a high degree. This Empire, 
incapable of relieving its people, suffering the 
most terrible want during the rise in the price of 
bread, powerless to stop civil war among its own 
peoples, governing Hungary with the brutal 
violence of a Tisza and a Lucacs, burdening 
Croatian Slavonia with the dictatorship of Cuvaj, 
failing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to redeem the 
promise made thirty-four years ago to emancipate 
the Christian peasants from Turkish feudal 
serfdom—this Empire now poses, as if it had not 
enough to do in its own country, as judge and 
arbitrator over the distant Balkan States. 

" The Austrian people have only one interest 
in the Balkans : the peaceful exchange of 



BEFORE THE WAR 55 

merchandise with the Balkan peoples. Our 
manufacturers wish to sell their products in 
Serbia and Bulgaria. In exchange we want from 
the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry their cattle 
and their cereals. The fact that this exchange 
of products has been made onerous, and has for 
many years been obstructed, is due to no fault 
of the Serbians or the Bulgarians. It is the fault 
of the agrarian party of Austria-Hungary. In 
order to raise the price of cattle throughout 
Austria-Hungary by avoiding foreign competi- 
tion, the rich agrarians caused our frontiers to be 
closed to Serbian and Bulgarian cattle. If we do 
not buy cattle in the agricultural countries of the 
Balkans, these countries will naturally eliminate 
our products from their markets. This is the 
obstacle to our commerce in the Balkans. But 
to remove this obstacle it is not necessary to send 
our soldiers to the frontier. The barrier will 
fall if we break the power of the agrarian party 
in Austria-Hungary, and if we pull down the 
custom-houses. 

" We do not want war against Serbia, we want 
war against the famine policy of our agrarians. 
That is the Balkan policy we need. . . . Neither 
do we want to spill the blood of our soldiers in 
order to prop up the rotten feudalism of Turkey, 
and assure it of the subserviency of the Slav 
populations. And little Serbia, which has no 
more inhabitants than the city of Vienna, will 



/ 

56 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

certainly not become a danger to Austria by 
taking a few miserable villages ! . . . Austria - 
Hungary has committed enough crimes against 
the poor southern Slav populations. Only by 
military dictatorship will she be able to govern 
the Slavs of the south, who are under her 
domination. By her economic and agrarian 
policy she has reduced the peasants of Serbia 
to despair. She would even drive the vSlavs 
of the south into the arms of Russian Tsarism, 
were she to shed Serbian blood at this junc- 
ture in order to uphold the Turkish suzerainty 
over a Serbian peasantry ; were she to pre- 
vent the Serbian peasants, whose products she 
will not accept, from finding access to other 
markets. Precisely because we are the enemies 
of Russian Tsarism, whose expansion represents 
the greatest danger to European civilization, we 
ask Austria-Hungary not to take the aggressive 
by opposing the interests of the southern 
Slavs." I 

Unhappily the Austro - Hungarian agrarians 
were stronger than the pacifist elements of their 
country. Directly the Balkan League was dis- 
solved the Austrian Government began to seek 
a pretext to strangle Serbia, and to clear a road 
to the ports in the south and south-west of the 
Balkan Peninsula, across the political and mili- 

^ See the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Social- 
Democratic Party of Austria," October 191 2. 



BEFORE THE WAR 57 

tary ruin of the Serb State. Such a plan was 
bound to involve Austria-Hungary in a conflict 
w^ith Russia, above all as Germany desired that 
conflict even more than did Austria herself. 

As we shall presently see, Russia's policy 
toward the xA.ustro -German alliance was in no 
manner provocative. On the contrary, it was a 
rather weak and amiable policy. But Russia, 
despite her weakness and the sympathies of her 
ruling classes for their German colleagues, could 
not remain completely impassive before Austria's 
attempt to strangle Serbia. The German patriot 
and professor Herr Delbriick wrote in 1909 that 
" Italy and Russia could not permit the continual 
penetration by Austria of the Balkan Peninsula," 
and the Serbian people " could not remain 
tranquil while enclosed on two sides by Austro- 
Hungary and, having no outlet to the sea, it 
saw before it the inevitable prospect of fail- 
ing into a complete dependence upon that 
Power." I 

To realize plainly what might be the result to 
Russia of the German and Austrian domination of 
the Balkans, we must once more remember that 
the greater part of Russia's exports of grain 
passes by way of the Black Sea and the 
Dardanelles. On this export trade depends, not 
only the agricultural economy of Russia but also 
the Budget of the State. If Turkish rule on 
^ See Preussische Jahrbiicher^ January, 1909, vol. 134. 



58 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the banks of the Bosphorus is not always agree- 
able to Russia, a German and Austrian domina- 
tion of a military character would be extremely 
dangerous to her, and not to Russia alone, but 
to Italy, France, and England. As for Russia 
herself, her economic and political situation on 
the shores of the Black Sea might become abso- 
lutely insupportable and untenable, in the event 
of the Balkans and Constantinople being con- 
quered by Germany and Austria. The Baltic is 
already closed by a powerful German fleet. If 
the Black Sea were closed also Russia would 
find herself in a cul-de-sac and would become 
the economic and political vassal of the Austro- 
German bloc. 



CHAPTER IV 

I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The 
commercial exchange between these two countries. The 
success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated 
by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs 
Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The 
necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. 
Why was not the Russo-German economic entente realized ? 

I 

In addition to the general political questions 
which divide Germany and Russia, there are also 
certain special problems which result in the oppo- 
sition of the two nations. 

The economic relations between Russia and 
Germany were markedly intensive and well de- 
veloped before the war. To characterize these, 
it will suffice to say that according to the date 
communicated to the First Russian Export Con- 
gress (which met at Kiev in the early part of 
1914), 50 per cent, of the total Russian imports 
come from Germany. Germany and Russia, 
therefore mutually satisfy the half of their several 
economic needs and their demands on external 
markets. In 1901 Germany imported from 

Russia 1 8 7' 6 million roubles worth of merchan- 

59 



60 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

dise, while Russia took from Germany goods to 
the value of 216-9 million roubles. In the same 
year England imported from Russia goods to the 
value of 1 45' 5 million roubles, and exported to 
Russia goods to the value of 127-1 million 
roubles. In 1909 the German goods imported 
into Russia amounted to 363-3 million roubles, 
and the Russian export to Germany 387-1 
millions, while for England the corresponding 
figures were 127-9 ^^^ 228*9 million roubles. 
As for the other European countries, their com- 
mercial exchange with Russia is of little value 
compared with the German trade.' 

But the most important factor in this problem 
is the qualitative aspect of the commercial rela- 
tions between Germany and Russia. Many 
Russian economists assert that, thanks to the 
fiscal and commercial policy of Germany, Russia 
is economically dependent on the former country. 
This opinion is expressed, not only by those 
economists who support the interests of the great 
capitalists but also by the democratic and inde- 
pendent economists, whose view -point is that of 
the great masses of the people. For instance, 
one of the most notable students of Russian 
economics, M. Oganovsky, a representative of 
the " populist " (narodnik) movement, states that 
the world does not contain any great independent 

' The figures are cited from the Annual of the journal Aefc^ 
for the year 191 2, 



BEFORE THE WAR 61 

Power which could possibly find itself in the 
position of the colony of another Power, and that 
Russia alone constitutes an exception to this 
rule. I 

" Russia was gradually becoming more and 
more of a German colony— in this sense notably, 
that the Russian people were becoming an object 
of exploitation by the upper classes of the German 
people. In 1904, profiting by our embarrassing 
situation, the German Government managed, at 
the moment of concluding the Customs Treaty 
with Russia, to assure itself of immense advan- 
tages, which cost our agricultural producers over 
a thousand million roubles. The extremely high 
customs duties which were imposed on Russian 
agricultural products imported into Germany by 
the treaty of 1904 protected the German Junkers 
from the competition of the Russian wheat - 
growers, and forced the latter to lower the price 
of their products in order to sell them in the 
German market. As for the compensation re- 
ceived by Russia in the form of the increase of 
the customs duties on the products of German 
industry, this compensation, according to the 
report of the Russian Council of State, ' could 
not be otherwise than burdensome to the rural 
economy, which consumed foreign articles (such 
as agricultural machinery, etc.), as well as to 

' "One of the Causes of the War," an article in the Yejeme- 
statchny Journal, Petrograd, October 1914. 



62 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Russian industry, which needs articles of foreign 
production for its technical equipment.' " ' 

We may judge how far the commercial treaty 
of 1904 facilitated the economic conquest of 
Russia by Germany by the following fact : Ger- 
many exported to Russia, an agricultural country 
par excellence, not only industrial products but 
a large quantity of corn. In 1902 Germany ex- 
ported to Russia only 106,000 cwt. of rye; in 
1905 (a year after the conclusion of the Customs 
Treaty of 1904) the amount had risen to 
603,000 cwt., and in 191 1 to 2,105,000 cwt. 

" During the last few years the importation of 
German rye has attained figures more or less re- 
markable, and it is said that the principal cause 
of this phenomenon is the fiscal policy of 
Germany during the last twenty years." ^ 

During the period 1907- 11 the quantity of 
rye imported from Germany into Russia amounted 
to some I 5 per cent, of the total exports of rye 
from Russia to foreign countries. During the 
same period Germany exported to Russia more 
than 16 per cent, of her total export of rye. 

And here I must remark that the success of 
German competition was facilitated, not only by 
the mistaken Customs Treaty but also by the 

' Cited from the article by M. Finn-Yenotaevsky, " The 
Causes of the World War," in the review SovrenierDiy Mir^ Petro- 
grad, October 1914. 

^ M. L. Litochenko, "German Rye in the Russian Market," 
an article in the review Viestnik F<?2;r<7/_y, Petersburg, January 19 13. 



BEFORE THE WAR 63 

errors of the domestic policy of the Russian auto- 
cracy, and above all by an absurd anti-Semitism. 
In 1 9 1 3 I published, in articles appearing in the 
English weekly journal Darkest Russia, a 
whole series of facts which demonstrate only too 
clearly the complete absurdity of this policy from 
the standpoint of national economy. I can but 
repeat what I said in these articles : — 

" If, for instance, we turn to the position of 
affairs in the commercial ports on the Baltic, we 
shall find here, too, the ruinous traces of the 
Government's anti-Semitic policy. We may take 
as an example Libau, which also plays an im- 
portant part in Russian trade. Through Libau 
corn, timber, etc., are exported, and herrings and 
other articles imported. During the last few 
years it has been noticed that Libau has been 
falling behind the German port of Konigsberg 
in the progressive development of its trade, and 
that the German port has been growing more 
and more successful in its competition with the 
Russian. At the beginning of 191 1 the com- 
mittee of the Libau Exchange investigated the 
causes of this phenomenon, and came to the con- 
clusion that the chief cause of the success of 
Konigsberg and of the backwardness of Libau 
was the restriction of Jewish rights in the latter. 
If the herring trade is passing from Libau to 
Konigsberg, it is because at Konigsberg the 
Russian Jews, who act as middlemen between 



64 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the importer and the consumer, are allowed free- 
dom of residence and of trade, and may possess 
warehouses, and so on, whereas at Libau, which 
is outside the Jewish Pale of Settlement, the Jews 
are deprived of these privileges, and therefore 
prefer to carry on their trade at Konigsberg. 
In the same way other branches of trade, such 
as the export of timber, suffer because the Jews, 
who are the chief middlemen, are not permitted 
freely to perform all those operations which are 
necessary for selling and delivering the exported 
goods. The Retch, in recording this statement, 
added at the time that ' the revival of trade in 
the other neighbouring German towns, such as 
Memel, Tilsit, etc., is also due to the emigration 
of Russian Jews who had no right to reside in 
their own country outside the Rale of Settlement. 
In Prussia the Jews are allowed to move from 
place to place, and to trade with freedom. It 
is a fact that Russian Jews are found at the head 
of all the big export firms.' Such are the fruits 
of the anti-Semitic policy, which, according to 
its inspirers and agents, seeks to benefit 
' national ' interests. The Government declares 
that it restricts the activity of the Jewish mer- 
chants with the object of handicapping them in 
the competition with Russian merchants, and with 
a view to regenerating ' national ' trade. But 
in reality the persecution of the Jews has merely 
promoted the decay of Russian centres of foreign 



BEFORE THE WAR 65 

trade and the prosperity of German towns at 
their expense."' 

II 

The term of the commercial treaty concluded in 
1904 was to have expired at the end of 191 5. 
The problem of the renewal of this treaty was 
already being discussed many months before the 
war, and this discussion contributed not a little 
to the cooling of the relations between the two 
neighbouring coimtries. This is noted as far 
back as the beginning of 1 9 1 4 by the Parisian 
review La Courrier Europeen, which states, in 
this connection, that " the approaching expira- 
tion of the Russo-German commercial treaty is 
the occasion of much bluff, menace, arid compro- 
mise." To this observation I replied in one of 
my articles which appeared in the English press 
that "if there is a certain amount of 'bluff' in 
the controversy between the journalists of the 
two nations, it must not be forgotten that the 
economic interests of the directing parties are 
at the bottom of this unfriendly ' discussion ' be- 
tween the Russian and German Nationalists. 
' We are aware,' says the Lokal-Anzelg^r of 
Berlin, ' how passionately the Russians are pre- 
paring for the discussion of the renewal of the 
treaty. . . . They are searching for weapons to 

^ Darkest Russia^ August 13, 19 13, "The Economics of Anti- 
Semitism." 

5 



66 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

use against the German negotiators.' To this the 
Den of Petersburg repUes : ' The Germans are 
blackmailing us in order to frighten us and to 
secure all the advantages of the new commercial 
treaty.' The very fact that material and economic 
interests are involved in the Russo-German con- 
flict renders it most dangerous to the peace of 
Europe ; for if men to - day no longer go 
crusading for religious matters^, they are ready 
enough to wage war for the sake of increasing 
their export of wheat, or pigs, or mineral 
produce." ' 

What was the attitude of the various ele- 
ments of Russian society in respect of this 
serious problem of the economic relations 
with Germany and the renewal of the treaty 
of 1904? 

The simplest attitude was that of the Govern- 
ment. From the point of view of the Russian 
bureaucracy a customs tariff ought to be erected 
in such a fashion as to yield large revenues for 
the State Treasury. Eiscal necessities were more 
than satisfied by the Protectionism extant in 
Russia. In 1901 the customs duties yielded the 
Russian Treasury 197 million roubles; in 1904, 
2285 million; in 1908, 278'5 million; and in 
191 2, 326 million. 

In Russia, as a rule, indirect taxation is far 

' See my article " Russia's Tariff Wall " in Darkest Russia, 
March 15, 1Q14. 



BEFORE THE WAR 67 

more highly developed than direct taxation. High 
customs duties are perfectly consistent with the 
financial system of Russia ; in 1904 all the direct 
taxes to^'ether yielded only 135 million roubles, 
while the customs dues alone poured 228 millions 
into the treasury. In 19 14, according to the 
budgetary estimates, the direct taxes should have 
yielded 264 millions, and the customs due 350 
millions. In 1904 the customs dues formed only 
one-ninth of the total of the indirect taxes, but 
in 1 9 1 4, according to the estimates, they would 
have formed one-sixth part. The customs dues, 
therefore, are a precious morsel in the eyes of 
the high Russian bureaucracy, and the latter are 
well content with them. 

Protectionism is also a gratifying policy to 
certain groups of large industrial capitalists. 
High import duties, by eliminating foreign com- 
petition, and artificially disturbing the equilibrium 
between supply and demand, allow them to in- 
crease the prices of their goods and to monopolize 
the home market for their own selfish profit. 
Such monopolization is all the easier because in 
many cases the customs duties which are imposed 
on articles imported into Russia are so high that 
they result, not merely in the " protection " of 
the national industries but in the prohibition of 
foreign imports. Often the duties imposed are 
greater than the value of the object taxed ; for 
example, a pood of cast-iron costs 40 to 42 



68 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

kopecks in Russia, and the import duty on cast- 
iron is 45 kopecks per pood.' 

In addition to yielding! large revenues to cer- 
tain groups of wealthy manufacturers, the customs 
tariff also enriches certain financial groups, as 
an artificial increase of the " surplus value " of 
industrial enterpriser results in an inflation of 
stock, and shares at a premium result in stock- 
jobbing and speculation. 

As for the masses of the people, and the 
national economy, in the truer and wider sense 
of the term, the present Protectionist system is 
in no way profitable to them. In the first place, 
an artificial inflation of prices causes a decreased 
consumption. And in Russia, we find, prices 
are high, while consumption is lower than in 
other European countries. In 1910 the annual 
consumption of cast-iron was 14 poods per head 
in the United States, 1 1 poods in England, i o 
poods in Germany, and only i^ poods in Russia. 
It is the same with other products. The de- 
velopment of consumption is impossible in Russia 
without a lowering of prices, and this is impos- 
sible failing the demolition of the high tariff wall 
which surrounds the Russian market, transform- 
ing it into a " preserve " in the hands of a few 
monopolists. These monopolists, in search of 
gain, sometimes create an artificial want of this 
or that article— an " industrial famine." Thus, 
' About io-o8d. and lo'Sd per 36 lb. 



BEFORE THE WAR 69 

of late years Russia has known " famines " of 
coal, cast-iron, etc., by which the State itself has 
suffered very considerably, as State undertakings 
such as railways^ etc., have lacked the materials 
or products which they required. More than 
once the Government has been forced to suspend 
the import duties on such products, and allow 
them a free entrance from abroad, since there 
was no other means of holding in check the greed 
of the monopolists. 

Could a better proof be found of the absurdity 
of the modern Protectionist system? 

Protection by means of import duties is harm- 
ful to the interests of the national economy 
because it fetters the foreign trade of Russia. 
In preventing the free entry of foreign merchan- 
dise Russia finds the doors of other countries 
closed against her products. And so far the total 
value of her foreign trade is less than the total 
of the State Budget, while in England (a Eree 
Trade country) the value of the foreign trade is 
many times greater than the State Budget. 

And it may be affirmed that Protection is in 
the long run harmful to the true interests of 
Russian industry itself. This is not a paradox. 
By eliminating foreign competition it deprives the 
Russian capitalist of energy and initiative, and 
transforms our industrial monarchs into pre- 
tenders, too insufficiently preoccupied with the 
technique and the perfecting of the means of 
production of their undertakings. 



70 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Finally, the political consequences of Protec- 
tion are extremely negative, because it corrupts 
the industrial bourgeoisie, subjects it to a Govern- 
mental tutelage, and deprives it of the spirit of 
opposition to and independence of a reactionary 
Tsarism. 

Unhappily, not all the ideologists of the capi- 
talist bourgeoisie have a clear comprehension of 
the disadvantages of the Protectionist system, 
and among them there are some who would still 
further expand and reinforce this lamentable 
system. Peter Struve, for example, the ideo- 
logical father of the Russian Liberal Party, insists 
that our Protectionism ought to be developed in 
all its " logical consequences," which include 
" the exportation of Russian products at low 
prices." Russian produce, in fact, says M. 
Struve, ought to be cheaper to the foreigner than 
to the Russian. To make this possible, the State 
ought to repay to the Russian exporters the 
customs duties which they pay on importing 
merchandise from other countries. But M. 
Struve himself realizes that this " logical conse- 
quence " cannot be welcomed by public opinion, 
which, in his own words, " is inspired with senti- 
ments hostile to Protectionism," and he fails to 
understand that the repayment of import duties 
does not constitute an abatement of Protection, 
but, on the contrary, an aggravation. The whole 
Liberal section of Russian society, says M. Struve 



BEFORE THE WAR 71 

regretfully, would pronounce against such a 
measure. 

The true democracy of Russia is opposed to 
Protectionism, for reasons which I have already 
expounded. But we must not forget that Russia 
can play a large part in the foreign markets only 
as a grain -exporting country. " We must permit 
ourselves no illusions as to the possibility of such 
a development of our industry as would enable 
us to organize a considerable exportation of its 
products," says Professor Migulin, a member of 
the superior committee of the Ministry of 
Finance. On the contrary, the exportation of 
the products of the rural economy of Russia is 
already well developed, and has a great future 
before it. In 191 3 the total value of the Russian 
export trade was 1,427 million roubles, which 
was made up as follows : Cereals, 546 million 
roubles; eggs, 87 millions; butter, 68 millions; 
linen, 107" 6 millions; timber, 152-5 millions; 
grain other than cereals, 47 millions, etc. Agri- 
cultural produce forms the principal element of 
the Russian export trade. But the exportation 
of agricultural produce into Germany and other 
countries will be free only if the importation of 
foreign merchandise into Russia is also free. The 
opening of the commercial frontiers presents no 
danger to Russian agriculture from the standpoint 
of the possibility of foreign competition, because 
the natural wealth of Russia is so great and the 



72 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

cost of production of cereals relatively so low 
that Russian grain can easily overcome all com- 
petition from abroad — if only the changing social 
and political conditions of Russian life will give 
the liberty necessary for the manifestation of 
economic energy and initiative. 

The idea of the abolition of Protectionism and 
the institution of Free Trade with Germany would 
be welcomed, not only by the Russian but also 
by the German democracy. The working classes 
of Germany had long been discontented with the 
Protectionist system of their own country, ex- 
ploited as it was by the agrarians, who en- 
deavoured to obtain a monopoly of the home 
market, and to draw enormous revenues from 
the increased prices of articles of prime necessity. 
Of late years the increase in the cost of neces- 
saries has become so great that the German 
Government has been forced to open a free 
passage for the importation of Russian meat, and 
this temporary measure was acclaimed by the 
working classes. 

One might imagine, too, that the industrial 
circles of Germany would have consented to the 
revision of the commercial treaty with Russia 
in the direction of an abatement, or even the 
complete suppression, of import duties, as the 
immense Russian market would then have been 
open to them. But the German Agrarians, 
the Prussian Junkers, violently opposed any idea 



BEFORE THE WAR 73 

of revising the treaty in this direction. On them 
rests, as far as Germany is concerned, the chief 
responsibiUty for the political and economic con- 
flict with Russia, as the German Democratic Press 
has stated. Vorwdrts, on April lo, 19 14, de- 
clared that "it is the egotistical obstinacy of the 
German Agrarians alone which explains the gene- 
sis of economic and political discord between 
Germany and Russia." 



CHAPTER V 

I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic pro- 
gress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. The 
policy of the Government. Recent success of the libera- 
tive movement. The political strike and the popular 
demonstrations of July 19 14 in Petersburg. 



The better to comprehend the situation created 
for Russia by the war, we must briefly glance 
at the condition of the internal life of the nation 
before the war. 

We will commence with an analysis of the 
economic development of Russia, because the 
economic factor is to the social and political life 
of a people what matter is to the biological life 
of the organism. 

After the years of the great crisis and the 
subsequent stagnation, the industrial and com- 
mercial activity of Russia resumed its course, and 
from 1909 onwards the country was again 
traversing a period of economic progress. 

Here are some significant figures : — 

In 1909 there were in Russia 14,733 industrial- 
establishments subject to the control of the 

74 



BEFORE THE WAR 75 

Inspection of Factories (without counting mining 
enterprises). The number of workers employed 
in these establishments was 1,832,783. In 1910 
the number of establishments had risen to i 5,72 i, 
and that of the workers to 1,951,955 ; for the 
year 191 1 the figures were 16,600 and 
2,051,198; for the year 191 2 they were 
1 7,3 56 and 2, 1 5 1, 1 9 1 . So for a period of four 
years we have an increase in the number of 
factories and workshops representing 2,623 new 
establishments, and an increase of 3 18,408 in the 
number of workers. In 1908 all the industrial 
undertakings of Russia, mines included, produced 
merchandise to the value of 4,707 million 
roubles ; in 1 9 1 2 this sum had increased to 
5,134 million roubles. In 191 1, 191 2, and the 
first eight months of 19 13, no less than 856 
shareholders' companies for purposes of indus- 
trial exploitation were founded in Russia, their 
capital amounting to a total of 1,088 million 
roubles. 

This economic revival came after a long and 
painful crisis and depression, and brought with 
it a revival of political life. The workers in the 
factories and workshops, who in all modern 
countries constitute the principal revolutionary 
power, do so in Russia also. The economic 
crisis, and the diminution in the number of 
workers, enfeebled not only their material forces 
but also their moral resistance. But with the 



76 RUSSIA AND TI^E GREAT WAR 

increasing economic activity of the country, their 
power began to revive. The demand for labour 
increased, and the workers once more felt that 
they formed a necessary element of the economic 
and social life of their country. They wished 
to profit by the increasing demand for labour 
by demanding an increase of wages, which were 
very low during the period of the crisis, and 
improved conditions of labour, which were more 
than unsatisfactory. The workers' organizations, 
the trades unions, broken by the years of the 
industrial crisis and political reaction, began to 
spring up once more in spite of all the adminis- 
trative restrictions and police persecutions. 

The co-operative movement also began to de- 
velop, especially among the peasants. Towards 
the middle of 19 14 the total number of co-opera- 
tive societies in Russia increased to 19,325, with 
more than 9 million members, and an annual 
balance-sheet of 800,000 million roubles. A 
Russian economist asserts th^t " in the co-opera- 
tive movement at least two-thirds of all the 
peasants' savings of Russia have already been 
absorbed." ' 

But although the Tsar's Government tolerates 
co-operation to a certain extent, it opposes the 
trades unions with all its might, as it opposes the 
tendency to strike, and all political organization 
of the working-classes. And during the last few 
* See the Rousskiya Vudomosti^ 1914. No. 271. 



BEFORE THE WAR 77 

years we have seen in Russia what we saw before 
the year 1905. The development of industry 
is inevitably giving rise to the labour movement, 
but the archaic legislation of the autocratic regime 
and the reactionary administration will not allow 
the movement to develop in a legal form. Every 
demand on the part of the workers, even the 
most limited and modest, is regarded by the 
Government as a " revolt " which must be piti- 
lessly suppressed. F.rom this policy resulted the 
ghastly " tragedy of the Lena." On the 4/ 17th 
of April, 1 9 1 2, the striking miners of the gold- 
mines of the Lena (in Siberia) were shot down 
like ferocious beasts simply because they dared 
peaceably to ask of their employers and the local 
administration that the conditions of their labour 
should be bettered, that their wa,ges should be 
paid more regularly, that their wives should not 
be employed in rough and dirty tasks, that they 
should not be given spoiled and putrid food, etc. 
Five hundred killed and wounded were left on 
the desert banks of the great Siberian river- 
innocent victims of the Tsarist regime. 

But their hot blood melted the snow and ice 
of that dead silence and depression which had 
overtaken Russian society during the years of 
the reaction. A great popular movement sprang 
from the graves of these unknown workers. 
While in 19 10 the ofhcial statistics recorded only 
222 cases of strikes, in which 46,000 workers 



78 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

were involved, in 1 9 1 2 the number of strikers 
in Russia had risen to 1^070,000, of whom 
821,000 were "political strikers." 

To appreciate this movement we must remember 
that in Russia, where the law allows the people 
hardly any legal possibility of expressing its 
demands, where the press has practically no 
freedom, and liberty of assemblage is all but 
unknown, the " political strike " is the sole 
means of efficacious public protest which remains 
to the workers. 

The elections to the Duma at the end of 191 2, 
which took place in an atmosphere of open ad- 
ministrative pressure and political falsification, 
proved that Russian society had not lost the spirit 
of opposition, and that the attitude of the popular 
masses was still resolutely opposed to that of the 
Government. Despite all difficulties and per- 
secutions, the Independent, Democratic, and 
Socialist Press is coming to life again, and the 
years 191 3-14 saw the appearance in Petersburg 
of three daily papers of the Extreme Left— one 
Socialist - Revolutionary in tendency and two 
Socialist-Democratic — not to speak of a great 
Radical daily (ostensibly " without party "), 
and a few monthly or bi-monthly reviews of the 
same complexion. When the Censorship, the 
police, and the judiciary suppress one of these 
organs it is at once re -issued under another 
name ; when one of the editors is arrested, his 



BEFORE THE WAR 79 

place is filled by the following day, and the 
difficult work of propaganda is continued. 

The " educational movement " also underwent 
a rapid development — that is, the action of the 
popular universities, libraries, and public confer- 
ences and classes, most of which were organized 
by the workers themselves. 

But instead of making concessions to the public 
consciousness, which had awakened from its 
" social slumber," Tsarism continued its negative 
policy of reaction and repression. It undertook 
a regular campaign of persecution against acade- 
mic autonomy and the Liberal professors (most 
of whom are more than moderate in their political 
opinions). M, Kasso, Minister of Public Instruc- 
tion, disported himself among the superior, 
secondary, and inferior schools " like a hippo- 
potamus in a china-shop " in the words of a 
Russian publicist. The Government was also 
conducting an active anti-Semitic propaganda, 
which consisted not only of words, but of actions 
also, setting on the stage the spectacle of a 
" ritual murder " — the Beiliss affair— arranged by 
the " Black Bands," the police, and the judiciary. 
Arrests and deportations of members of the 
political organizations belonging to the Left 
continued uninterruptedly. 

But all these measures were in vain. It became 
evident that although the Government possessed 
material power, it had no true social, moral, and 



80 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

political power. And since 1 9 1 2 we have 
witnessed in Russia a self-exhaustive process 
which has seemed to deprive the reaction of all 
dominating ideas, of any positive programme, 
while the popular movement has continually in- 
creased in force, until in 1914, finding before 
it the mechanical obstacles of repressive police 
measures, it overflowed them and rushed through 
the streets— in the literal sense of the word. In 
the middle of July 19 14 the workers of Peters- 
burg and many other industrial centres proclaimed 
a political strike in order to protest against the 
innumerable arrests of the leaders of the Labour 
Movement and the editors of journals, the severe 
penalties inflicted on strikers, etc. The number 
of workers who took part in this strike amounted 
to 250,000 in Petersburg alone. Directly the 
general strike was declared, meetings were held 
in the yards of the factories and in the streets. 
Great public demonstrations took place in the 
streets and squares of the capital, followed by 
bloody collisions between the workers and the 
police, and the inhabitants of Petersburg saw 
barricades thrown up as in 1905. 

The situation of the Government had become 
all the more critical in that even before the strike 
and its popular manifestations it had found itself 
all but isolated. The very moderate elements 
even were ill content with it. M. Gutshkov, ex- 
President of the Duma and leader of the " Octo- 



BEFORE THE WAR 81 

brists/' openly predicted the inevitability of a 
revolution in Russia. Other leaders of the 
moderate parties declared that no organized and 
positive action was possible as long as the existing 
Government remained in power. The leader of 
the right wing of the Constitutionalists (the 
Cadets), M. Maklakov, invited the Duma to 
" perish with honour," because it was then 
" living in dishonour." 

In such a political atmosphere the revolutionary 
uprising of the people was extremely dangerous 
to the Government. It was on the brink of an 
inevitable fall. 

But then came the war, and the situation was 
suddenly transformed. The danger of foreign 
aggression forced the masses of the Russian 
people to check the remarkable impetus of its 
struggle for liberty and to occupy itself with the 
problems of national defence. 



CHAPTER VI 

I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The 
revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military 
expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan of 
19 1 4. Its strategical and military destination. 

I 

What was the material power of the Russian 
State before the commencement of the great 
European war— that is to say, what were its 
financial and military resources ? 

The year 1914 was marked in the history of 
Russian finances by a change of Ministers ; M. 
Kokovtsov was replaced by M . Bark, after twelve 
years at the head of the Ministry of Einances. 
What was the outcome of these ten years of work ? 

In 1904, at the moment of the outbreak of 
the Russo-Japanese War, the Budget of the 
Russian Empire amounted to 2,063 millions 
of roubles. In 1914 it was 3,558 millions; 
an increase of 1,500 millions, or 75 per cent, 
in ten years. The increase in the Budget 
was greater and more speedy than the increase 
in the population ; in 1 904 the burden or 
incidence of the Russian Budget was expressed 
by a figure of 1 3 to 14 roubles per head of 



BEFORE THE WAR 83 

population, while in 19 14 it had risen to 21 
roubles per head— so that it was one and a half 
times as heavy as it was ten years earlier. And 
as the average of our national revenue amounts 
only to 50 or 60 roubles per head, the Russian 
people pays the State 30 to 40 per cent, of its 
annual income. We may therefore say that in 
Russia the State exhausts the material forces of 
the people by its bad financial system. But de- 
spite this fact, or indeed because of it, the State 
coffers always suffer from a chronic deficit, like 
the lean kine seen by Joseph in his sleep, which 
ate the fat kine, but were themselves no fatter 
by so doing. 

In 1904 the budgetary deficit of the Russian 
Empire was 80 million roubles; in 1905 it was 
15 millions; in 1906, 481 millions; in 1907, 
295 millions; in 1908, 181 millions; and in 
1909, 131 millions. So for a period of six years 
only the total of the annual deficits amounted to 
1,183 millions. This huge deficiency was filled 
by two colossal loans which were negotiated in 
Paris— a loan of 2,250 million francs in 1906 
and one of 1,400 millions in 1909. In addition 
to these two great financial operations the Russian 
Government concluded several smaller loans. 

Two good harvests, those of 1^909 and 19 10, 
and the forced exportation of grain, slightly 
ameliorated the commercial balance-sheet of the 
country, and the Minister of Finances already 



84 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

began to boast of the absence of a deficit. But 
as the Russian Budget has no solid social and 
economic base beneath it, the deficit soon ap- 
peared again, and in 1 9 1 4, according to the esti- 
mates, the deficit would have been 23 millions 
of roubles. The Minister of Finances hoped to 
cover this by the aid of the " free reserves '^ 
of the Treasury. But the " free reserves " them- 
selves are in reality merely the product of pre- 
ceding loans, and represent, not the net revenue 
of the State, but its anterior indebtedness. 

During the years 1904-14 the National Debt 
rose from 7,000 million roubles to 10,000 
millions. This is an increase of 3,000 millions, 
or 43 per cent, in ten years. As for the annual 
payments into the sinking fund and interest, 
these were 403 million roubles in 1914, while 
in 1904 they were 299 millions — an increase of 
25 per cent. 

Let us now consider the internal structure of 
the Russian Budget since 1904. 

Here we have the tabulated revenues :— 







1904. 

Million roubles. 


1914. 

Million roubles 


Direct taxes ... 


.. 


134*9 


264 


Indirect taxes 


.. 


418-6 


709-2 


Customs, etc.... 


.. 


104*2 


232-4 


State railways 




454-5 


858-3 


State properties 


.. 


117 


259-7 


Alcohol monopoly 


.. 


543-5 


935-9 


Other monopolies 





70-9 


133-7 


Payments made by 


peasants 






to redeem their ho 


dings ... 


88-8 





Other sources... 




85-9 


138*2 



BEFORE THE WAR 85 

Comparing these two columns of figures, you 
will see that the sources of revenue have re- 
mained much what they were. In 19 14, as ten 
years ago, Tsarism obtained the money which 
it needed principally by means of indirect taxes. 
■While the direct taxes have increased only by 
130 millions, and amounted in 1914 to 264 
millions, the indirect taxes have increased by 
291 millions, and their total amounted to 709 
million roubles. But the indirect taxation of the 
people is not confined to indirect taxes properly 
so called. The import duties, the alcohol mono- 
poly, etc., must also be regarded as indirect taxes 
on the various articles of consumption and pro- 
ducts. And if we add up the total of all these 
indirect taxes in their various forms we get a 
sum of 1,136 millions of roubles for 1904, and 
2,010 for 1 91 4, the absolute increase being 874 
million roubles ; but the relative increase is also 
great; in 1904 the indirect taxes constituted 54 
per cent, of the total Budget, and in 19 14 they 
had risen to 60 per cent. From this point of 
view the evolution of the Russian Budget pre- 
sents a spectacle very different to that which we 
behold in the other European States, in which 
we find a tendency toward the increase of 
indirect taxes and the diminution of direct 
taxes. 



86 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

II 

A few words as to the partition of the expendi- 
ture. The greater portion of the budget of 
expenditure is swallowed up by the abyss of 
unproductive expenditure. For example, the 
" costs of administration " increased in seven 
years (1907-14) from 282 millions to 480 
millions, while the expenditure on the arts 
and public instruction increased from 84 to 176 
millions. The expenditure in respect of the de- 
velopment of agriculture, which in 1907 was 46 
millions, was 88 millions in 1914. One rouble 
per head per annum for education and half a 
rouble per head for agriculture — such is the ex- 
penditure on these items in the most illiterate 
and the most largely agricultural country of 
Europe ! As a contrast, the unproductive ex- 
penses are extremely high ; their total in 1 9 1 4 
attained the colossal sum of 2,000 million roubles, 
or four-sevenths of the whole Budget. 

As for the military expenditure, which more 
especially concerns us here, it is to-day one 
and a half times as great as in 1907 ; in place of 
500 millions spent in that year, Russia spent more 
than 750 million roubles on her Army and Navy 
in 191 3. 

The distribution of the military expenditure in 
1 9 1 3 was as follows : Payment of officers of the 
Army and Navy, 138 million roubles; payment 



BEFORE THE WAR 87 

of soldiers and sailors, 348 million roubles ; pro- 
visioning of the Army with flour, 3 08 million 
roubles ; with meat, butter, vegetables, salt, etc., 
72 million roubles. Forage (oats, hay, etc.) for 
horses, 286 million roubles ; equipment of the 
Army, 47 million roubles ; purchase of horses, 5 
million roubles. Artillery material and arma- 
ments of infantry and cavalry, 35-5 million 
roubles of the ordinary Budget plus 42 millions 
of the extraordinary Budget; total, 77' 5 
millions. Material for the engineering arm, 
2-9 million roubles of the ordinary Budget plus 
IO-8 millions of the extraordinary Budget. Con- 
struction and reparation of fortresses, etc., and 
other defensive works, 24*4 millions of the ordi- 
nary plus 199 of the extraordinary Budget. 
Construction and maintenance of non-defensive 
works, 44' 6 millions. Maintenance of barracks 
and buildings of the military administration, etc., 
3 4' 9 millions. Medicines and surgical material, 
etc., I million of the ordinary and 13 of the 
extraordinary Budget. 

These figures refer to the budgetary estimates 
for 19 13. As for the expenditure of the Navy, 
we quote the figures relating to the Budget of 
1 9 1 2 :— 

The construction of battleships for the Baltic 
Squadron, 29 millions ; construction of battle- 
ships, torpedo-boats, and submarines for the Black 
Sea Fleet, 239 millions ; repairing vessels of 



88 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

war, etc., i8 million roubles ; total, 716 million 
roubles. Naval artillery, 256 millions; tor- 
pedoes and wireless telegraphy, 5 millions. Fuel 
(coal, petroleum, etc.) for the Navy and naval 
ports, I 58 millions ; works of naval ports, dock- 
yards, and slips and repairs to same, 62 millions. 

Ill 

In addition to the sums destined for the annual 
expenditure, the Russian Treasury has at its dis- 
posal a floating balance or " free reserve." In 
the Report on the Budget for 1 9 1 3, the Minister 
of Finances stated that this reserve amounted, 
in January 1 9 1 3, to 450 million roubles. Accord- 
ing to the Report for the following year, this 
reserve had increased, and on January i, 19 14, 
amounted to 550 millions. The Minister of 
Finances naturally explained the existence of this 
floating balance as being the result of the wise 
economy of his prudent administration, but in 
reality it was only a result of the State's indebted- 
ness. In the Minister's Report on the Budget 
for 19 1 3 we find the proof; the total balance- 
sheet of the State revenues for the five preceding 
years (1908-12) showed a figure of 14,275 
million roubles, while the expenditures were 
13,825 millions. The difl"erence between these 
two sums forms the 425 millions of the floating 
balance or " free reserve." But if we recall the 
fact that 350 millions of revenue were produced 



BEFORE THE WAR 89 

during these five years by loans, we shall find 
that the true "free reserve" consists of loo 
millions only, while the remainder (350 millions) 
represents the debit account of the Russian 
Empire during those years. 

The floating balance of the Treasury was re- 
garded by the Russian Government more particu- 
larly as the reserve necessitated by the possibility 
of war. At the end of his Report on the Budget 
of 1 9 14 M. Kokovtsov emphasized " the neces- 
sity of preserving intact the free reserves of the 
Treasury " because " the possession of this free 
balance, while fortifying the financial position of 
Russia, and eliminating the necessity of State 
loans, seems to be particularly important in the 
present state of the political interests of the 
various Powers." 

These words were spoken at the end of the 
year 19 13. At the same time the question of 
a new Russian loan, to be floated in Paris, was 
mooted. 

On the 14th of December, 1913, the well- 
informed financial contributor to the Parisian 
Journal, M. Monthoron, expressed himself as 
follows :— 

" We must hold ourselves ready for every 
eventuality. One of the first cares of every 
Government that is solicitous for the defence of 
this country must be to ensure that defence in 
such a manner that we in France should not be 



90 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

called upon, in the event of a conflict, to support 
alone the first onslaught of the Triplice. For 
this purpose it is necessary at all costs to assist 
our friend and ally to carry out a rapid mobili- 
zation on his western frontier. This is the im- 
portant task which M. Delcasse has pursued in 
Petersburg. It is with a view to its realization 
that engagements were entered into in high 
quarters before the rise of M. Doumergue to 
power, with the object of securing the speedy 
completion of the Russian railway loan by 
January 15th at the latest." 

Another organ of the Parisian press, the 
Correspondant, a Clerical review, gave the history 
of the negotiations for this loan in its issue of 
the 25th of December, 191 3: — 

" A Parisian financier, very much in the public 
eye, employed his leisure by going to Russia in 
a purely private capacity in order to seek an 
opportunity for some large stroke of business. 

" France was about to vote the Three Years' 
Bill— in other words, was about to reach the limit 
of the military burden which she could assume. 
Germany, on the other hand, was still able to 
increase the numbers and the might of her Army. 
Hence the urgent necessity of demanding from 
the Russian Alliance a really effectual assistance, 
which would guarantee peace by making a con- 
flict a priori dangerous to our eastern neighbours. 
But this assistance could be ' serious ' only if it 



BEFORE THE WAR 91 

would realize without delay the entire programme 
indicated by the French General Staff, and would 
permit, by the creation of strategic railways, of 
the preparation of the means of transport and 
circulation indispensable to the mobilization of 
the Western Army of Russia. 

" In the fulfilment of this programme the crea- 
tion of railways seemed to be of the greatest 
importance. It was only necessary for our 
eminent financier to go to M. Kokovtsov and say 
to him, more or less in the following words : 
' You have a pressing and imperious need of 
money ; railways are indispensable to you. Now 
we are able to build them and guarantee their 
success ; and we are ready once again to place 
our enormous reserves of capital at your service. 
But we impose on you the construction of 
strategic lines which can be utilized in the event 
of conflict.' 

" The manner in which all this was said gave 
the implicit impression that the man who spoke 
with such assurance was at least invested with 
an official mission. 

" The Minister was extremely reserved. But 
it seemed to him, reasonably enough, impossible 
that a proposition so definite should be put 
forward merely as a private matter. Neverthe- 
less, he did not think it necessary to conceal 
the fact that a simple agreement did not appear 
inacceptable. , 



92 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" A few days later our Minister of Finances 
received in his turn a visit from this ' private ' 
negotiator. ' I believe I can apprise you, M. 
le Ministre, having last week seen M. Kokovtsov, 
of an opportunity of constructing strategic rail- 
ways in Russia on condition that the French 
market will be open, for a term of five years, 
to 500 million francs of Russian bonds per 
annum.' 

" Meanwhile the Petersburg Government dis- 
creetly inquired through its Ambassador whether 
an agreement on the basis indicated was possible. 
The French Government made the same inquiries 
through M. Delcasse. 

" Finally the agreement was negotiated." ' 

A syndicate of five great Parisian banks under- 
took to organize the issue of the new loan, whose 
total, made up by annual instalments, was to con- 
sist of 5I milliards of francs— £220,000,000. 
The first instalment of £20,000,000 was issued 
early in 19 14. 

The same journal has explained the motives 
which determined France to risk this colossal 
financial operation. 

If, in the event of a Franco -German war, 
" Russia did not enlist herself heart and soul from 
the very first days of the war^ and if by misfortune 
we [the French] were to meet with serious re- 
verses at the outset, who would venture so far to 
* Le Correspondani, September 25, 1913. 



BEFORE THE WAR 93 

rely on the chivalry of our ally as to feel assured 
that he would engage himself, the game once 
being lost, in a struggle which would be without 
issue as without profit to him ? Who could 
guarantee that Russia would not act with oppor- 
tune weakness ? On every count it is therefore 
in our interests to ensure that Russia shall 
assume, from the first moment of the war, an 
offensive which would furnish the proof of her 
absolute fidelity to our case. . . . Now it is 
obvious that in the present condition of the 
Russian railway system it would not be possible 
for her to succeed in such a task." 

I must add that the heads of the Russian Army 
themselves indicated the scanty development of 
the railway system of Western Russia as the chief 
cause of the military superiority of the Austro- 
German bloc over Russia. General Kuro- 
patkin, in his confidential report of 1900, stated 
that Russia at that time had only nine lines of 
railroad running toward the Austro - German 
frontier, while Austria and Germany had twenty- 
five lines running toward the Russian frontiers. 
During the fourteen years which have elapsed 
since that report was written the superiority of 
Germany and Austria in this particular has con- 
siderably increased. 

But the railway problem is of primordial im- 
portance in modern warfare. As was very justly 
said by one of the characters in a novel by 



94 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Anatole Krance, " In the event of a war the real 
generals will be the station-masters." 

The experience of the present war, with its 
rapid and extensive transport of great masses of 
troops from one frontier to another, has proved 
that M. Anatole Krance's creation was perfectly 
correct in his statement. 



CHAPTER VII 

I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. — II. The military forces of Russia 
compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The 
Russian Navy. 



In the middle of the nineteenth century, before 

the Crimean War, the mihtary forces of Russia 

were already of considerable importance from 

the point of view of numbers. In January 1853 

there were in Russia 532 battalions of infantry, 

225 squadrons of cavalry, 105 batteries of field 

artillery, 30 mounted batteries, 4 mountain 

batteries, and 9 battalions of engineers. This 

was the active army, properly speaking. There 

were also reserve units : 1 6 battalions of infantry, 

24 squadrons of cavalry, 10 batteries of field 

artillery, 3 batteries of mounted artillery, and 

2 battalions of engineers. To these we must 

add 53 battalions of the "home guard" and a 

large number of special corps and " commands." 

In all, the total number of soldiers was 968,000, 

and the number of generals and officers was 

27,700. The muskets and cannon were very 

poor . 

95 



96 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

The soldiers were recruited among the peasants 
(serfs) and the meshtshanie (small townsfolk), 
the duration of service being twenty years ! The 
officers were badly trained. 

The Crimean War demonstrated the bad con- 
dition of the Russian forces and the necessity 
of reform. The term of military service was 
diminished, and the level of the corps of officers 
was raised by the establishment of compulsory 
examinations for those who wished to attain the 
rank of officer. 

The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 contributed 
greatly to the technique of artillery fire, and 
Russia followed the example of Prussia in all 
that concerns the construction of cannon and 
small arms, and replaced the old muskets, first 
by Carl6 rifles and then by the Berdan model. 

The war of 1870-71 once more gave an 
impulse to the development of the armed forces 
of Russia : rifled cannon were introduced in 
the artillery and the Government established 
universal military service, which was not, as a 
matter of fact, particularly universal, as there 
were numerous exceptions or privileges in the 
case of this or that category of persons. It 
must be admitted that the Minister of War of 
those days— M. Milutin— did not, in his en- 
deavours to improve the state of the Russian 
Army, attribute much importance to the quanti- 
tative factor, and in 1876 the Russian Army 



BEFORE THE WAR 97 

numbered only 73 1,000 men— a lower figure than 
that of 1853. But the famous European system 
of " armed peace " impelled Russia, together with 
all the other great European States', to increase 
her military forces, which, in 1880, after the 
Russo-Turkish War, numbered 894,000 men, 
with 32,000 generals and officers, and in 1913, 
1,224,000 men (not counting the Cossacks) and 
57,700 generals and officers. At the same time 
the technique of artillery and infantry fire was 
perfected by the introduction of repeating rifles 
and quick-firing guns. 

The reactionary period of Alexander III has 
left its mark on the life of the Army as on the 
general life of the people. The liberal measures 
of Milutin, who wished to improve the education 
—not merely professional but general— of the 
officers, were suppressed, and the military schools 
were reorganized in such a manner that the 
officers whom they gave to the Army could not 
be over-intelligent. The condition of the troops 
was very bad. As a result the great army of the 
great Russian Empire was beaten by little 
Japan . 

" The debacle of the war against Japan proved 
emphatically the weakness of our armed force 
and the necessity of urgent reforms," said a Rus- 
sian writer on military subjects. " But, as a 
matter of fact, all the reforms after the war 
consisted of some changes of uniform. In addi- 

7 



98 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

tion to this, the Minister of War has of late 
years persistently applied himself to the increase 
of the effective of the Army, the number of 
generals and officers and military officials, and 
the bureaucracy of the central administration of 
the Army." 

It is true that the term of compulsory service 
has been reduced from four to three years. 
" However, this was done, not because the 
Ministry of War considered it necessary, but in 
response to the pressure of the revolutionary 
demands of the soldiers," says the same author. 

In 19 1 o the effective of the Army was re- 
organized by suppressing the units of the 
permanent reserves and replacing them by 
skeleton units or cadres, on which the units 
were to be formed on mobilization. Finally, in 
the spring of 19 13, the increase of the armies 
of other European Powers was followed by an 
increase in the strength of the Russian Army, 
and a considerable addition to the number of 
guns, etc. But we know nothing precisely con- 
cerning the dimensions of this increase, and it 
was determined on during the secret sessions of 
the Duma. Of late years also much money has 
been expended on military aviation. 

II 

According to the figures relating to the end of 
19 1 3, the total strength of the military forces 



BEFORE THE WAR 



99 



of Russia before the present war was as 
follows I : — 



Armies. 


n 
g 

S 


c 



c'S 


■£0.5 


G y5 

c'S3 




^'5 






3 

cr 


3±; 

Sea 




3li 


rt 

acq 




In Europe — 
















Petersburg 


144 


60 


51 


5 


3 


8 


— 


Vilna 


136 


60 


51 


4 


— 


8 


3 


Warsaw 




160 


180 


60 


13 


— 


10 


3 


Kiev 




168 


118 


63 


6 


6 


10 


2 


Odessa 




72 


36 


27 


2 


— 


4 


6 


Moscow 




160 


49 


60 


4 


— 


10 


— 


Kazan 




80 


30 


30 


2 


— 


4 


— 


Caucasus 




118 


92 


27 


6 


17 


6 


— 


Total 


1,038 


625 


369 


42 


26 


60 


15 


In Asia — 
















Turkestan 


44 


48 


12 


2 


5 


— 


— 


Omsk 


16 


6 


6 


— 


I 


I 


— 


Irkutsk ... 


64 


20 


24 


2 


4 


4 


3 


The Amur 


96 


17 


30 


— 


14 


9 


6 


Frontier Guards of 
















the Trc 


ms-Amur 


24 


36 


— 


— 


4 


— 


— 



Total 



244 244 



72 



28 



14 



My readers will understand that not all these 
forces could immediately be utilized on the 
western frontier in case of a war against the 
Austro-German hloc. Part of the corps would 
have to remain on the other frontiers as observing 
forces, and another portion could be utilized only a 
long time after the declaration of war on account 
of the slowness of mobilization and concentration 
in Russia. Consequently, according to the cal- 
culations of a competent specialist, the numerical 

^ I borrow these figures from the well-informed contributor to 
Le Correspondant (see the issue for December 25, 19 15). 



100 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

situation of the belligerents, in the event of a 
war between Russia and the Austro -German bloc, 
should be as follows :— 







.2 

1 




2 

V3 






Sa3 


N.2 

II 




Russia 


... 


6o8 


418 


215 


28 


3 


36 


9 


Austro-German 


coali- 
















tion 




407 


328 


294 


32 


2 


19 


4 



Commenting on these figures, the specialist 
who gives them states that they are liable in 
themselves to produce an erroneous impression. 
" If they are interpreted according to the rules 
of simple arithmetic, they seem to confer upon 
Russia a crushing numerical superiority over her 
adversary. The reality is quite otherwise : 
nothing is less certain than the superiority of 
the Russian troops over the troops of the Austro- 
German coalition." ' And this because the Rus- 
sian Army takes many times longer to mobilize 
and to concentrate than do the armies of Austria 
and Germany. 

To what a degree Germany was sure of her 
military superiority over Russia we may judge 
from the fact that the German General Staff in 
times of peace maintained only six army corps 
on the Russian frontier, while there were nine- 
teen on the French frontier. 

We shall see later that the ex-Minister of War, 

* Le Correspondant, December 25, 1915, p. 1072, 



BEFORE THE WAR 101 

General Kuropatkin, declared long ago that the 
Austro -German were superior to the Russian 
forces . 

Ill 

After the naval battle of Salamin, in 1854, 
the Russian Government concentrated the whole 
force of its Black Sea Fleet in the roadstead of 
Sebastopol, and there sunk it, in order to bar 
the way to the forts of Sebastopol to the enemy's 
vessels. Thus perished the principal naval force 
of Russia. As for the Baltic Fleet, at that period 
it consisted of wooden sailing ships, and was of 
no military value. 

In 1856 the Russian Government elaborated 
a proposal for the construction of a new fleet, 
but the Treaty of Paris did not permit Russia to 
possess vessels of war in the Black Sea. Only 
thirty years later, in 1886, did the Black Sea 
float the first Russian ironclads. 

Towards the end of the reign of Alexander III, 
in 1892, Russia had in the Baltic 5 ironclads, 
more or less modern, actually afloat, while 4 were 
under construction ; i o ironclads, of very old 
pattern (built in 1864-8) ; 10 monitors ; i gun- 
boat (and 2 under construction) ; 1 2 first-class 
cruisers, 1 1 of the second-class (built before 
1880) ; 3 torpedo -destroyers (plus 2 under con- 
struction) ; 10 coast-defence ships, 3 training- 
ships, and 5 transports. In the Black Sea there 



102 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

were 5 battleships, of the " round " Popov type 
(very antiquated) ; i first-class cruiser ; 2 de- 
stroyers (plus one under construction) ; 6 gun- 
boats ; and 2 transports under construction. 
Besides these Russia had her " Siberian flotilla," 
composed of 2 gunboats and 2 transports ; and 
a " Caspian flotilla," consisting of 4 armed steam- 
ships and 2 gunboats (built in 1866). 

Towards the period of the war with Japan the 
principal naval forces of the Russian Empire 
were to be found in the Pacific, where there 
were 8 battleships, 1 1 first-class cruisers, 
6 second-class cruisers, 7 gunboats, 2 destroyers, 
31 large torpedo-boats and 4 small. The 
Baltic Fleet, which constituted the sole reserve 
of the Russian Navy, was strong in numbers 
but negligible in quality. Of its 8 battleships, 
5 were forty years old ; 3 of its large cruisers 
were built before 1878, and so forth. For the 
most part they were not real warships, but " old 
boxes," as Wilhelm II called them. All the same, 
this " squadron " was sent against the Japanese, 
who completely destroyed it. 

At the end of 1905 Russia no longer had a 
fleet ; part of it was sunk and part had been 
taken by the Japanese. Half a century after the 
battle of Salamin she was once more left without 
a navy. 

The Government had to consider the question 
of the creation of a new fleet. This question 



BEFORE THE WAR 103 

was much discussed in the Duma and in the 
Press. Some of the experts asserted that Russia, 
being a continental Power, with no colonial 
policy, had no need of a fleet save for the 
defence of her own coast (torpedo-boats, sub- 
marines, etc.). The others, and the Minister of 
Marine among them, wished to continue the old 
policy and to build large battleships, and, above 
all, cruisers. Three times the Duma refused the 
necessary credit for the construction of battle- 
ships, but the Tsar, ignoring the vote of the 
Duma, sanctioned the requisite expenditure. ■ 
In 1 9 1 3 the naval forces of Russia were as 
follows :— 

In the Baltic : 9 battleships (of various ages, 
built between 1887 and 1891); 3 armoured 
cruisers, more or less modern ; 6 modern 
cruisers; 6 gunboats; 50 destroyers; 28 tor- 
pedo-boats; 12 submarines; 18 transports, etc. 
In the Black Sea : 7 battleships (plus 3 under 
construction) ; 2 cruisers ; 4 gunboats ; 1 3 
destroyers (plus 9 under construction); 14 
torpedo-boats ; 4 submarines (plus 7 under 
construction) ; 3 transports, etc. 

The " Siberian flotilla " was composed of 2 
cruisers, 9 large and i small torpedo-boats, 
I gunboat, 12 submarines, and 9 transports. 

The "flotilla of the Amur" consisted of 18 
river gunboats. 

The " Caspian flotilla " consisted of 2 gunboats. 



104 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

In all, the Russian Navy in 1913 was com- 
posed of 29 large and 230 small units, mostly of 
an old type. On the ist of January 191 3 the 
number of sailors was 46,300. The officers com- 
prised : 135 general officers and admirals; 677 
superior officers; 2,257 officers; 614 civil 
officials, and 280 physicians and surgeons. Thus 
for each large warship there were 5 admirals, 
104 other officers, 10 doctors, and 21 civil 
officers. A hypertrophy of the military bureau- 
cracy and an atrophy of the fighting power- 
such is the picture of the present condition of the 
Russian Fleet. It is superfluous to add that the 
German Navy is of a crushing superiority com- 
pared with the Russian Navy. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Did Russia desire the war ? The two Russias, popular and 
governmental. The pacific tendencies of the Russian 
peasants and working-men. — II. Official Russia and its 
attitude towards the Austro-German coalition. The poli- 
tical, military, and ideological recoil of the Russian Govern- 
ment from the Austro-German expansion. — III. The war and 
the Revolution. The Russian reaction and the Prussian. 



Did Russia desire the present war? 

In discussing this question we must first of all 
admit of another : Of which Russia are we 
speaking? For one cannot speak of a single 
Russia. There are two Russias. One is the 
popular Russia, democratic Russia, the Russia 
of vast, labouring, suffering human masses . The 
other is the Russia of the " directing elements," 
the nobles and the upper bureaucracy. 

Popular Russia, the Russia of the peasants, 
workers, and lower middle-class townsfolk, did 
not desire the war, simply because the popular 
masses in Russia, as in all European countries 
to-day, are in general opposed to war, except it 
be waged in defence of their country and against 
an armed foreign invasion. I could in this con- 

105 



106 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

nection cite many declarations to this effect, made 
and renewed more than once by the popular 
parties of Russia. The representatives of the 
peasants and the working-classes in the Duma 
have always declared, in the name of their man- 
datories, that the peasant population and the 
industrial workers did not desire war, and that 
they protested against all those blunders of the 
Government which might lead to war with a 
neighbouring State. Again, in the early part of 
19 1 3, during the Balkan crisis, the Social- 
Democratic section of the fourth Duma (this 
fraction is the sole legal representation of all 
the workers of Russia) sent an open letter 
to the Social-Democratic parties of Austro- 
Hungary, in which occurred the following : — 

" Thanks to the work of international diplo- 
macy, and in the first place of the Austrian 
and Russian diplomats, the dread menace of a 
general sanguinary conflagration, and primarily 
of a Russo-Austrian conflict, is still hovering over 
Europe. . . . Although every attempt to throw 
two nations against each other is ... a crime 
against humanity and reason, a war between 
Russia and Austria— a war which would be a 
savage melee of nations and races — would be a 
veritable incarnation of madness. 

" The people of Russia have no motive which 
would give them a shadow of justification for 
such a crime. The peasant masses of Russia 



BEFORE THE WAR 107 

have nothing to seek in the Balkans ; they need 
agrarian and fiscal reform in their own country. 
The Russian peasantry, ruined and starving, is 
not a supporter of Imperialism ; it is merely 
its victim. And the same is true of the masses 
of the lower middle-classes in the towns, who 
are crushed by the weight of militarism. As 
regards the Russian proletariat, it cannot become 
the supporter of Imperialism, as it constitutes 
the class most severely prejudiced by the present 
system of political lawlessness, arbitrary police 
rule, and nationalistic bacchanalia." ' 

The representatives of the rural democracy, 
the Trudoviki (Labour) Party, pronounced them- 
selves no less systematically opposed to any war- 
like and aggressive policy, and, as we shall 
presently see, even after the declaration of the 
war by Germany, the representatives of labour 
and the peasantry in the Duma voted against 
the military credits in order to proclaim before 
all the world their profound aversion to the war 
and their pacificist sentiments. 

II 

But although popular Russia did not desire 

the war, perhaps of^cial Russia desired and 

provoked it. 

^ Quoted from the Bulletin Periodique du Bureau Socialiste 
International, Brussels, 1913, No. II, p. 3. This journal is 
published in three languages, French, German, and English. 



108 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

This, of course, is what the German Govern- 
ment says in its White Book. 

" Russia desired the war," says the White ( ! ) 
Book. 

" Russia has ht the incendiary torch," repeats 
the Chancellor of the German Empire, Herr 
Bethmann-Holweg, in the Reichstag, on the 
4th of August 19 14. 

On the other hand, the leader of the Russian 
Government, M. Goremykin, solemnly declared, 
in a speech delivered before the Duma on the 
8th of August 1 9 14, that Russia did not desire 
the war. The same declaration was made by 
M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
stated, during the same session, that it was not 
the Russian policy that threatened the peace of 
the world ; and by the President of the Duma, 
M. Rodzianko, who also repeated that Russia 
did not wish for war. 

So we are confronted by two theories, abso- 
lutely contradictory and diametrically opposed. 
Which is nearer the truth ? 

Before replying to this question let us calmly 
analyse the objective facts. 

In the first place, we must take a retrospective 
glance at Russian politics as they were after the 
close of the war against Japan before we can 
form an opinion. Was the Russian policy at 
that time of an aggressive character or other- 
wise? Readers who have read my "Modern 



BEFORE THE WAR 109 

Russia " (which was pubHshed a year before the 
war) will remember that I therein demonstrated 
that the Russian policy after 1904 was merely 
a systematic recoil from the Austro-German 
coalition. This recoil manifested itself under 
three forms : political, military, and ideological. 

From a political point of view Russia has made 
many concessions to Germany and Austria. In 
1904 she concluded a commercial treaty with 
Germany, whose conditions Germany dictated. 
During the famous interview between M. 
Isvolsky and Baron von Aerenthal at Buchlose, 
Russia surrendered to Austria in the matter of the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the 
Potsdam interview the Tsar gave his " German 
cousin " a free hand in the matter of the Bagdad 
railway, in respect of the German march to the 
Persian Gulf and the gates of British India. 

From the military point of view we can point 
to a recoil of a purely material and geographical 
nature. In 19 10 the Russian General Staff 
withdrew the " armed frontier " of the Empire 
from the political frontier dividing Russia from 
Germany, and moved the principal points of con- 
centration of the Russian troops several hundreds 
of miles to the east. The Russian Staff ex- 
plained this measure as depending on strategical 
considerations, but the French military press 
found it almost " a violation of the Franco- 
Russian convention," and this opinion is 



110 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

expressed even in the military statistical annuals. 
For example, in the annual dealing with VEtat 
militaire des toutes les Nations da Monde for 
1 9 14, published by a French military publishing 
house,' we read, in this connection, that " the 
decrease in the number of army corps of the 
Russian army hitherto accumulated on the 
western frontier and the constitution of a central 
mass which the development of the railway 
system would make it possible rapidly to trans- 
port to the points threatened," are " arrange- 
ments incontestably favourable to the rapidity 
and regularity of the Russian mobilization, but 
which have the defect of leaving, at the outset, 
the field of battle more open than in the past 
to the eventual adversaries in the west, and which 
might have been, on these grounds, the subject 
of extremely sharp criticism from outside 
Russia y 

" Outside Russia " means in France. There 
was reason to suppose that the new distribution 
of the military forces of Russia was inspired 
chiefly by Russia's fear of Germany and the 
desire of Tsarism to be on agreeable terms with 
its powerful neighbour. I could cite yet further 
" little infidelities " of this kind — infidelities on 
the part of Russia toward France (and England 
too) — but the facts I have already cited are suffi- 
cient to prove that official Russia not only was 
' By Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1914, p. 147. 



BEFORE THE WAR 111 

not seeking a quarrel with the Austro -German 
coalition, but more than once sought to evade 
such, even to the verge of humiliation. 

Even before the debacle of the Russo-Japanese 
War, the heads of the Russian Army were by 
no means disposed to belittle the superiority of 
the Austro-German forces as compared with 
those of Russia. " Comparing the Russian and 
German forces, the invasion of Russia by German 
troops is more probable than the invasion of 
Germany by Russian troops," writes General 
Kuropatkin in his secret report (1900), and he 
adds : " Our western frontier, in the event of 
a European war, would be in such danger as 
has never been known in all the history of 
Russia." 

I imagine it is hardly necessary to insist on the 
fact that after the Japanese War, which resulted 
in the total annihilation of the Russian Navy and 
a great loss of military power, the military 
superiority of Germany became even more con- 
siderable. It is true that the Russian Govern- 
ment elaborated a new naval and military 
programme, but in July 19 14 this programme 
was still far from being realized, and it may be 
affirmed that on the eve of the present war Russia 
was not ready to wage war against the Austro- 
German bloc. The German and Austrian 
Governments well knew this, and on the 28th of 
July 1 914 the British Ambassador in Berlin 



112 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

transmitted to his Government the following 
remarks of the Austrian Ambassador in this 
connection :— 

" My Austrian colleague," telegraphed the 
British Ambassador, " said to me to-day that 
a general war was most unlikely, as Russia 
neither wanted nor was in a position to make 
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many 
people here." ^ 

This opinion of the official circles of Austria 
and Germany would suffice to demonstrate that 
all their subsequent assertions that Russia desired 
the war have no correspondence with the truth 
and are contradicted by their own words. The 
diplomatic and military withdrawal of Russia 
from Germany and Austria found its ideological 
expression, not only in non -official literature, but 
even in the declarations, official and semi-official, 
of members of the Government and the representa- 
tives of the upper bureaucracy. I have already 
quoted the confidential memoir of Baron Rosen, 
who was quite recently one of the inspiring forces 
of the foreign policy of Russia, and who claims 
that this policy should be adapted to the interests 
of Germany and Austria. Fear of German aggres- 
sion is implicit or expressed in all his speeches 
or writings. Germany, he says, "has only two 
outlets. Either she must divert Russia from her 

' Correspondence relating to " Great Britain and the European 
crisis," London, 1914. 



BEFORE THE WAR 113 

alliance with France, or prepare to deal Russia 
such a blow that she would remain disarmed 
for a long time afterwards." " Germany will 
not hesitate to follow the example of Japan," he 
says in the same memoir, which was published, 
as we know, shortly before the present war. 

During the diplomatic crisis resulting from the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Governmental press of Russia published inspired 
articles and semi-official declarations in which 
was expressed the same idea of the necessity of a 
Russian withdrawal before Austria, and in which 
the " Slav idea " was represented as a ridiculous 
prejudice or an archaic superstition. To the 
highly justifiable complaints of the Serbs, who 
asked the Russian Government why it did not 
impose its veto on the Austrian annexation of 
the two provinces populated by Serbs, Tsarism 
coolly replied : " We have our own interests to 
consider, which do not coincide with the interests 
of the Slav world in general and of Serbia in 
particular." 

These pronouncements provoked a great 
resentment among the Slavophiles and the 
Panslavists of Russia, who reproached the 
Government with deserting the " Slav cause," of 
breaking with all the historic traditions of the 
country, and of being guilty of what was almost 
a betrayal, having regard to its political duties 
and engagements. As for these same Slavo- 

8 



114 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

philes and Panslavists, they had no influence in 
the democratic world of Russia, and were quite 
powerless. A French journal referred to their 
propaganda as being merely " relatively inoffen- 
sive gymnastics," and stated that when the 
Government cried " Silence, urchins ! " all held 
their peace.' 

Ill 

Finally, the last point on which we must dwell 
a moment is the problem of the relations between 
the domestic situation in Russia and the foreign 
policy of Tsarism. Here I will remind the reader 
of what I said in my book " Modern Russia " : — 

" Considerations of internal politics have 
always weighed very perceptibly on the external 
activity of the Russian monarchy. The latter 
has always regarded the rumour of victory as 
a means of impressing the imagination of its 
subjects, and of justifying the enslavement of 
the people by the excessive power of the State 
in international relations. Whenever Russian 
Tsarism has had reason to fear a revolutionary 
movement it has thrown itself into some warlike 
adventure. For example, the insurrection of the 
Decembrists (1825) hastened the fourth Russo- 
Turkish War (1828); the Crimean War was 
hastened by the signs of the revolutionary move- 
ment of the preceding years ; and the same was 
' Le Correspondant, September 191 3, p. 1032. 



BEFORE THE WAR 115 

true of the Oriental campaign (1877-8) and the 
Russo-Japanese War. But after this last cam- 
paign and the revolution of 1905 the process 
became useless and the autocracy abandoned it. 
. . . Tsarism had considerable experience of this 
kind during and after the Russo-Japanese War. 
It saw revolutionary manifestations in the Army, 
and more especially in the Navy ; it has seen 
cruisers flying the red flag and fortresses in the 
hands of insurgents, and does not Avish to repeat 
the experience. This is why it avoids, and will 
avoid so long as it is possible to do so, any armed 
conflict with a European Power. . . . We have 
the right to assert that the revolutionary move- 
ment of the popular masses, the working classes, 
the peasants, the Army, and the Navy, is the 
best and principal guarantee of a pacific attitude 
on the part of the Russian monarchy." ' 

On the other hand, there is no doubt that 
Germany counted on the possibility of a revolu- 
tion in Russia during the war as one of the 
elements of her military movement against the 
Russian Army. Curious revelations of Germany's 
anticipation will be found in the Yellow Book of 
the French Government. This book contains a 
secret official report on the reinforcement of the 
German Army, written, we may suppose, by a 
member of the German General Staff. In the 
second chapter of this report we find the descrip- 
' "Modern Russia," pp. 215 and 228. 



116 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

tion of various prospects favourable to Germany 
in the event of a war. 

It will be necessary/' we read, " to excite 
disturbances in the North of Africa and in 
Russia. This is a means of absorbing the forces 
of the enemy. . . . Risings provoked in time 
of war by political agents need to be carefully 
prepared, and by material means. They ought 
to break out simultaneously with the destruction 
of the means of communication ; they should 
have a direct figurehead, who may be found 
among the influential religious or political 
leaders." ' 

The German monarchy, whose characteristics 
are authority, a strong policing, and, above all, 
order, wishes to sow revolutionary ideas a.mong 
its neighbours, the more easily to defeat them. 
Could one imagine a more hypocritical policy? 
This hypocrisy seems all the greater when we 
remember that Wilhelm II, on the 28th of July 
19 1 4 (two days before the outbreak of the war), 
appealed to Nicholas II in a dispatch in which 
he demanded for Austria liberty to crush little 
Servia, in the name of the principles of the 
monarchy and the counter-revolution. 

" The unscrupulous agitation which has for 

years been conducted in Serbia has led to the 

monstrous attempt of which the Archduke 

Francis Ferdinand was the victim. The frame 

^ See the Livre Jatme^ p. 11. 



BEFORE THE WAR 117 

of mind which led the Serbs to assassinate 
their own prince and his consort still prevails 
thoughout the country. You will doubtless 
agree with me," says Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, 
" that both of us, you as much as I, have, as have 
all sovereigns, a common interest in insisting that 
those who are morally responsible for this terrible 
murder shall receive the punishment they deserve." 

Germany has always been represented by the 
Russian reaction as the surest friend of the auto- 
cratic regime in Russia. The entire Press of 
the Extreme Right always made this affirmation, 
even on the eve of the war. The leader of the 
Russian anti-Semites, M. Purishkevitch, was 
known for his amicable relations with the most 
notorious representatives of the Prussian reac- 
tion. Another leader of the Russian reactionaries, 
the deputy Markov, wrote two or three months 
before the war that Russian Tsarism ought to 
conclude a Holy Alliance with German 
Kaiserism. To the Russian reactionaries Ger- 
many is a pious monarchical nation, while France 
is " impious and republican " and England " per- 
fidious and Masonic." 

These ideological ties between the Russian 
reaction and the German monarchy are fortified, 
so to speak, by the ties of physical parenthood. 
The German elements occupy an important place 
in the Imperial family of Russia, in the Courts, 
and in the Tsar's personal suite, and play a great 



118 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

part in the superior bureaucracy and even the 
higher commands of the Army. A Russian 
publicist who has given much study to this 
interesting question has estabhshed the fact that 
among the general officers of the Russian Army 
there are many Germans of the Protestant " con- 
fession " : in 1902 there were 144, and 180 in 
1905, without numbering the generals of German 
origin whose fathers have been " re -baptized " 
and become Orthodox, or have themselves under- 
gone that process; in 1905 there were 157 
" Orthodox " Germans among the Russian 
generals. "And what is most curious," adds 
the said publicist, " is that it is notoriously among 
the German officers of the Russian Army that we 
find the most rabid partisans of the Orthodox 
Church, of the autocracy, of True -Russian 
Nationalism, and the most savage reac- 
tionaries." ' 

If we now examine the civil bureaucracy in 
Russia we shall find many German names also 
among the best-known representatives of the 
political reaction . 

Here, again, is a fact which permits us to 
affirm that official and Governmental Russia 
could not have desired war with Germany. Not 
only did it not desire it, but evaded it until the 

' M. N. Rubakin, " The Russian Bureaucracy in Figures," 
an article in the review Rousskiya Mysl, Moscow, 1907, 
pp. 49-50. 



BEFORE THE WAR 119 

moment when the war was forced upon Russia 
by Germany, and when a fresh withdrawal of the 
Russian Government before the Austro-German 
plot was already absolutely impossible. 

But, say the defenders of Germany, it is per- 
haps quite possible that Russia did not desire 
the war in 19 14. But she was preparing for it 
in 19 1 8 or 1920. And in order to save herself 
from attack Germany found herself forced to 
wage a preventive war. 

This argument seems to me to have no honest 
meaning behind it. Imagine, for example, that 
I have reason to " suppose " that you perhaps 
have the " intention " to kill me in five years' 
time. Does that give me the right to kill you 
to-day? Any assassin might appeal to such an 
argument in order to represent himself as an 
innocent victim of the man he has assassinated. 



PART II 
IN THE BLOODY FRAY 



CHAPTER I 

I. The diplomatic documents and the political reality. The 
opinion of a little Chinese scholar and a great European 
scientist. — II. The international tension in July 1914 and 
the question of responsibility. The Austro-German aggres- 
sion and the part played by Russia. Could Russia have 
anticipated the war ? 

I 

I READ in the papers an amusing story of a little 
Chinese schoolboy, whose teacher suggested that 
he should write a " composition " on the origins 
of the war. This is what he wrote in his exercise- 
book :— 

" At this very moment there is a great war in 
Europe. The war began because the prince of 
Austria went to Serbia with his princess. A man 
in Serbia killed them. Germany wrote letters to 
Austria saying, ' I will help you.' Russia wrote 
a letter to Serbia, ' I am on your side.' France 
was not anxious to fight but got ready her 
soldiers. Then Germany wrote a letter to 
France : ' You must not make ready ; for if you 
do I will beat you in nine hours.' And Germany 
began to fight with France and matched through 



124 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Belgium. Belgium said : ' I am a country and 
not a road for you.' And Belgium wrote a letter 
to England saying what Germany had done. 
And so England went to help Belgium." 

This explanation of the causes of the present 
war pleased me greatly, because it seemed to me 
to be near the truth. Is it not true that the 
" Austrian prince " " went to Serbia " ? Is not 
Bosnia peopled almost exclusively by Serbs— is 
it not truly Serbia? Is it not true that Germany 
wrote letters to Austria in order to incite her to 
provocative action and violence? And that 
Russia wrote a letter to Serbia so that she should 
not on this occasion be left isolated and weak in 
the face of this violence ? Is it not true that 
France, who " was not anxious to fight," was 
forced to " make ready " her soldiers in order to 
defend herself against invasion by Germany? Is 
it not true, finally, that Belgium is a country and 
not " a road " for the Prussian troops, and that 
England had not only a right but a duty to fulfil 
in protesting against the treatment of a free 
country as though it were no more than " a road," 
and to aid little Belgium, who has become for 
ever great in the history of the centuries ? 

The truth which I found in the naive composi- 
tion of a little Chinese boy I do not often find 
in the more learned " compositions " of the great 
European diplomatists — in all these White Books, 
Black Books, Brown Books. These books de- 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 125 

compose the white Hght of truth, as a prism 
decomposes the hght of day, into a number of 
discordant colours. 

The minutes of heavy diplomatic tension which 
preceded the war have already given birth to an 
abundant literature of comment— for the most 
part interested and partial. But in all this lite- 
rary inundation there are none the less a few solid 
islands on which the reader's mind can find 
refuge from the flood of lies and inventions. As 
such an island I may especially indicate the 
remarkable analysis of the events which preceded 
the war made by the celebrated Italian historian 
Guglielmo Ferrero (author of the great work on 
" The Grandeur and; Decadence of Rome "). 
Here is what he has written on this subject : — 

" In the fatal week between the 24th and the 
31st of July there were two distinct periods. In 
the first place it was Austria who endangered 
the peace of Europe, by her aggressive and belli- 
cose policy, and by taking no notice of the 
reiterated and extremely plain declarations of 
Russia. Whatever one might reproach Russia 
for, she cannot be reproached for a lack of 
frankness during this crisis, for she declared, 
from the outset, to all the world, Austria and 
Germany included, that she would not abandon 
Serbia to her fate, but would mobilize if Serbia 
were attacked. Germany, on the other hand, 
during these first few days, assisted in the de- 



126 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

velopment of the crisis, by oscillations whose 
intention it is not easy to penetrate, and at whose 
inward motives we can with difficulty guess. She 
began with veiled threats, then relapsed into a 
sort of indolent optimism ; finally she tried to 
induce Russia to capitulate, while exercising 
pressure in Paris, and effected the miscarriage, 
one by one, of the British attempts at mediation 
by a passive resistance. During the last days 
of July the roles were changed : Austria became 
more and more conciliatory and Germany more 
and more aggressive, so that Germany sent her 
ultimatum to Russia on the very day when Austria 
was on the point of coming to an understanding 
with her neighbour. The critical moment of this 
sudden fatal change was the 29th of July. 
It was on the 29th that Germany, suddenly re- 
verting to her plan, already dallied with on the 
26th, of inducing Russia to capitulate, substituted 
herself for Austria, protested at Petersburg against 
the mobilization on the Austrian frontier, and 
finally threatened mobilization and war if Russia 
continued to mobilize, thus rendering desperate 
an already critical situation. 

" It seems, then, impossible to maintain, as the 
Berlin Government has done by all the means 
at its disposal, that Germany was provoked by 
Russia, England, and France. In all this terrible 
business these three Powers had pushed the 
spirit of conciliation to its extreme limit. They 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 127 

could not have gone farther without being guilty 
of an act of national renunciation. Their policy, 
moreover, was throughout the whole of this week 
perfectly clear and intelligible. Even with the 
few documents we possess it can readily be 
comprehended. No enigmas ; on the other hand, 
the German policy, especially that of the 29th of 
July, is indecipherable. Why on the 29th, less 
than twenty-four hours after the Chancellor had 
made his excellent and pacific proposals to the 
British Ambassador, did the Imperial Govern- 
ment suddenly summon Russia to cease her mobi- 
lization against Austria, when the latter Power 
did not as yet feel herself sufficiently threatened 
by the Russian preparations to complain of them ? 
This seems to be the capital point of the whole 
affair. Unhappily it is also the point on which 
all the official and other German publications pre- 
serve the profoundest silence. The explanation 
which Herr Jagow gave to M. Jules Cambon on 
the 30th — namely, that ' the heads of the 
Army insisted ' — is too concise and insufficiently 
clear. 

" So long as we are given no other explanation 
we are obliged to rely on the only one which at 
present seems credible. There was a war party 
in Germany. It was composed for the most part 
of irresponsibles, belonging to all classes of 
society. Professors, journalists, politicians, great 
nobles, high officials, military and civil, all com- 



128 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

plained, after 1905, that the foreign policy of 
Germany had become too feeble. The solution 
of the Morocco question had displeased many 
of them. For ten years all kinds of societies 
had been energetically striving to affect public 
opinion. The Pan-Germanic propaganda had 
infected all classes and worlds : the Court, the 
Parliament, the administration of the universities, 
the banks, and so on. All these factors had 
created an internal situation which the Govern- 
ment could not indefinitely resist. We shall 
certainly one day learn by what intrigues it was 
induced to order the German Ambassador in 
Russia to take, on the 29th, the fatal step which 
provoked the war. It is not improbable, when 
that time comes, that we shall find that the re- 
sponsible persons were reduced to executing the 
will of the irresponsible. It is even possible that 
the German Government believed it might suc- 
ceed by intimidation alone, as it had done in 
1909. If so, it was deceived. Unhappily states- 
men were never guilty of an error of calculation 
which had more terrible results. This explains 
why the question of responsibility has so excited 
Europe and America. On this question depend, 
in all probability, the destinies and the future of 
a political system which was regarded, until these 
last few months, as established on a foundation 
of granite." 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 129 

II 

To these just reflections of the well-known 
Italian historian I will add simply a few extracts 
from documents. 

In its White ( !) Book the German Govern- 
ment accuses France and Russia of encouraging 
Serbia in her "threats " (sic) against the existence 
of Austria-Hungary. But in the telegram sent 
by Sir Maurice Bunsen, British Ambassador in 
Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey (on the 31st of 
July 19 14) we read: "The Russian Ambassa- 
dor has explained to me that Russia does not 
desire to intervene unduly in Serbian affairs . . . 
and that as far as the Austrian demands are 
concerned, Russia has advised Serbia to give way 
to them as far as possible without sacrificing her 
independence." But the tactics of Austria, or 
rather of Germany and Austria, were intended to 
make reconciliation with Serbia impossible, as 
may be seen by Sir Edward Grey's telegram to 
the British Ambassador in Berlin, dispatched on 
the 27th of July: "The German Secretary of 
State has himself said that there were items in 
the Austrian Note which one could hardly expect 
Serbia to accept." The same opinion was ex- 
pressed even more cynically by the editor of 
Zukunft, Maximilian Harden, who wrote as 
follows in his issue for the ist of August : — 

•" If monarchs desire to go to war they do so, 

9 



130 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

and then instruct an industrious jurist to prove 
that the right is on their side. ... In the 
Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance 
has no precedent in history, each phrase bears 
witness that Austria - Hungary desired the 
war. . . . Only a war, for which the best minds 
of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the 
fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian 
Empire, and of the monarchy. . . . Only the 
refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put 
forward in the Note could have profited Vienna. 

" The question has been asked : where was 
the plan of campaign elaborated— in Vienna or 
Berlin ? And some hasten to reply : In Vienna. 
Why do people tolerate the propagation of such 
dangerous fables ? Why not say the thing that 
is (because it must be) : namely, that a com- 
plete understanding in all matters existed between 
Berlin and Vienna? " ' 

We can but thank Herr Harden for these 
cynical avowals, which facilitate our search for 
the most responsible authors, or rather the guilty 
criminals of this " world-war." After the 
admissions of the German journalist, can we ask 
whether Russia, France, and England did all they 
could to prevent the conflict premeditated and 
coldly provoked by Germany and Austria? My 
readers may like me to give yet a few more 
interesting quotations. On the 15th of July M. 

^ See Herr Harden's article in Zukunftiox August i, 1914. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 131 

Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, wrote 
to his Government : " Certain organs of the 
Viennese press, discussing the military organiza- 
tion of France and Russia, represent these two 
countries as being in no condition to have their 
say in European affairs, which would make it 
appreciably easier for the Dual Monarchy, sup- 
ported by Germany, to subject Serbia to any 
treatment it chooses to impose on her. The 
Mllitariscke Rundschau ' admits as much without 
hesitation : ' The moment is still favourable for 
us. . . .At the present moment the initiative 
belongs to us; Russia is not ready ; the moral 
factors ( !) and justice (!!!) are on our side, as 
well as force.' " - In another document — a Consu- 
lar report submitted to the French Government 
on the 2 1 St of July— we read: "There is here 
[in Vienna], and also in Berlin, a clan which 
accepts the idea of a general conflict ; in other 
words, a conflagration. The leading idea is 
probably that it would be best to act before 
Russia has completed her extensive improvements 
of her army and railroads, and before France 
can complete the details of her military organiza- 
tion.'' 3 It is thus proved that the Austro- 
German coalition desired the war independently 
of whatever attitude might be assumed by Russia, 

' The most influential military organ in Austria. 
^ Quoted from the Yellow Book published by the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 19 14, p. 28. 3 Ibid., p. 30. 



132 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

France, or England. What could Russia, under 
these circumstances, have done to avoid war? 
Cast Serbia into the jaws of German militarism? 
But this would have been an action of incredible 
cowardice and treachery. This the German 
Government understood very well, as we see from 
the dispatch sent by Wilhelm II to Nicholas II 
on the 24th of July, in which the German 
Emperor, speaking to the Tsar of the impression 
produced in Russia by the Austro - German 
aggression against Serbia, said : " I do not by 
any means attempt to conceal from myself the 
difficulty which you and your Government are 
experiencing in resisting the manifestations of 
public opinion." Wilhelm II himself admits that 
public opinion in Russia had reason to feel 
imcomfortable at the idea of looking on at the 
ignoble attempt on the part of two great States, 
both armed to the teeth, to strangle a little nation. 
Those who think that Russia may thus have 
been responsible for the outbreak of the present 
war often make the following objection : How, 
they ask, can you suppose that Russian Tsarism, 
which has oppressed and now oppresses so many 
peoples in its own Empire, was sincerely anxious 
to defend Serbia? To this question I frankly 
reply : I am not a friend of the Russian Govern- 
ment. I do not believe in the " sincerity " 
of the intentions of the autocratic Government. 
I know that it oppresses many peoples. But 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 133 

this is no reason why it should commit a final 
act of cowardice, and abandon Serbia to the 
Austro-German sword. And if the Russian 
Government dared to oppose the brutal violence 
to which Serbia was to be subjected by the armed 
forces of the Russian army, it performed a good 
action independently of its " inward intentions." 
Autocratic Tsarism is not a good thing, but would 
it have been any better had it been guilty of an 
act of treason towards the little Serbian nation, 
which looked to Russia for its salvation? 

Do you consider that one should expiate the 
sins one may have committed by a fresh crime, 
the dishonour which has stained one by a new 
infamy ? 

I do not believe it. And even among the 
Germans there were those who did not believe 
it — at least, there were before the war— who 
believed that Russia not only had the right to 
support Serbia against Austria, but that she was 
obliged to do so. A few days before the declara- 
tion of war the Social - Democratic journal 
Vorwdrts, expressing the thoughts of the labour- 
ing classes of Germany, made a frank declaration 
of this opinion, saying that Russia could not 
renounce her duty to defend Serbia against the 
pressure of Austria. 



CHAPTER II 

I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted 
with an unexpected war. — II. The session of the Duma. 
The agreement between the majority of the parties and 
representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote 
for the mihtary credits. 



Not only was the present war not desired by 
Russia— it was entirely unexpected by that 
country, as was emphasized by the Russian press 
as well as by the declaration of the Government 
in the Imperial Duma. 

" On the 20th of July (old style) was 
published the Imperial ukase relating to the 
resumption of your interrupted labours a 
month ago in the midst of what seemed to be 
profound peace." In such words the President 
of the Council of Ministers addressed the 
members of the Duma. " During this month 
events of the greatest historical importance have 
occurred. One after another, like claps of 
thunder, they have burst over the life of Russia 
and Europe, long prepared by the invisible course 
of history, yet sudden in their happening." 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 135 

How far not only the members of the great 
pubhc, but even those persons who made it their 
special business to study the problems of foreign 
politics, were from entertaining any supposition 
of the possibility of an imminent outbreak of 
war, we may judge from the following fact : — 

Two and a half years ago one of my friends, 
M. Pavlovitsh, who is one of the most assiduous 
students of international relations, wished to 
publish a French pamphlet, in which he demon- 
strated that the eventuality of armed conflict 
between Germany and England was incredible. 
During a private interview he told me that he 
had intended to entitle his pamphlet " The War 
Impossible." "There is no need to exag- 
gerate," I said ; "we have no guarantee of the 
impossibility of this war." M. Pavlovitsh gave 
in and entitled his pamphlet " The Improbable 
War." • 

This was in 1 9 1 2 . In 1 9 1 4, two or three 
months before the outbreak of the present war, 
the same writer (who is, I repeat, one of the 
best-informed and profoundest students of these 
questions in Russia) delivered a lecture in which 
he attacked the " alarmists " who circulated false 
rumours as to the possibility of a conflict between 
Russia and Germany, and these attacks were 
repeated by him in an article published almost on 

' Michel Pavlovitsh : Le ConUit Anglo- AUemand. La guerre 
improbable, Paris, 1912. 



136 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the eve of the declaration of war. Thus in Russia 
the war was completely unexpected, even by 
persons well informed as to international ques- 
tions. As for the " simple profane/' the masses 
of the population, to them the war was truly like 
a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. And this is a 
circumstance we must always take into con- 
sideration if we would appreciate the events 
which followed the declaration of war and the 
attitude of official and popular Russia in respect 
of this national and international disaster. 

On the 20th of July 19 14 (old style), that is, 
on the 2nd of August by European reckoning, 
the following manifesto was issued, relative to 
the declaration of war by Germany upon 
Russia :— 

" We, Nicholas II, by the grace of God 
Emperor and autocrat of all the Russias, Tsar 
of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc. 
" Declare to all our faithful subjects : 
" Following her historic traditions, Russia, who 
in faith and in blood is one with the Slav peoples, 
has never regarded their fate with indifference. 
The brotherly feelings of the Russian people for 
the Slavs have reawakened with unanimous 
impulse and peculiar force during these last few 
days, at the moment when Austria-Hungary pre- 
sented to Servia demands which were manifestly 
such as a sovereign State could not accept. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 137 

" Despising the conciliatory and pacific reply 
of the Serbian Government and refusing the 
benevolent mediation of Russia, Austria hastily 
resorted to an armed attack, which she opened 
by the bombardment of the undefended city of 
Belgrade. 

" Forced, by these new conditions, to take 
necessary measures of precaution, we gave the 
order that the Army and the Navy should be 
placed on a war footing ; but, careful of the 
blood and the wealth of our subjects, we 
employed all our efforts to secure a pacific issue 
of the negotiations then proceeding. 

" In the midst of these friendly relations the 
ally of Austria, Germany, despite our hopes that 
we should always remain good neighbours, and 
shutting her ears to the assurances which we 
gave her that the measures taken were taken 
without any hostile intention towards her — Ger- 
many proceeded to demand that these measures 
should be revoked, and, having received a refusal, 
suddenly declared war upon Russia. 

" Now it is no longer a matter only of taking 
the part of a sister nation unjustly wronged ; 
but of defending the honour, the dignity, and the 
integrity of Russia and her position among the 
Great Powers. We firmly believe that in order to 
defend the Russian soil our faithful subjects will 
rise all as one man, filled with abnegation. 

" In the dread hour of trial, let intestine dis- 



138 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

sensions be forgotten, that the union of the Tsar 
with his people may be yet more firmly consoli- 
dated, and that Russia, rising as a single man, 
may repulse the insolent attack of the enemy. 

" With a profound faith in the righteousness 
of our cause and a humble confidence in 
Almighty Providence, we invoke in our prayers 
the Divine benediction upon Holy Russia and 
our valiant troops. 

"At St. Petersburg, the 20th of July (old 
style) of the year 19 14 in the era of Jesus Christ, 
and the twentieth year of our reign. 

" Nicholas." 

I will call the attention of my readers to the 
phrase which I have italicized in this manifesto_, 
the phrase calling the subjects of the Tsar to 
forget "intestine dissensions." As we shall 
presently see, the Government itself did not 
respond to this appeal. 

While issuing the proclamation here quoted 
on the 2nd of August, the Russian Government 
also issued on the same day a ukase of the Tsar 
concerning the convocation of the legislative 
assemblies. " In the midst of the heavy trials 
sent upon our country," says the ukase, " and 
wishing to be in perfect union with our people, 
we have thought it well to convoke the Council 
and the Imperial Duma." The Prime Minister 
explained verbally to the Duma that the Govern- 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 139 

ment proposed in future to address itself also to 
the Legislative Assembly. " The legislative insti- 
tutions must understand that in the future they 
too will be convoked to sit in extraordinary ses- 
sion if circumstances necessitate such a step." 
The members of the Duma welcomed this con- 
stitutional promise with applause, which is easily 
comprehensible if we remember that in Russia 
the autocratic Government ordinarily regards the 
legislative body as a negligible factor. But while 
appreciating the " constitutionalism " for once 
manifested by Tsarism we must not exaggerate 
its degree, and we must not forget that the 
Government itself has explained its constitu- 
tionalism by very mercenary reasons. " War 
being declared against us," said the Prime 
Minister in the Duma, " the Government could 
not occupy itself with the means of meeting the 
military expenditure. . . . The Minister of 
Finances will make you acquainted with the 
measures which are proposed in the first place. 
The necessity of these measures is one of the 
reasons for the convocation of the legislative 
institutions." 

It is true that the Premier added that " this 
is only an external reason and not the most 
important," and that the Duma ought at such 
a moment "to be the expression of the popular 
thoughts and feelings." But here a question 
of principle arises : for this very Duma to which 



140 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Tsarism addressed its " constitutional appeal " 
was created by Tsarism to assist in a Coup d'etat, 
which was accomplished in 1907, at the time of 
the brutal dissolution of the second Duma ; it 
was by no means created by Tsarism to be the 
expression of the thoughts and feelings of the 
people, but to be a docile instrument of reaction. 
None the less, I am ready to admit that the 
Convocation of this Duma, the result of a coup 
d'etat, was an act of greater constitutionalism' 
than the convocation of no Duma at all— a very 
possible proceeding. 

II 

The extraordinary session of the Duma for the 
8th of August 1 9 1 4 was opened by a speech 
delivered by the President, M. Rodzianko, from 
which I will quote the more important state- 
ments :— 

" We all know very well that Russia did not 
desire the war, that ambitions of conquest are 
foreign to the Russian people, but that destiny 
itself has seen fit to involve us in an act of 
justice. . . . The die is cast. . . . Calmly, 
without anger, we can say to those who are 
attacking us : Lay down your arms. . . . Our 
people is good and pacific, but terrible when 
forced to defend itself. . . . The Russian hero 
will not hang his head in dejection, whatever 
trials he may experience ; his stalwart shoulders 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 141 

will support everything. ... At this hour our 
thoughts and our hopes are yonder on the fron- 
tiers, where our valiant Army and our valiant and 
courageous Fleet ' go forth fearlessly to battle. 
... As for us who remain at home, let us accept 
our duty, the duty of labouring without ceasing 
to assure bread to those families which are 
deprived of their heads ; let the Army know, 
not by our words alone but by our actions, that 
we shall not allow their families to suffer 
poverty." 

At the close of the President's speech the 
official declarations were made, in the name of 
the Government, by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

" Russia did not desire the war," said M. Gore- 
mykin. "The Government has conscientiously 
sought some means of extricating itself peacefully 
from the complicated situation which has over- 
taken it, seizing upon even the faintest hope of 
averting the rain of blood which threatened us. 
But there are limits even to the pacific spirit of 
Russia. Fully conscious of the heavy responsi- 
bility which weighed upon it, for the Imperial 
Government to have continued humbly to with- 
draw from the challenge flung down before it 
would have meant the renunciation of our position 
as a Great Power ; it would have been a fatal 
error ; it would have humiliated us without in any 
' Unhappily, almost non-existent. 



142 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

way modifying the course of events, which was 
not decided by us. 

" The war has opened, and it only remains for 
us to repeat the words which have resounded 
throughout the world : We shall prosecute this 
war, whatever its character, until the end. In 
all the many centuries of Russian history there 
has been perhaps but one national conflict, that 
of 1 8 1 2, which could for importance be com- 
pared with the events now imminent. The 
Government is in no way blinded by presump- 
tion ; it clearly realizes the fact that this war 
will demand an extreme effort of all its forces, 
many victims, and a courage equal to all the 
blows of Fate. But the Government cherishes 
an immovable faith in its final success, for it has 
an illimitable faith in the great historic mission 
of Russia." 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs then gave the 
deputies a long explanation of the international 
situation on the eve of the war, and the part 
played by Russia. 

" In these difficult hours, in which resolutions 
heavy with responsibilities have been taken, the 
Government has derived strength from the feeling 
that it is in perfect agreement with the popular 
conscience." Thus M. Sazonov. "When the 
moment comes for history to pronounce its impar- 
tial verdict, I have the firm conviction that 
this verdict will be in our favour. . . . Oux 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 143 

enemies are striving to cast upon us the responsi- 
bility for the scourge now desolating Europe, 
but their calumnies cannot lead into error any 
one who will with conscientious attention follow 
the Russian policy of these last few years and 
these last few days. ... It was not the policy 
of Russia that threatened the peace of the world. 
. . . You know what has been the occasion of 
the war ; torn by intestine disorders, Austria 
resolved to escape from them by striking a blow 
which, while impressing the world with her 
power, should humiliate us . To that effect Serbia 
was chosen. . . . You are not ignorant of the 
conditions under which the ultimatum was pre- 
sented to Serbia. By submitting to them she 
would have become the vassal of Austria. It 
is clear that non-intervention on our part would 
have been equivalent to the abandonment of our 
ancient character of defender of the Balkan 
peoples. And at the same time it would have 
involved the admission that the will of Austria, 
and that of Germany, who stands behind her, 
is the law of Europe, and that neither we, nor 
France, nor England can admit. (Prolonged 
applause.) 

" No less than we, our valiant Allies sought 
with all their might to preserve peace. Our 
enemies blundered : they took these efforts for 
signs of weakness. Even after the provocation 
given by Austria, Russia declined no attempt at 



144 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

a peaceful solution of the conflict. In this direc- 
tion all efforts that could be made were made 
honestly and prosecuted to the end by us and by 
our Allies .... We held firmly to one condition 
only : ready to accept any compromise that could 
have been admitted by Austria without diminish- 
ing her prestige, we excluded all that might have 
attacked the sovereignty and the independence of 
Serbia. 

" From the outset we did not conceal our point 
of view from Germany. There is no doubt that, 
had it wished, the Cabinet of Berlin might, with 
a single imperious word, have checked its ally, 
as it did during the Balkan crisis. But in reality 
Germany, who until the last few days never 
ceased to assert in so many words her desire to 
influence Vienna, rejected one by one all the 
propositions put forward, and replied by mere 
empty assurances. 

" Time was passing ; the negotiations did not 
advance. Austria savagely bombarded Belgrade. 
. . . The obvious object was to gain time by 
means of negotiations and to confront Europe 
and ourselves with the accomplished fact : the 
humiliation and annihilation of the Serbian State. 
Under these conditions we could not abstain from 
taking natural measures of precaution, all the 
more as Austria had already mobilized the half 
of her Army. When the mobilization was ordered 
in Russia our Emperor gave his Imperial word 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 145 

to the Emperor of Germany that Russia Would 
not resort to the employment of force so long 
as a hope existed of arriving at a pacific solu- 
tion under the conditions, full of moderation, 
which I have already indicated. 

" This voice was not heard. Germany declared 
war, first upon us, then upon our Allies. Losing 
all self-control, she trampled on the sacred rights 
of two States whose neutrality she had solemnly 
guaranteed by her own signature, in agreement 
with the other Powers." (Cries from all the 
benches of " Shame ! Shame ! ") 

" We can only bow our heads before the 
heroism of the Belgian people, which did not 
fear to struggle against the huge German Army." 
(Thunders of applause. The deputies persis- 
tently acclaimed the representative of Belgium, 
who was in the Diplomatic box.) 

" The procedure of Germany has not failed to 
arouse the profound indignation of the wTiole 
civilized world, and, above all, that of chivalrous 
France, who, with ourselves, has risen in the 
defence of right and justice." (A fresh outburst 
of applause. Cries from deputies of " Long live 
France ! " The deputies rose to their feet and 
the French Ambassador received a long ovation.) 

" Need I add that England shares the same 
feelings ? She also responded as one man, and 
saw that it was necessary to shatter the preten- 
sions of Germany to impose her burdensome 

10 



146 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

hegemony upon the whole of Europe." (Another 
outburst of applause. Great enthusiasm. This 
time the British Ambassador received the 
ovations of the Duma.) 

" We are fighting for our Fatherland ; we are 
fighting for its prestige and its position as a 
Great Power. We will not accept the yoke of 
Germany and her ally in Europe." (Violent 
shouts, "bravoes," frantic applause.) "The same 
motives are guiding our Allies." 

After the declarations of the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duma 
listened to a long series of speeches from dele- 
gates belonging to various parties of the Duma. 
These speeches proved that a perfect agreement 
prevailed among the great majority of the 
members of the Duma in all that related to their 
attitude in respect of the war. But it must be 
admitted that the declarations of the parties of 
the Right were very insignificant in their con- 
tents. The representative of the Centre confined 
himself to exclaiming : " Long live the Tsar, the 
People, and victory ! " The representative of the 
Nationalists expressed his opinion that " in the 
difficult and glorious moment through which we 
are passing Russia is called upon to repair some 
of her historic faults." (One may read into these 
words a reproach addressed to the Russian 
Government for its policy of "recoil" before 
the Austro -German bloc in 1909, etc.) The 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 147 

representative of the Octobrists declared : " My 
political friends have sent me here to express 
their firm conviction that, before the invasion 
now threatening", we shall all be united ; we are 
all equally ready to sacrifice our goods, our lives, 
and those of our nearest and dearest, in order 
to struggle against the enemy which is striving 
to ruin the strength and liberty of our great 
country." 

The situation was highly embarrassing to the 
Extreme Right, which had long defended in its 
press the idea of a union between the Russian 
autocracy and the German monarchy. The 
spokesman of the Extreme Right was M . Markov, 
who, as was later established, had as recently as 
April 1 9 1 4 published articles in which he insisted 
on the necessity of replacing the alliance with 
France (impious and republican) and the entente 
with England (perfidious and Free-Masonic ( I ) ) 
by a worthy union of the Russian reaction with 
the Prussian reaction. None the less, M. Markov 
was under the necessity of declaring that his 
party " awaited the victory " of Russia over 
Germany . 

The declaration of the Democratic Constitu- 
tionalists (the Cadets) was made in their name 
by tTie deputy Milukov. 

" The parliamentary group of the Liberal 
Party," he said, " has more than once raised in 
the Duma the questions which have been touched 



148 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

upon by the two first speakers who ascended this 
tribune." He referred to the representatives of 
the Labourites and the Social -Democrats, whose 
declarations will presently be cited. " Its opinion 
on these questions is well known to all. It is 
needless to say that no external circumstances 
can modify it. When the moment has come our 
party will once more attack these questions, and 
will once again point out the only path that can 
lead to the eternal regeneration of Russia. It 
hopes that in passing through the severe trials 
which await us our country will draw nearer to 
its sacred object. But at the present moment 
other questions confront us, affecting us all too 
profoundly, and another task is before us, a 
terrible and august duty, a task which im- 
periously calls for an immediate solution. We 
must concentrate all our forces in the defence 
of the State, against an external enemy, who 
pretends to sweep us from his path in order that 
he may establish a world-wide supremacy. 

" Our cause is a just cause. We are struggling 
to liberate our country from a foreign invasion, 
to liberate Europe and the Slav world from the 
Germanic Hegemony, to liberate the entire world 
from the intolerable yoke of armaments which 
never fail to increase, ruining peaceful workers 
and perpetually provoking fresh armed con- 
flicts. 

" In this struggle we are all one ; we make no 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 149 

conditions, we put forward no claims, we simply 
throw into the balance of conflict our firm will 
to vanquish the aggressor." 

I believe — and many Russian citizens are of the 
mind— that the Democratic Constitutionalists have 
committed a grave blunder in declaring that they 
" put forward no claims," for there were ques- 
tions (for example, that of a political amnesty) 
which should not have been set aside even at 
such a moment. And this political blunder 
on the part of the Cadets was imme- 
diately emphasized by the declaration of 
the Labour Party. But before speaking 
of this declaration I must cite the resolution 
voted by the Duma at the close of the 
session : — 

" Having heard the explanations of the Govern- 
ment, and being convinced, not without a feeling 
of satisfaction, that it has exhausted every means 
of maintaining peace compatible with the pres- 
tige of Russia as a Great Power, the Imperial 
Duma expresses the firm conviction that in the 
present hour of trial, before the advancing threat 
of war, all the peoples of Russia, united in a 
common sentiment of love for their country, and 
convinced of the justice of their cause, are ready 
to rise at the appeal of their Sovereign, in order 
to defend their country, its honour, and its riches . 
The Duma derives from this sentiment a calm 
assurance in the invisible strength and glorious 
future of Russia. 



150 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" Proceeding to the order of the day and ex- 
pressing the desire to collaborate in the defence 
of the country and the protection of the families 
of the reservists, the Duma sends its brotherly 
greeting to the valiant defenders of our country 
who, with abnegation, are accomplishing their 
heroic task." 

This resolution, and the projected legislation 
introduced by the Government, were voted by 
the Duma unanimously, but in the absence of 
two parties of the Extreme Left, who, not wishing 
to participate in the vote, left the hall of the 
Duma before it was taken. 

Ill 

Before leaving the hall of session the Trudo- 
vlki, who represented the peasant democracy, and 
the Social-Democrats, who represented the in- 
dustrial workers, made declarations in which they 
expounded their point of view in all that con- 
cerned the war. 

The party of the Tradoviki had responded to 
the appeal of the Government and the Cadets 
concerning the propriety of ignoring all intestine 
dissensions in the following words : — 

" Citizens of Russia, let us remember that 
you have no enemies among the working- 
classes of the belligerent countries. While 
defending to the uttermost all that is dear to 
us against the attempts at conquest made by the 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 151 

hostile Governments of Germany and Austria, 
remember that this horrible war would not have 
taken place if the great ideals of democracy — 
liberty, equality, and fraternity— had inspired the 
activities of ruling Russia and the Governments 
of all countries. And now, even in this terrible 
hour, the authorities do not forget the internal 
dissensions of the country ; they do not amnesty 
those who have striven for the liberty and happi- 
ness of their country ; they will not make peace 
with the non-Russian peoples who have pardoned 
everything and are fighting with enthusiasm at 
our side for the common Fatherland. And in 
place of alleviating the situation of the labouring- 
classes, the Government imposes on them pre- 
cisely the chief weight of military expenditure 
by the augmentation of the indirect taxes." 

But while throwing the responsibility for the 
war on all the Governments, the Social - 
Democrats proclaimed that it was the duty of 
the Socialists to defend their country against a 
foreign invasion. 

" The proletariat, the perpetual champion of 
liberty and the interests of the people, will alv^^ays 
defend the treasure of civilization amassed by 
the people against all attempts, no matter from 
whence they come," said the spokesman of the 
Social-Democrats in the Duma. 

And in speaking thus the representative of 
Russian Social -Democracy in the Duma was but 



152 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

following the tradition establislied by the Social- 
Democratic sections of preceding Dumas : 
notably the Social-Democratic section of the 
second Duma, whose members were sent to penal 
servitude for supposed implication in a " military 
conspiracy " invented by the police, declared 
through one of its spokesmen that " if the 
foreign oppressors declare war on Russia the 
proletarian youth would seize their rifles and 
resist them as they resisted their oppressors at 
home." 

The same idea was expressed by the repre- 
sentative of the Trudovikl, who made use of lan- 
guage so simple and affecting as to produce a 
profound impression on that very majority of the 
Duma which in general and on the same day had 
been more than chilly in its attitude toward the 
Extreme Left . 

" We have the immovable conviction," said the 
Labour deputy, " that the great Russian 
democracy, united to all the other forces of the 
country, will offer a decisive resistance to the 
enemy who shall attack us, and will defend its 
native soil and the culture created by the sweat 
and blood of the generations. W-e believe that 
on the field of battle, in the hour of suffering, 
the brotherhood of all the peoples of Russia will 
be cemented. A single will shall be born of 
them which at home will deliver the people from 
its terrible chains. . . . 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 153 

" Peasants and workers, and all you who desire 
the happiness and prosperity of Russia, in these 
days of heavy trials temper your spirits ! Gather 
up all your strength, and, having defended the 
country, set it free ! 

" To you, our brothers, who are shedding your 
blood for the Fatherland, our deep respect and 
our fraternal greeting ! " 

However, while admitting that the working- 
classes in field and factory should energetically 
participate in the defence of the country, the 
Labour group and the Social-Democratic section 
took no part in the vote on the resolution or the 
projected legislation referring to military credits. 
To understand this attitude we must in the first 
place remember that the position of the repre- 
sentatives of the peasants and industrial workers 
in the present Duma is quite peculiar, and unlike 
that of any other parties in the Duma. While 
all the other parties accept the existing *' Con- 
stitution," and act as legal components of the 
latter, the Labour group and the Social-Demo- 
crats deny the Constitution on principle. For 
them the Duma is not a " national representa- 
tion," but the result of a brutal coup d'etat. 
■This is why they cannot, from the political and 
moral point of view, associate themselves with 
the acts of a Government which violated its 
constitutional promises in 1907, or with the 
declarations of a Duma created as a result of 



154 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

political violence committed against the people ; 
they believe they have no right to take the 
slightest part in the doings of the present Govern- 
ment, or of the Duma, which is the instrument of 
that Government. In acting thus they consider 
that they are accomplishing their sacred duty to 
the people. 

This is one reason why the Extreme Left 
refused to take part in the voting of the Duma. 
Another reason is found in the desire of the 
Labour deputies and the Social-Democrats to 
remain faithful to their Socialist principles, and 
the obligations assumed by the Socialist Parties 
of the whole world at the international Socialist 
Congresses, which advised the Socialist repre- 
sentatives in all Parliaments not to vote for mili- 
tary credits, in order thus to express their per- 
petual protest against militarism and warfare. 
Can we reproach the Russian Socialist deputies 
because they honestly obeyed the resolutions of 
their Congress, and have observed their obliga- 
tions even in face of a foreign invasion? All 
we can say of them is that they acted like honest 
men — perhaps even too honest if we compare their 
attitude with the miserable conduct of their 
German " comrades," who have followed the 
battle-car of their Kaiser like docile slaves. 



CHAPTER III 

I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures 
taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures; the 
new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of 
alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the 
war. 

I 

War-time, when a foreign invasion threatens the 
country, is not a very favourable moment for 
internal reforms— ^above all, when the Government 
of the country at war is not, as a rule, disposed 
to progressive and reformative action. However, 
even from the measures relating to the immediate 
task in hand in time of war one can always form 
an opinion of the general character of the policy 
of the central power. 

Immediately war was declared a " state of 
war " was proclaimed throughout the whole 
Empire, and the power was transferred from the 
hands of the civil administration to the hands of 
the military governors. But this measure in 
reality changed little or nothing in the life of the 
people, for even in times of peace the Russian 
citizen lived under a system of various " excep- 



156 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

tional regulations." None the less, as we shall 
presently see, the proclamation of a state of war 
was followed by certain fresh restrictive measures, 
in many cases sensible enough in view of those 
meagre " rights of man " which already existed 
in Russia. 

But before speaking of the negative side of 
the domestic policy of Tsarism during the war 
I must, in order to be impartial, draw the atten- 
tion of my readers to its more or less positive 
side. 

Any Government, in any war, is confronted 
with two principal tasks : firstly, it must place 
the armed forces of the country on a war footing 
and " organize victory " ; in the second, it must 
organize the rearguard of the army and ensure 
its solidity. 

In the rearguard of the Russian Army two^ 
points were especially vulnerable— the frontier 
regions of Poland and the Transcaucasian region, 
which would receive the first blows from the 
enemy, and whose fidelity to the Russian cause 
ought as promptly as possible to be assured. And 
here Tsarism, which has wasted much time over 
useless and harmful national persecutions, found 
it necessary to renounce altogether its old policy, 
and to assume the attitude of a " liberator " of 
the Poles and Armenians, whose sympathies 
appeared so precious on the outbreak of the war. 

On the 9th of August the Commander-in-Chief 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 157 

of the Russian Army, the Grand Duke Nicholas, 
pubhshed his famous Proclamation to the 
Poles : — 

" Poles ! 

"The hour has sounded when the sacred dream 
of your fathers and your grandfathers may be 
realized. A century and a half has passed since 
the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, 
but the soul of the country is not dead. It con- 
tinues to live, inspired by the hope that there 
will come for the Polish people an hour of 
resurrection and of fraternal reconciliation with 
Great Russia. The Russian Army brings you 
the solemn news of this reconciliation, which 
obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish 
peoples, which it unites conjointly under the 
sceptre of the Russian Tsar. Under this sceptre 
Poland will be born again, free in her religion 
and her language and her autonomy. Russia 
only expects from you the same respect for the 
rights of those nationalities to which history has 
bound you. 

" With open heart and brotherly hand Great 
Russia advances to meet you. She believes that 
the sword with which she struck down her 
enemies at Griinwald is not yet rusted. From 
the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the 
Russian armies are on the march. The dawn 
of a new life is beginning for you, and in this 



158 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross^ the 
symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of 
peoples." 

Six weeks later (on the 1 7th of September) 
the Tsar addressed the following manifesto to 
the Armenians : — 

" Armenians ! 

" In one sublime impulse all the peoples of 
our great Russia, from east to west, have risen 
to my call. Armenians, after five centuries of 
the tyrannical yoke beneath which so many of 
your blood have succumbed, while others are yet 
suffering the most abominable outrages, the hour 
of liberty has at last sounded for you. The 
Russian people recalls, not without pride, its 
illustrious Armenian children. The Lazarevs, the 
Melikovs,' and others besides, have fought by 
the side of their Slav brothers for the glory of 
their country. 

" Your ancient fidelity is to me a pledge that 
you will succeed, in these solemn days, in per- 
forming your whole duty in a spirit of unshake- 
able faith in the final success of our armies and 
our just cause. 

" Armenians, united with your brothers in blood 
under the sceptre of the Tsars, you will at last 
know the benefits of liberty and justice." 

' Armenian Generals who fought in the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1877-8. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 159 

Referring to these proclamations, many sceptics 
have spoken of an " august demagogy," of the 
insincerity of the intentions of Tsarism, etc. But 
I beUeve we ought to accept the fact, such as 
it is. And it is a fact, and a very important 
fact, that the danger of war has compelled 
Tsarism to make before the whole world promises 
of liberation to two oppressed peoples. The per- 
formance of these promises will depend on the 
efforts of the Russian democracy and the demo- 
cracies of the allied nations, but it is a great 
moral and political victory that the Russian 
Government should have made a solemn admis- 
sion that its ancient policy of oppression was 
completely erroneous — that it is not by means of 
the knout, but of a liberal policy, that the 
sympathies of nations are to be won.' 

" As for the reproach of "august demagogy," it must be 
admitted that the German Emperor has no rivals in this respect. 
Here is the text of a proclamation addressed by William II 
to the Poles of Russia after the outbreak of the war : — 

" Poles, you will certainly recollect that one night the bells of 
the holy convent of Swati Gori (The Sacred Hills) began to ring 
although no human hand had touched the bell ropes. All pious 
persons then understood that a great event had come to pass, 
which was announced by this very miracle. This event was my 
decision to fight against Russia, to restore to Poland all her 
sacred things, and to unite her to Germany, the most cultured 
nation. 

" I have dreamed a prodigious dream. I saw the Holy Virgin, 
who commanded me to save her holy habitation, which was 
threatened with a great danger. She gazed at me with tears 
in her eyes, and I have accomplished her will. May this be 



160 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Another victory— this time not moral only, but 
actual — concerns the relations between the 
Government and the organs of local self- 
government and private societies. In order 
to safeguard the rearguard of the Army, the 
Government had to organize assistance for the 
families of the reservists, by inviting the muni- 
cipal organizations, etc., to take part in the work. 
On the other hand, the assistance of these organi- 
zations and of societies and associations of many 
kinds was necessary to the work of evacuating 
sick and wounded soldiers, the creation of 
hospital trains, hospitals, centres of supply, etc. 
To satisfy all these urgent and complex needs 
the local government bodies and private associ- 
ations required a complete liberty of action. But 
this liberty of action was non-existent, as the 
actions of the municipalities and zemstvos were 
hampered by various bureaucratic regulations ; 
the members of their executive organizations 
might exercise their functions only after receiving 
a special " confirmation " from the Ministry, 
which could always oppose its veto to the 
inclusion of this or that person ; and even the 
persons employed by the municipalities and 

done by your agency, O Poles ! And come forth to meet my 
soldiers as one goes to meet brothers and saviours ! Poles ! 
know that those who will be on my side will be largely rewarded. 
Those who set themselves against me will perish. God and the 
Holy Virgin are with me. She Herself has raised the sword to 
aid Poland." 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 161 

zemstvos had first to be submitted to the 
approval and authorization of the local Gover- 
nor, who could dismiss them " without explana- 
tion of motives." All these regulations, harmful 
enough in time of peace, were especially intoler- 
able in time of war, when the work of public 
bodies and private associations had to be quickly 
and freely organized. The Government, there- 
fore, was obliged to remove these restrictions — 
if not de jure, then de facto. The central 
authority declared that all public and private 
organizations assisting the State to give aid to 
sick and wounded soldiers should be considered 
Governmental institutions. " All attempts to 
hinder in any way whatsoever the labours of 
these public and private organizations may 
destroy their keen and creative spirit and initi- 
ative, and merely hamper the great and holy 
work," wrote the Minister of the Interior in his 
circular letter to the Governors. And when the 
municipalities began to invite the services of 
doctors and administrative officials for their 
hospitals and hospital trains, together with female 
nurses and other employees, without the previous 
authorization of the Governors, neither the latter 
nor the Ministry dared to protest. And, as we 
shall see in a later chapter, thanks to the with- 
drawal of these restrictions, a remarkable task 
has been performed by Russian society. 

After a while, unhappily, the Government once 

11 



162 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

more began to limit the activities of the social 
organizations ; for example, it dissolved the 
" Free Society for Economic Studies " of 
Petrograd, which had done much to alleviate 
the misery caused by the war. It was closed 
by the Minister of the Interior, who found 
that the little libraries organized by the 
said society for sick and wounded soldiers 
contained books and pamphlets which, although 
approved by the Censor, were none the less 
" too Liberal " in tendency. 

II 

•Where was the money for the war to be found ? 
We have seen that the financial situation of the 
Russian State before the war was by no means 
brilliant. The war could only make it still more 
difficult. " The war which broke out during the 
latter half of the year — the greatest and most 
difficult, in respect of the mobilized means and 
forces, of all the wars that Russia has ever 
waged — calls for an imprecedented strain on the 
resources of the State Treasury," said the Minister 
of Finances, describing the situation in his report 
on the Budget Estimates of 191 5. At the same 
time the war forced the Government to prohibit 
the sale of alcohol, thereby depriving it of its 
greatest source of revenue. 

To fill the enormous deficiency in the Budget 

and to cover the cost of the war the Government 

took the following measures :— 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 163 

In the first place, it sought to limit the ordi- 
nary expenditure already settled by the Budget 
of 19 14. This limit was fixed at 300 million 
roubles. Then it issued various internal and 
foreign loans, for a short term : notably the loan 
of July 23rd (old style) which amounted to 
40 million roubles ; the loan of August 22nd, of 
300 million roubles ; the loan of October 3rd, 
of 400 million roubles ; the loan of October 6th, 
of 400 million roubles, plus 1 14 millions placed 
in England : making a total of 1,714 millions in 
two and a half months. To this sum we must 
add 500 millions of "floating reserves" and a 
balance of 180 millions not expended by the 
Ministers of -War and the Marine (referring to the 
Budget of the preceding year), and we have a 
total of 2,500 million roubles, placed at the dis- 
posal of the State during the first two and a half 
months of the war. 

As for the monetary circulation, it was, accord- 
ing to the Minister of Finances, in no immediate 
danger. The legislation voted by the Duma on 
the 8th of August, 1 9 1 4, enabled the State Bank 
to issue notes not covered by the metallic funds 
to the amount of 1^500 million roubles. The 
reserve gold at the moment when war was 
declared was 1,700 million roubles, and — so 
stated the Minister of Finances in the Duma — the 
total issue of the Bank was thereby more than 
half covered. " In Germany," continued the 



164 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Minister, " the legal metallic guarantee in time 
of peace is only one -third. Our guarantee is 
therefore superior even in time of war." In 
saying this the Russian Minister of Finances 
doubtless fell into an exaggeration ; we cannot 
deny that the financial and monetary system of 
Germany is more solid than that of Russia, as 
this solidity is not guaranteed merely by the 
" floating reserves " of the Treasury, but by the 
entire wealth of the country. 

We cannot even approximately calculate what 
the war will cost Russia. The specialists do not 
always agree in their solutions of this problem. 
The Petrograd professor M. Friedmann states 
that the war is costing 20 to 30 million roubles 
per diem, or 600 to 8 00 million roubles per month, 
and that in six months Russia would spend 3,500 
to 5,000 million roubles. Another Russian 
expert calculates the mamtenance of the Army, 
during the war, to cost 3 roubles per soldier 
per diem. For an army of 7 million men this 
would mean 21 million roubles per diem, or 630 
million roubles per month. In his report on the 
Budget Estimates for 191 5 the Minister of 
Finances stated that "it is extremely difficult to 
form an opinion as to the general extent of the 
extraordinary expenditure in time of war, as one 
cannot tell how long the war will last, and I 
do not consider that I have the right to divulge 
any approximate calculations of the necessary 
expenditure." 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 165 

But one thing we can affirm : the ordinary 
resources of the Russian Treasury cannot cover 
this expenditure — above all, when we consider 
that many of these resources are diminished by 
the war, which has checked the commercial ex- 
change of Russia and the outer world, depriving 
the State of its customs, revenues, etc. 

To cover the deficit the Government has taken 
the measure familiar to it : has commenced to 
increase the burden of taxation. The augmenta- 
tion of the direct taxes should yield, in 191 5, a 
surplus of 87 million roubles in comparison with 
previous years ; the augmentation of the indirect 
taxes (taxes on sugar, matches, petroleum, 
tobacco, etc.) should yield 95 million roubles; 
the increased railway tariffs are expected to pro- 
vide 228 million roubles ; and so on. The total 
increase in all taxes, etc., may in 191 5 yield a 
surplus of 500 million roubles of extra revenue. 
But as the mere prohibition of the sale of alcohol 
will occasion a loss of 650 million roubles, it 
will be understood that the Government has to 
seek fresh sources of revenue. If Russia had 
possessed a popular and democratic Government, 
the latter might no doubt have found the 
necessary resources for the prosecution of the 
war ; it might, for instance, have confiscated the 
useless properties and funds of convents and 
churches, have monopolized the mines and oil- 
wells, and established a progressive and pro- 



166 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

portional tax on private property, etc. But 
Tsarism, the friend of the rich and the privileged, 
is not willing to take such simple measures as 
these. It prefers to increase the indirect taxes, 
which are taxes on poverty, and it appeals to 
the allied nations for money. And I must con- 
fess that the form of the requests which Russia 
has addressed to France and England is not 
always precisely . . . correct. For example, 
the two well-known Russian economists Profes- 
sors Migulin and Goldstein^, demonstrating that 
it was the duty of France and England to provide 
money for the war, employed arguments which 
might almost be regarded as a species of skilful 
blackmail. " Our objects in this war do not 
coincide with the objects of our Allies," argued 
one of these professors in his articles. " For 
France and England the principal enemy is 
Germany, while for us it is Austria. After the 
occupation of Galicia we can confine ourselves 
to defensive tactics, while for our Allies it is 
necessary that we should continue an offensive 
against Germany. But an offensive war costs 
far more than a defensive war, and if our Allies 
wish our army to continue the offensive war they 
must give us the money for the organization of 
such a war." 

Such arguments as these I find extremely dis- 
gusting ; the reader might suppose that the 
Russian Army is a horde of mercenaries which 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 167 

will fight in this or that fashion, according to 
the amount of money which the Russian Govern- 
ment may receive for its services. Such a sup- 
position would be an unthinkable insult to the 
Russian people, and no Russian democrat would 
accept responsibility for the professors' argu- 
ments. 

In the far from reassuring picture of the 
financial situation of Russia during the war there 
is yet one bright spot. I refer to the prohibition 
of the sale of vodka. 

And it must be understood that the initiative 
of this measure came from the people itself. Kor 
a long time the more thoughtful elements of the 
population have demanded the cessation of the 
sale of alcohol by the State. But the Government 
ignored these demands, and continued to draw 
hundreds of millions of roubles from the intoxica- 
tion and brutalization of the masses of the people, 
taking no notice of the resolutions forwarded by 
the municipalities and rural communes concern- 
ing the abolition of the vodka traffic. The only 
means of action remaining to those who strove 
to combat alcoholism was a moral propaganda. 
And in this connection we have of late years 
witnessed an interesting phenomenon : in the 
various Russian cities " abstainers' clubs " have 
been formed, managed by bratzy, or " little 
brothers," whose members give a solemn promise 
to abstain from the consumption of alcoholic 



168 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

drinks. " This movement had a slightly mystical 
or sectarian character," writes a Russian pub- 
licist.' And for some years the moral impulse 
of this propaganda has opposed itself to the policy 
of popular alcoholization practised by Tsarism 
for many years past. The criticism of the 
Democratic press, the protests of labour organi- 
zations, medical societies, etc., have finally over- 
come the resistance of the Government, and on 
the 31st of January, 1914, a rescript of the Tsar 
was published which ordered local administrators 
to take into consideration the will of the people 
as expressed in the resolutions concerning the 
suppression of the vodka traffic, and to close the 
vodka shops where the population so demanded. 
After the publication of this Imperial rescript 
a wave of anti - alcoholic propaganda swept 
through all Russia. Between February and July 
of 19 14 one -tenth of the total number of vodka - 
shops maintained by the State were closed by 
the wish of the local population. In certain 
districts the movement was remarkable in its 
dimensions ; in the Government of Riazan no 
less than 309 vodka-shops out of a total of 391 
were closed, or 79 per cent. 

On the 1 7th and 1 8th of July (old style), when 
the Russian Army was being mobilized, the sale 
of alcoholic drinks was discontinued over practi- 

' A Borissov, in the review Rousskiya Zapiski^ Petrograd, 
November, 19 14. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 169 

cally the entire territory of the Empire. But 
this was only a temporary measure, and the 
Government had the intention of recommencing 
its disastrous trade after a brief period of delay. 
However, the people, seizing a favourable 
moment and pretext, expressed its desire to 
see the sale of vodka completely discontinued. 
Labour associations, municipalities, zemstvos, 
rural communes, and co-operative societies de- 
manded that the sale of alcohol should be pro- 
hibited " for the whole duration of the war, and 
if possible for ever." 

The Government was once more forced to give 
way before the popular pressure. On the i6th 
of August the Russian journals published an 
official communication according to which the 
Emperor " indicated to the Minister of Finances 
that the existing situation demanded a change 
in the point of view concerning the means tending 
to the diminution of alcoholism, and that in place 
of palliatives the question of more decisive 
measures must be confronted — notably the ques- 
tion of a reconstruction of the whole Budget on 
the basis of a gradual elimination therefrom 
of the enormous revenues derived from the 
monopoly of alcohol." 

The Ministry of Finances conducted an inquiry 
into the results of the temporary suppression of 
the sale of alcohol. In Moscow, according to 
the data of the examining magistrates, " the 



170 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

number of crimes and misdemeanours in common 
law for the period included between the 17th 
of July and the 13th of August had diminished 
by 47 per cent, compared with the normal." In 
the city of Simbirsk " the criminality diminished 
by one-half ; in Orel by 80 per cent. ; in Odessa 
by 75 per cent. ; and in Kostroma by 95 per 
cent." 

Industrial employers stated that " the suppres- 
sion of wine-shops has increased the productivity 
of labour." This fact is verified by one of the 
contributors to the Journal cles Debuts. " In the 
Russian factories and foundries," he writes, " the 
returns of labour very sensibly increased [after 
the suppression of the sale of alcohol]. In this 
respect figures are cited which we have not the 
courage to reproduce, so great is the difference 
between the two sets of figures. But in a coal- 
mine with which we are well acquainted the 
verified increase in the yield is fifteen per cent. 
The figures for Monday's work, which used to 
be bad in the extreme, are now normal." 

In spite of all these facts the superior financial 
bureaucrats were ill -pleased by the suppression 
of the drink traffic, which had yielded them ample 
revenues. A member of the Einance Committee, 
M. Migulin, asserted in his articles that " the 
absolute suppression of the sale of alcoholic 
drinks will probably not be successful if it is 
long persisted in," etc. But the people continued 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 171 

its protests against alcoholism. The jury of one 
of the provincial Courts of Assizes inserted in 
one of its verdicts the declaration that alcoholism 
is one of the princifml causes of crime. " Drink- 
ing," it said, " is worse than the present war. 
The devastation of war can be repaired, but 
nothing can be expected of alcoholism save a 
general peril." 

On the 22nd of August an ordinance of the 
Tsar was published relating to the suppression 
of the sale of alcohol and alcoholic drinks " until 
the end of the war." A month later — on the 28th 
of September — at a meeting of the " Union of 
Christian Abstainers of Russia " a telegram from 
the Tsar to the president of the Union was 
read in which Nicholas II made the declara- 
tion : "I have already decided to suppress 
for ever the sale of vodka by the State in 
Russia." 

A few groups of manufacturers — distillers, wine- 
merchants, etc.— attempted to protest against the 
suppression of the drink traffic. But the press 
put them in their place. " No compromises, no 
half -measures. . . . The ruin of whole branches 
of industry ? So be it ! What else can be done ? 
Ought we to poison the people in order to benefit 
the revenues of 3,000 distillers of vodka and a 
few thousand owners of vineyards and breweries ? 
Can we compare the losses of the distillers, 
owners of vineyards, and breweries, with the 



172 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR \ 

great and net profit which will accrue to Russia 
from her complete sobriety? "^ 

Drawing up the general profit and loss account 
of the abolition movement, a Russian publicist 
wrote as follows : — 

" One of the melancholy peculiarities of 
Russian life consists of the extreme contrast 
between the interests and opinions of the 
laborious population on the one hand and those 
of the ruling classes on the other. . . . And 
here, suddenly, instead of contrasts we see an 
unlooked-for harmony. In their opinions con- 
cerning alcoholism, in their aspirations towards 
the purifying of their daily existence of bruta- 
lizing drunkenness, the masses of the labouring 
people are at one with the obvious and over- 
whelnling majority of the propertied classes. 
And this agreement gives birth to an imposing 
power. . . . The forces of the Government 
appear to form a solidarity with the forces of 
society and of the people ... it would seem 
that there is no room for doubt . , . this time 
the war against alcoholism must be victorious." ^ 

" Unhappily," adds the same writer, " the 
Government programme includes no creative 
measures." To consummate the renascence of 
the life and energies of the Russian people, it 

^ In the review Gorodskoie Dielo (" Municipal Work "), 
Petrograd, 19 14, No. 18. 

* A. Borissov, in the article already cited. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 173 

is not enough to forbid the consumption of 
vodka ; to accompHsh this the whole system 
of the State must be reformed, and all the 
conditions of popular existence. 

Ill 

Having granted certain concessions to society, 
having abolished the drink traffic, which had so 
long poisoned the body and soul of the people, 
Tsarism doubtless believed that all its political 
and moral obligations were fulfilled. It even 
began to reward itself for making these con- 
cessions by reinforcing the restrictive measures 
affecting other domains of the life of its sub- 
jects. 

Immediately after war was declared the 
Government suppressed the entire opposition 
press— even the very moderate section thereof. 
For instance, the journal Retch, the organ of 
moderate Liberalism, was suppressed, and its 
editors were compelled to humiliate themselves 
by a " repentance " and a promise to obey the 
Government, in order to redeem the right to 
publish their journal. All the Labour journals, 
and the majority of the " alien " journals 
(Ukrainian, Lettish, etc.) were suppressed. 
Many labour associations, trades unions, work- 
ing-men's clubs, and other societies were 
broken up. Searches were made in the houses 
of persons who were " suspect " (not as spies, 



174 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

but on account of their political convictions), 
while numerous arrests and deportations com- 
pleted the picture. 

The Russian Government was not willing to 
follow the good example afforded by the Govern- 
ments of the other belligerent countries, all of 
which proclaimed an amnesty for political 
offenders. While inviting the citizens to for- 
get the " intestine discords " of the country, the 
Russian Government itself forgot nothing, but 
left the prisons and penal establishments full of 
prisoners at the very moment when the brothers 
of those prisoners were marching to the front to 
die for their country. If the moral of the army 
is to be strong and healthy, the moral of the 
whole people should be so. But by continuing its 
political persecutions the Russian Government, 
instead of facilitating the heavy task of the Army, 
rendered it more difficult. 

The story of the arrest of M. Bourtzev, the 
famous writer on provocation, shows us howi 
destitute is the Russian Government of elemen- 
tary tact. Bourtzev, after the declaration of 
war and the publication of the proclamation to 
the Poles, believed in the " liberalism " of the 
Government, and began to preach to the revolu- 
tionaries and political emigres the necessity of 
a reconciliation with Tsarism. To prove the 
sincerity of his ideas and his confidence in the 
Government, he left the foreign country in which 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 175 

he had for some years been living as a political 
refugee, and went to Russia^ hoping to be of 
use to his country during the difficult period of 
the war. Directly he reached the Russian frontier 
Bourtzev was arrested and thrown into prison, 
and after some months' confinement he was tried 
and condemned to deportation for life to Siberia 
for the crime of lese-majesfe—tha.t is, for writing 
a few articles in which he expressed his opinion 
of the Tsar with insufficient respect. 

A still more painful impression was produced 
upon the entire Russian democracy by the arrest 
of five working-men deputies of the Social - 
Democratic Party. The pretext given for this 
arrest was that the police had discovered in the 
rooms of one of these deputies the manuscript 
of a proposed resolution concerning the revolu- 
tionary propaganda in the Army. But this pretext 
was completely futile, for the mere possession 
by a deputy of a proposed resolution, which might 
have been sent to him by goodness knows whom, 
cannot in general be regarded as a crime ; and 
in this particular case this anti-militarist docu- 
ment was sent to the deputies from across the 
frontier, by a small, irresponsible group of men 
who did not represent any party organization, and 
who had distributed this manuscript resolution 
among the Russian Socialist emigres long before 
the arrest of the deputies. Moreover, the tenor 
of the document, whose irresponsible authors 



176 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

spoke of the necessity of transferring the revo- 
lutionary propaganda to the field of battle, was 
so inoffensive in its complete stupidity that every- 
body readily realized that no serious politician 
could possibly have taken it seriously. 

The absurdity of the arrest of these five depu- 
ties was so obvious tha.t it gave rise to discontent 
even among the Octobrists, who justly reproached 
the Government with disturbing, by its own 
actions, the " national union " to which it was 
summoning the people. At first the Government 
wished to hand the five deputies to the military 
authorities and to cause them to be tried by court 
martial (for high treason, etc.), but the President 
of the Duma, according to the journal Nache 
Slovo,^ was able to prevent this act of stupidity. 

None the less the deputies remain in prison, 
and will be cited before the ordinary courts, 
which will no doubt condemn them, although they 
are " guilty " of nothing. 2 

I need not here enumerate other arbitrary 

' A Russian daily published in Paris, No. 3, 191 5. 

2 After these lines were written the news came from Russia 
that the five deputies were condemned to deportation to Siberia. 
And why? Not on account of "treason," of which the Public 
Prosecutor accused them, but because they were members of the 
Social-Democratic Party. Here is a proof of the absurdity of 
the present political system of Russia. The Social-Democratic 
group in the Duma is lawful, but the party to which it belongs 
is illegal ! Social-Democratic deputies cannot be arrested and 
deported as such, but they may be deported as members of an 
illegal party ! 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 177 

actions on the part of the Government which 
have been committed since the declaration of war. 
One such action is like another ; there is nothing 
new about them. But I should like to draw 
my readers' attention to one particular circum- 
stance. The Russian journal Golos (" The 
Voice "), published in Paris, stated, in its Petro- 
grad letter, that there was a moment at the begin- 
ning of the war when Tsarism was ready to make 
great concessions in its domestic policy. This 
was the moment when Germany had already 
declared war upon Russia, but when the final 
decision of England was not yet known. The 
Russian Government was afraid to face Germany 
alone, and was conscious of its weakness ; it 
was anxious to win the sympathies of its people. 
With this object in view it was actually on the 
point of issuing a constitutional manifesto more 
comprehensive than that of October 30th, 
1905, but at the very last moment it received 
the assurance that England would join in the war, 
and, its external situation being strengthened, 
Tsarism no longer thought it necessary to make 
concessions to the people, and the manifesto was 
not issued. 

It is the greatest pity that the French and 
English Governments have not brought pressure 
to bear upon the Russian Government, with a 
view to compelling it to cease its reactionary 

policy. Such pressure would be justified, not only 

12 



178 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

firom the humanitarian point of view, but also 
from the point of view of our Allies' own in- 
terests ; for all that weakens the Russian people 
during the war also weakens our Allies. 



CHAPTER IV 

I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nationalities 
of the Russian Empire before the international war. — II. The 
Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles become 
Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — IV. The 
Ukraine. — V. Finland. — VI. The position of the Jews. 
Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist problem 
in the Baltic Provinces. 



I 



More than twenty different nations and races 
inhabit the territory of the Russian Empire. The 
complexity of the national composition of the 
Russian populace gives rise to serious difficul- 
ties, even in time of peace. In times of inter- 
national tension, and especially in time of war, 
it is a hundred times more embarrassing. This 
fact was officially stated by the ex-Minister of 
War, General Kuropatkin, who wrote in his con- 
fidential report for 1900 that " the extension of 
the frontiers of Russia in all directions has led 
Russia to occupy territories inhabited by various 
foreign and hostile nationalities. To-day the 
frontiers of the inner Russia are surrounded by 
populations which are only distantly allied to 

179 



180 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the Russian people ; and in this sense the 
frontiers of Russia were in 1900 less advan- 
tageous from a military point of view than they 
were in i 700." ' 

The political blindness of Tsarism and its 
Governmental incapacity still further complicated 
the dangerous situation in the frontier districts, 
whose populations, oppressed by the Russian 
reaction, manifested a great and well-justified 
discontent . 

Yet although the General Staffs of Germany 
and Austria counted on this discontent as a 
support to their strategical operations, they were 
completely disappointed and disillusioned. The 
great majority of the " alien " populations of 
Russia remained faithful to her, and their loyalty 
was so great and so sincere that the Russian 
Government itself must have been astonished 
thereby. 

II 

In the Duma, during the session of the 8th 
of August 1 914, the leaders of the various 
national groups, one by one, ascended the tribune 
to proclaim their fidelity to Russia. 

Among all these henceforth historical declara- 
tions that which produced the greatest impression 
was that of the Polish kolo (circle), in whose 
name the deputy Yaronski declared : — 

^ Cited from my " Modern Russia," second edition, p. 214. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 181 

" At this historic moment, when Slavism and 
the Germanic world, led by our ancient enemy, 
Prussia, meet in a fatal shock, the situation of 
the Polish people, deprived of its independence 
and the possibility of freely manifesting its will, 
appears a tragic one. This tragedy resides, not 
only in the fact that our country is the theatre 
of the war and all its horrors, but also in this : 
that the Polish people, torn into three parts, will 
see its sons in each of the hostile camps. 

" Although territorially divided, we must, with 
our Slav sentiments and sympathies, form a 
single whole. This policy is not only dictated 
by the justice of the cause in which Russia has 
intervened, but also by our political reason. The 
world-wide importance of the events through 
which we are passing should relegate to the 
second place all domestic matters. 

" Please God, Slavism, under the supremacy 
of Russia, will deal the Teutons such a blow 
as was dealt them at Griinwalden five hundred 
years ago by Poland and Lithuania. May the 
blood we shall spill and the horrors of a war 
which for us is fratricidal lead to the reunion 
of the three portions of the sundered Polish 
people." 

In connection with this declaration of the 
Polish representatives in the Duma, we must in 
the first place lay stress on the fact that it was 
made when the proclamation of the Russian 



182 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

generalissimo had not yet been issued. Secondly, 
we must note that the ideas expressed in the 
declaration of the Polish deputies are shared by 
the majority of the nobles and the bourgeoisie, and 
a great part of the peasantry of Russian Poland. 
It was not merely an expression of the opinion 
of politicians and parliamentarians, but the true 
sentiment of the propertied classes of Poland. 
This " Russo-Polish " patriotism and this hatred 
of the Germans manifest themselves in the most 
unexpected ways. The Polish public, in the 
theatres of Warsaw, demanded the performance 
of the Russian National Anthem by the orchestra, 
and the Polish ladies offered flowers to the 
Russian soldiers leaving Warsaw for the front. 
It is said that the greatest of Polish writers, 
Sienkievicz, expressed his feelings concerning the 
present war in a distinctly " Russophile " 
manner ; and the best known of the Polish 
poets, modem, M. Micinski, went to Moscow 
especially for the purpose of promoting a Russo- 
Polish propaganda in that city. 

Russian society was amazed by all these facts, 
and one of the leading Russian poets, M . Brusov, 
expressed the feelings which arose within him 
at the sight of this astonishing spectacle in a 
little poem entitled " Warsaw " :— 

For the first time I solitary tread, 

Joyful of heart, the streets of Warsaw town ; 

The bloody dream, the dreadful fame, are dead : 
The fatal years no longer weigh me down. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 183 

They were ! But no ! — they have not passed away : 
The centuries' work one moment may not mine. 

And yet, may be, the work begins to-day : 
To-day the sun in heaven is for a sign. 

Oh, may it shine indeed to mark this day 

Whereon our voices found a brother's speech ; 

All that till now our tongues refused to say, 
All that we cherished dumbly out of reach. 

Not on a strait and narrow path we meet 

As poet meeting poet ; I have come 
Down the broad highway on these Russian feet, 

And as a Russian I was welcomed home ! 

And in the streets the shouts about me ring 

Like verses of a poem chiming true. 
And Polish women autumn's blossoms bring 

To Russia's joyous warriors marching through ! 



Another well-known Russian poet, M. Bal- 
mont, has written, on the same subject, a poem 
entitled " The Carnival of Blood " :— 

Soil of Russia, soil of Poland, 

Land of Poland, land of Russia ! 

I behold you, visions so familiar ! 

Yonder blows the wind and drives the snow ! 

O forests, marshes, meadows, plains ! 

The storm whistles ; the rumbling of falling grenades, 

The shrill of the shrapnel, the rumble and clamour 

Roaring death's carnival song, prolonging his hour ! 

Oh, how long is his hour ! What a world of blood 

Destiny yet has to drink, ere at length 

The goblet of ruddy wine is drained to the lees ! 

Yet not for ever shall her brows be knit : 

One day a Spring undreamed of shall come to us, 

Russia with Poland ; oh, holy, virgin lands ! 



184 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

But, to tell the truth, what appeared to poets 
remote from political life as a " day of be- 
ginning " and "an undreamed-of spring" was 
really no more than a day of reckoning, of 
drawing up a historical balance-sheet, and those 
who have attentively analysed the economic and 
social evolution of Russian Poland will not be 
surprised by all these phenomena. The process 
of capitalistic development has united Poland to 
Russia by the indestructible bonds of commercial 
exchange. The annual produce of the factories 
and workshops of Poland represents a value of 
i,ooo million roubles, and two-thirds of this is 
consumed by the Russian market. And in spite 
of all the errors and horrors of the policy of 
reactionary Tsarism, the forces of economic 
evolution have cleared the ground for a new 
ideology, as far as the propertied classes in 
Poland are concerned. This new ideology 
manifests itself to-day in this " Russo-Polish " 
patriotism, which at times perhaps seems even 
too Russophile and too enthusiastic. 

As for the poorer classes of Polish society, 
as for the proletariat, the political tendencies of 
this, the most revolutionary element of modern 
Poland, are of another kind. For a long 
time now the more thoughtful of the Polish 
workers have abandoned the idea of a Polish 
war of independence, and have dreamed rather 
of a conflict of classes. There is only one very 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 185 

small group of Polish Socialists which holds a 
different opinion ; this group, even before the 
war, was conducting a propaganda inciting to 
a national insurrection of the Poles against 
Russia. But this propaganda had no success 
among the populace— firstly, because its Utopian 
character was too obvious, and secondly, because 
the propaganda was supported by the Austrian 
Government. Here is the proof of the latter 
assertion. 

In the month of October 1 9 1 2 the committee 
at the head of this little group of Socialists pub- 
lished, in Warsaw, a secret proclamation, in 
which the possibility of a coming war between 
Austria and Russia was referred to, and which 
offered advice to all Polish patriots in Russia to 
be followed in the event of war. This advice 
was as follows :— 

1 . In the event of the mobilization of the 
Russian Army, " the appeal to the citizens 
[relative to the mobilization] will be distri- 
buted as generally as possible. 

2. "As to all those comrades who have 
suffered the misfortune of being mobilized, or 
who are incorporated in the Russian Army, we 
recommend them above all to conduct a propa- 
ganda in favour of revolutionary ideas among 
the troops. We do not recommend them to 
provoke a revolt, because under these circum- 
stances the revolt would be useless. Should 



186 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

war break out, no matter with whom, we advise 
you to injure Russia by all possible means. For 
instance, all kinds of weapons of war, instru- 
ments, means of transport, munitions of war, 
telegraphs, telephones, etc., must be destroyed. 
Fulfil your duty as a soldier deliberately and 
at your ease, so that you may at length desert 
and allow yourself to be taken prisoner, so that 
you may give the enemy's army full information 
concerning the Russian Army." ' 

When I tell you that the " Socialist " Com- 
mittee which gave such advice to the Polish 
" patriots " in Russia performed its functions 
under the benevolent protection of the Austrian 
Government, and that the armed " legions " 
which it organized were organized with the 
authorization of the Austrian police, you will 
understand that we are dealing, not with Polish 
socialism, but simply with the interests of the 
Hapsburg dynasty, which were mistaken for the 
interests of " Polish independence " by a few 
naive individuals who dreamed of the liberty of 
Poland, but could not realize that dream by their 
own action, and therefore decided to become the 
tools of the Austrian policy. 

But this " Austrian orientation " of Polish 
patriotism did not enjoy any success among the 

' See the circular of the PoHsh Socialist Party published in 
Warsaw in October 191 2. Quoted from the Bulletifi periodique 
du Bureau Socialiste International^ third year. No. 9, pp. 18-19. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 187 

masses of the people in Russian Poland. The 
great majority of the Polish working-men 
Socialists understood that such a propaganda, 
which really favoured the organization of a 
" patriotic " military espionage in the Russian 
Army for the benefit of the Austrian Army, had 
nothing in common with the aims and strivings 
of the Socialists. To the appeal of the Austro- 
Polish patriots the most influential labour 
organizations of Russian Poland — those of the 
Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Jewish 
Bund— replied that they did not accept the idea 
of an " Austrian orientation " and that " the 
" proletariat of Poland conformed, in its 
revolutionary policy, with that of the Russian 
proletariat." ' 

I happened to obtain an interview with a well- 
known Polish Socialist who remained in Poland 
during the first months of the war. He described 
the mood of the Polish working-classes in the 
following terms : " When the workers in Poland 
hear rumours of a labour movement in Petro- 
grad or elsewhere in Russia they are greatly 
interested— as much so as if had been in Poland 
—while if they are told anything about the Polish 

^ See the declarations of the " Labour Council " of Warsaw 
and of the Central Committees of the four principal Socialist 
organizations in Poland published since the beginning of the war. 
Cited from the Russian edition of the Bulletin of the Bund, 
January 1915, No. 7, p. 11. 



188 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

workers in Cracow they remain almost indifferent ." 
This is a manifestation of the results of that 
historic process which has welded Russia and 
Poland into one economic organism and has 
created a solid basis for the community of 
interests of the Polish and Russian proletariats. 
And by one of the ironies of history the very 
Socialist labour movement which was always so 
persecuted by Tsarism is at present, objectively 
speaking, playing a part which is extremely use- 
ful in preserving the integrity and unity of the 
Russian State. 

Naturally, the revolutionary proletariat of 
Poland, as well as that of Russia, does not wish 
to preserve the Russian State in its present form, 
with an autocracy, a system of government by 
police, etc. It desires to transform it into a 
democratic State, but by means of its own 
efforts, and not by the help of the German 
and Austrian monarchies. Not with Austria and 
Germany against Russia, but with the Russian 
people against the Russian reaction— such is the 
creed of the best and most thoughtful elements 
of the popular masses in Poland. 

Ill 

If we now turn our attention from Poland to 
the Caucasus — ^or rather to the Trans-Causasian 
region— we shall there find a political situation 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 189 

analogous in many ways to that existing in 
Poland. In the Trans -Caucasian country there 
is a people as unfortunate as the Polish, or 
perhaps even more unfortunate ; for while 
Poland has been divided among three European 
States, all more or less civilized, Armenia 
has been divided between three States, of which 
one— Russia— is half-Europeanized, while the 
other two— Persia and Turkey— were and still 
are almost completely barbarous. Every one 
remembers the horrors of the Armenian 
massacres organized by the Turks — not only 
by the Old Turks in the days of the Red Sultan, 
Abdul Hamid, but more recently also by the 
Young Turks, the friends of the German 
Emperor. Read the works of Armenian 
writers, and your heart will be filled with 
mortal anguish before these terrible visions 
of death and devastation which haunt the echoing 
palace in which the poetic Muse of Armenian 
letters dwells :— 

" The demons play at ball with the skulls of 
men of genius ; children devour the grass which 
has grown from their fathers' ashes ; maidens 
wear on their opulent bosoms the roses which 
have blossomed above the earth of the grave ; 
and the monstrous bats of Death fan with their 
wings the parchment visage of humanity. The 
rapacious vultures tear with fury the quivering 
heart of the peasant, and greedily drink his warm 



190 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

blood ; the iron shoes of the horses sink into 
bleeding trunks or crush the skulls of the 
wounded." 

Such is the grisly aspect under which the 
world appears in the eyes of one of the best- 
known Armenian writers, M. Avetis Aharonian.' 

"Who does not weep in our country?" he 
cries in another of his tragic tales. 

" My heart is wounded, mangled, rent. There 
is no room for another knife, another arrow : 
to make fresh wounds in it is no longer possible. 
... Its blood is a boiling sea upon the brazier 
of my sorrow ! " 

It is thus that an old Armenian woman, one 
of whose sons was " torn in pieces " by the 
Turks, while the other perished in fight, laments 
before the image of the Mother of God. All 
the history of Armenia, all her sorrows and 
sufferings, speak to us in the prayers of this 
old woman. 

After the dethronement of Abdul Hamid and 
the Young Turk " revolution " the Armenians of 
Turkey looked for an amelioration of their pain- 
ful situation, but their hopes were disappointed, 
and it is not surprising that the advent of a great 
international conflict and the beginning of the 
Russo-Turkish hostilities was welcomed by the 
Armenian people as the dawn of freedom. 

^ A. Aharonian, " Towards Liberty." A French translation 
was published in Paris in 191 2 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 191 

It is true that in Russia the Armenians are 
not yet free, any more than the other peoples of 
the Tsar's Empire, the Russian included. But 
in spite of the Tsarist reaction, the conditions 
of the Armenians in Turkish Russia were not 
so terrible as those of their brothers in Turkey, 
especially of late years, since the Tsar's lieu- 
tenant in the Caucasus, Count Vorontzov- 
Dachkov, has endeavoured to win the sympathies 
of the Armenian middle classes, in order to 
oppose them to the separatist movement on the 
one hand and the Turcophile propaganda on the 
other. The Armenian bourgeoisie was very 
willing to conclude a pact with the Russian 
Government, as its economic interests pushed it 
towards union with Russia. As the coal of 
Dombrova, the stuffs of Lodz, and other Polish 
products sold in the Russian market prepared 
the ground for Russophile sentiments among the 
propertied classes of Poland, so the petroleum 
of Baku and the products of the Caucasian mines 
exploited by the Armenian bourgeoisie have 
drawn them into contact with the economic 
organism of the Russian State and have made 
them almost Russophile. 

But I will make way for an Armenian patriot 
and democrat publicist, M. Varandian, who in 
December 1914 wrote the following lines con- 
cerning the Russo -Armenian relations and the 
hopes of his people :— 



192 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" The ancient Armenian race, which for many 
centuries was in the vanguard of civihzation in 
Asia, and which, after losing its pohtical 
mdependence in the fourteenth century, was, 
hke Poland, divided among three powerful 
monarchies, must now recover its autonomy in 
order the better to accomplish its traditional 
mission, that of an intermediary agent between 
the East and the West." 

So reason the publicists favourable to the 
cause of Armenia. Has not the Tsar himself, 
in his recent manifesto, promised his " dear 
Armenians " to restore their liberties? And now 
—great event [—Nicholas II himself visits the 
Caucasus, for the first time since his corona- 
tion (in 1894). He goes to the Armenian 
cathedral in Tiflis, addresses the aged patriarchs, 
and exhorts his subjects of whatever nationality 
faithfully to serve the great Russian fatherland. 
Then he turns toward the frontier, traversing 
the great centres of Russian Armenia, until he 
reaches Sarykamich. Never has the Tzar 
journeyed so far in these domains ; the curiosity 
and surprise are general. At ordinary times the 
Autocrat of All the Russias would not have dared 
to approach these formidable centres of 
Caucasian Carbonarism. . . . 

A wave of enthusiasm swept Russian Armenia 
from end to end ; the Armenian volunteers came 
forward by thousands ; among them were 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 193 

hundreds of students at the Universities of 
Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev. Corps were 
organized in the University towns of France and 
Switzerland. 

While their co-religionists on the other side 
of the frontier were loyally doing their duty by 
the Russian State, the Armenians of the Caucasus 
lent their aid to the Russian troops, in order to 
free their country from the Ottoman yoke. For 
a moment they had put their hopes in Young 
Turkey, in the internal regeneration of the 
Turkish Empire ; but the ultranationalist policy 
of Enver Bey and Talaat Bey, and, above all, 
the terrible tragedy of Adana, plainly demon- 
strated to the blindest that Old and Young 
Turkey were much the same, and that there 
could be no safety for a Christian people under 
Turkish rule. 

At the same time there was a reversal of the 
Armenian policy towards Russia, thanks to the 
Viceroy of the Caucasus, Count Vorontzov- 
Dachkov. The old policy of violent Russi- 
fication was abandoned ; it had never met with 
success, and only ended in an Armenian revolu- 
tion (1903). An able and intelligent man, the 
aged Vorontzov-Dachkov understood the great 
importance of Armenia to Russia— Armenia, 
" that sole oasis in the vast Mussulman desert." 

Will this new orientation of the Russian policy 
in Armenia be lasting? Will the promises of 

13 



194 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

liberty be kept? Sceptics refer to the lament- 
able precedents; neither in 1826, at the time 
of the Russo -Persian War, in which the whole 
population of Armenia took part, with the Arch- 
bishop of Tiflis at its head, nor in 1878, at 
the time of the Russo -Turkish War, which was 
conducted by Armenian generals (the com- 
mander-in-chief himself, Loris-Melikov, being 
an Armenian, and later on Minister and dictator 
of Russia), were the hopes of Armenia fully 
realized. 

This distrust, which is very natural, was swept 
away by the enthusiasm engendered by the v/ar 
against Turkey, and the Armenian democracy 
is morally and materially giving its support to 
Russia in this great conflict. 

IV 

We must now deal with the Jewish problem 
as it affects the present war. 

The situation of the Russian Jews is extremely 
painful, even at ordinary times, for among all 
the oppressed and unfortunate elements of the 
Russian population the Jewish race is the most 
unfortunate and most severely oppressed. 

" In Russia the domination of the aristocracy 
and the absolute monarchy has survived more 
completely than in any other capitalist country ; 
and this feudal and absolutist domination, as we 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 195 

know, finds its chief point of support in a policy 
of religious intolerance, racial hatred, and 
oppression of racial minorities : a policy 
which weighs more heavily on the Jews than 
on any other of the subject peoples of the 
Empire. Tied hand and foot by various ' laws 
of exception ' and by the arbitrary rule of the 
bureaucracy, the Jew, who is subject to educa- 
tional restrictions which make it impossible for 
him to receive the same instruction as that 
received by other members of the Empire, and 
for whom the famous ' line of residence ' or Pale 
was instituted, which prevents him from moving 
about in search of livelihood—the Jew is more 
closely acquainted than any with poverty and 
ruin." ' 

Add to this the pogroms organized by the 
" Black Bands " and encouraged by the superior 
bureaucracy ; remember the famous " ritual 
murders " invented by the Russian reaction and 
stage-managed, as far as the law is concerned, 
by the Ministry of Justice itself, and you will 
be of the same opinion as the author just quoted, 
and will repeat with him :— 

" The position of the Jews in Russia is 
altogether exceptional . The contemporary history 
of the European peoples knows nothing like it." 

Yet when war was declared the Jewish popu- 
lation of Russia showed, for the most part, that 
^ L. Hersch, Le Jtdf Errant d^aiij our dhui, Paris, 1913. 



196 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

it was greatly attached to its country, although 
Russia is but a cruel stepmother to her Jewish 
children. In all the towns and cities of the 
" zone of residence " or Jewish Pale there were 
great patriotic demonstrations : the Jews march- 
ing through the streets with the rolls of the 
sacred Torah and the national flag, and even 
the portrait of the Tsar. The superior Jewish 
bourgeoisie contributed largely to the collections 
made for the victims of the war, and among the 
young Jews a propaganda was carried out in 
favour of voluntary enlistment in the Russian 
Army. This attitude on the part of the Jews 
astonished even the Russian anti-Semites, whose 
too notorious leader, M. Purishkevitch, expressed 
this astonishment in the following phrase :— 
" I never thought the Jews were so amiable ! " 
Some of the anti-Semites tried to compromise 
this strange patriotism by explaining it by the 
fear of pogroms. But this miserable explana- 
tion does not tally with the facts. The truth 
is that the economic interests of the Jewish 
bourgeoisie are one factor, and the psychological 
effect of the war upon the Jewish intellectuals 
is another. 

What are the economic interests which give 
rise to Russian patriotism among the Russian 
Jews in spite of all the sufferings of the Jews 
in Russia? We shall find a reliable answer to 
this question in an article from the pen of a 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 197 

Jewish publicist which appeared in a Russian 
journal :— 

" The very motives which determine the 
patriotic and warlike feeling of the middle 
classes of the various nationalities in Russia 
apply absolutely to the Jewish bourgeoisie. An 
advantageous commercial treaty with Germany, 
the possession of the Dardanelles, or at least 
their neutralization, the supremacy of Russian 
exports in the markets of Western Asia and the 
Balkans, and, finally, the economic development 
of the whole Empire — all that the Russian 
bourgeoisie hopes to win from the war — is also 
the subject of the ' patriotic hopes ' of the Jewish 
bourgeoisie in Russia. For the latter, although 
the racial stioiggle, thanks to economic compe- 
tition, is increasingly bitter in middle-class 
circles, is none the less of one flesh with the 
Pan-Russian bourgeoisie, and is bound to it by 
a community of economic interests and aspira- 
tions. Especially in the industrial regions of 
the Pale, where the Jewish bourgeoisie plays a 
very considerable part, does this co -unity of 
interests manifest itself most fully. 

In the south and south-west of Russia in 
particular the Jewish bourgeoisie plays a very 
important part in the corn trade with Germany, 
and desires victory over the latter in order that 
after the war a Russo -German treaty may be 
concluded in the interests of the grain exporters. 



198 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

The committees of the Exchanges at Ekaterino- 
slav, Nikolaev, and Odessa express these aspira- 
tions. Still greater are the hopes of the industrial 
and commercial employers of the south, and 
there are many Jews among them ; these antici- 
pate victory in the Near East. In another 
great industrial region— Poland— the Jewish 
bourgeoisie plays a considerable part in a 
highly developed commercial exchange with 
Germany, and the question of a commercial 
treaty with the latter country is of vital interest 
to it. On the other hand, in its industrial 
and commercial activities the Jewish bourgeoisie 
of this region, as well as the Polish bourgeoisie, 
has relations with the markets of the whole of 
Russia. A Zionist organ, the Razsviet, which 
is by no means inclined to exaggerate the 
economic ties binding the Jews to Russia, states 
in this connection : ' The economic interests of 
the Jews in Poland have of late bound the Jews 
more and more closely to Russia, and the 
prospect of the separation of Poland from 
Russia, or of its annexation to this or that neigh- 
bouring State, would for them mean complete 
impoverishment .' 

" We perceive the very motives at work here 
which compel the Polish bourgeoisie to assume 
a negative position in respect of what is known 
as the ' Austrian orientation.' " » 

^ See the Russian journal Golos, 1914- 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 199 

Such is the present mentality of the mass of 
the Jewish bourgeoisie in Russia. As for the 
lower middle -class Jews, who constitute the 
majority of the Jewish population of Russia, they 
will be found—so asserts the publicist already 
cited— to be under the ideological influence of 
their wealthier brothers, on whom they are 
economically dependent. 

But the Jewish author I have quoted, while 
he justly estimates the economic factors of the 
patriotic attitude of the Jews in Russia, is almost 
silent as to the psychological aspect of the ques- 
tion. But it is essential to understand this 
aspect, above all, if we wish to understand the 
mental state of the intellectual Jews, many of 
whom believe that the present war was forced 
upon Russia, and that it is Russia's duty to 
defend herself against the brutal aggression of 
Germany. Unhappily, the stupid policy of the 
Government is damping the enthusiasm of these 
Jewish " patriots," and has created a psycho- 
logical tragedy which is well defined by the 
following private letter, which was published in 
the Russian press. The letter was written by 
a Jewish lady living in Petrograd :— 

" We are passing through a terrible time. 
Just think : it is human blood that is being 
shed ! It is horrible. We all of us felt so 
enthusiastic, and we are all cursing Wilhelm. 
Only one man— and so much blood, so many 



200 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

tears on his account ! When the war was first 
declared we Jews were extraordinarily sincere 
in what we felt : all of us, literally, were ready 
to give everything — life and all— for our country. 
For each one of us, in some strange fashion, 
is attached to Russia and loves his native 
country. There were many volunteers : every- 
body wanted to volunteer in the Army, to sacri- 
fice himself and to give what he could, with 
a single heart. I personally often felt ashamed 
to think that I could so soon forget the Beiliss 
affair and all the humiliations and outrages — 
forget them so completely that I felt as if they 
had happened a long time ago, in other times. 
. . . But to-day we are being gradually brought 
back to a sense of reality, and we feel nothing 
but shame and sorrow after our enthusiasm. 

" It is true that the blood rushes to our hearts 
when we see our dear soldiers passing, or when 
we hear about them, or think of them ; but 
we are not left to dream ; they are forcing us 
to wake to a sense of reality. Already there 
is nothing left of our dreams ! We have awaked 
to the same injustice, the same humiliations and 
outrages, although there are nearly 400,000 Jews 
in the Russian Army, and among them many 
heroes who have already merited the Military 
Cross for their brave deeds. 

" All is as it was before ; the situation is even 
growing worse. ... It is terrible ! At this 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 201 

moment, when one and all have their hearts full 
of feeling and their hands full of work, these 
cowards are nevertheless continually inventing 
fresh humiliations for the Jews. , . . No, if 
even now, in these terrible times, these gentry 
are capable of such a base and cowardly atti- 
tude, one cannot expect any decency from them. 
" S. made preparations to leave for the front, 
for the firing-line ; he wanted to enlist as a 
volunteer, to fight the Germans ; they refused 
him because he was a Jew. Then he entered 
for a course of instruction at the Samaritans' 
College, in order to go to the front as a nurse 
or ambulance-assistant ; he wished particularly 
to go right to the front, where the danger is 
greatest, where men can perhaps be of use who 
are willing to sacrifice their lives. But he is 
a Jew, and as a Jew it was impossible for him 
to go. At the present moment he and X. are 
organizing a military hospital and revictualling- 
station for soldiers at the extreme front ; he 
is working twenty hours a day, and when I call 
him back to reality by reading what the papers 
have to say of the new pleasantries, the new 
administrative measures affecting us Jews, he 
scolds us, telling us that we oughtn't to think 
of such things just now (but how can they 
humiliate us so at such a time !), and he affirms, 
on his word of honour, that if he is not killed, 
and if the situation is the same after the war, 



202 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

that he will leave Russia for ever ; but to-day 
he anticipates a better future and is ready to 
give his life. God grant that S. may be right, 
but at present our life is painful in the extreme. 
With all our hearts we desire to be patriots, but 
they won't let us; they repulse us. Well, let 
God judge them ! " ' 

While the Jewish " intellectuals " living in the 
interior of Russia are subjected to much moral 
suffering, the Jewish population of the famous 
Pale are the victims of indescribable physical 
suffering as well . On the 1 6th of January the 
Parisian journal LHumanite published a remark- 
able appeal from the Jewish Labour Party in 
Russia. In this appeal of the Bund, entitled 
" To the Civilized World," we find an affecting 
description of their incredible sufferings : — 

" The theatre of war in Russia includes 
more particularly Poland and certain provinces 
of Lithuania, which form part of the Jewish Pale. 
The Jewish population of these regions is com- 
pletely ruined by the war, and a great portion 
of it is literally starving. 

" Thousands of Jews are forced to fly 
from destitution and the invaders. And here 
the solicitude of the Government gets to work. 
The Government allows no Jew to cross the limits 
of the Ghetto ; those who have succeeded in 
finding shelter in towns outside the Ghetto are 
' See the journal Golos for the 26th of November, 19 14. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 203 

arrested, punished, and sent back to their ruined 
homes. There are few exceptions to this rule, 
even for Jewish soldiers wounded on the battle- 
field, once they have left hospital. 

" European countries will learn with amaze- 
ment that while France, England, and Switzer- 
land are welcoming the Belgian refugees . . . 
the Russian Government refuses its own subjects 
the right of migration. . . . 

" But this is not all. . . . Soldiers de- 
moralized by the anti-Semite propaganda have 
in Poland organized a series of pogroms. The 
Jews are massacred and their property pillaged. 
Even in Lodz, that " Russian Manchester," 
boasting half a million inhabitants, there was 
during the Russian occupation a pogrom which 
lasted several days. The Jews of Poland are 
literally beyond the pale of the law. 

" In other localities . . . the forced exodus 
of Jews is accomplished under the most inhuman 
conditions. Thousands of wretched beings, men, 
women, and children, sick and well, drag them- 
selves on foot, sometimes for whole weeks, over 
the relatively short distance which divides them 
from the only town in which they can count 
on shelter— Warsaw. Children die on the road, 
women give birth to premature children . . . 
mothers lose their nurselings, and suddenly dis- 
cover, to their horror, that they are clasping 
empty shawls to their bosoms. . . . 



204 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Here is a quotation from a Petrograd 
journal : ' At two o'clock the road to Warsaw 
was covered by the Jewish population of 
Grodzisk, There were about 1,500 families, 
and of these nearly 300 were the families of 
soldiers with the Army. . . . Between five and 
six o'clock we came to Blone, twelve versts from 
Grodzisk. But they would not let us enter the 
village ... we had to go round it, across a 
flooded plain. We made litters, and so carried 
the women and children as far as the highway. 
. . . The night fell, cold and wet, the sticky 
mud retarding our steps, and we went painfully 
forward, insulted and sometimes searched by the 
soldiers. . . . One woman gave birth to a 
child ; another had a miscarriage ; another died 
by the roadside. . . .' " 

This is typical. LHumanlte quotes another 
and similar account. And " directly the exiles 
have abandoned their belongings they are looted 
by soldiers and thieves ; not only shops, but 
private houses are sacked. 

" Such was the fate of the Jews of Grodzisk, 
Skemevitz, Sochatchov, Lovitch, Gura-Calvary, 
Novo-Alexandrovno, Cosennitz, Ivangorod, and 
many other towns. More than 100,000 refugees 
have sought an asylum in Warsaw. 

" The least pretext suffices to bring a Jew 
before a Council of War, which condemns him 
to death or hard labour ... if there is abso- 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 205 

lutely no proof ... he is condemned to 
corporal punishment, and forbidden to Uve in 
the town during the period of the war. 



" And to explain these atrocities the authori- 
ties have invented a fresh calumny worthy of 
the famous Beiliss affair : the Jews would assist 
the Germans ! What amazing hypocrisy ! The 
Government has called more than 250,000 Jews 
to the colours. It awards medals to Jewish 
soldiers who have distinguished themselves in 
battle. The patriotic press. . . has often 
emphasized the patriotism of the Jewish people, 
its generous gifts, the number of Jewish volun- 
teers, etc. In a number of towns the Tsar has 
received Jewish delegates and has thanked the 
Jews for their ' devoted attachment.' . . . The 
object of the manoeuvre is obvious. The legend 
of ' Jewish treason,' created at a moment of 
supreme national excitement, a more effectual 
legend than that of the ' ritual murders,' ought 
to inspire the great masses of the Russian people 
with an implacable hatred and a thirst for 
vengeance. And in case of necessity this will 
serve as a means for diverting the popular wrath 
and directing it against the Jews." 

In the Duma, on the 8th of February, 191 5, 
M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, reply- 
ing to the revelations concerning the persecution 



206 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of the Jews in the theatre of war, stated that 
these revelations " were merely the inventions of 
German calumniators," and that he " categoric- 
ally gave the lie to the calumny " that " the 
Russian troops had organized pogroms against 
the Jews." As to this ministerial denial, I may 
say, in the first place, that the troops are not 
accused of these barbarous actions ; the soldiers 
are not responsible, but the men who lead the 
troops, and the representatives of the anti-Semitic 
policy. Secondly, if the Russian Government 
sincerely wishes to cleanse itself of the stain of 
these shameful accusations it can do so very 
simply : it need only abolish immediately all 
restrictions affecting the unhappy Jewish popula- 
tion. So long as it does not do so the accusation 
lies against it, despite all the verbal denials of 
the Ministers. 

The terrible responsibility which rests on the 
Government and the commanders of the Russian 
Army is unhappily shared by the Polish 
Nationalist politicians. For years they have 
conducted an anti-Semitic propaganda in Poland, 
of the most barbarous nature, terrorizing the 
Jewish population by threats and organizing 
boy cots of Jewish merchants and artisans. 
Even the group of Revolutionary Nationalists — 
the Polish Socialist Party — Which at present 
represents the " Austrian orientation " in Polish 
society— has supported this ignoble propaganda. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 207 

During the discussion in the Duma of the pro- 
posal for municipal self-government in Poland, 
the Polish deputies made a pact with the Russian 
anti-Semites for the purpose of limiting the elec- 
toral rights of the Jews in Poland at municipal 
elections. 

Anti-Semitism has in Poland assumed such 
brutal forms that a Jewish Nationalist, who is 
also a well-known Zionist writer, M. Jabotinsky, 
declared that the Polish politicians had, by their 
policy towards the Jews, proved that they were 
not yet ripe for Polish autonomy, and that they 
were in need, " not of autonomy but of a wise 
Russian Governor." This declaration, however, 
was only an exaggeration provoked by the heat 
of the Polo-Jewish conflict. In reality, the Jews 
in Poland have completely thrown in their lot 
with that of the Poles, and regard Poland as 
their mother-country. But it is easily under- 
stood that to see conflict between the Poles 
and the Jews pleases the Russian Government, 
as it hopes to exploit that conflict in its own 
interests, according to the old principle : Divide 
et impera ! 

During the war, unhappily, the Polo-Jewish 
conflict has by no means been appeased, and 
the Polish Nationalist press has greatly contri- 
buted to the propagation of the legend of the 
" treason " of the Jews and their relations with 
the Germans. 



208 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

V 

While in Poland the racial problem is com- 
plicated by the conflict between the Poles and 
the Jews, in the Baltic Provinces it is aggravated 
by the conflict between the Germans on the one. 
hand and the Letts and Esthonians on the other. 
This conflict is not purely racial in character, 
as it also is based on a social and economic 
struggle. The Germans of the Baltic Provinces 
are in the numerical minority, but the entire 
nobility of the region is German, and holds in 
its hands, not only the landed property but also 
all the political influence, furnishing the Russian 
reaction with many of its most notorious leaders ; 
while the Esthonians, and, above all, the Letts, 
constitute the lower middle-classes and the 
peasantry of the country, are noted for their 
democratic ideas, and have given to the Russian 
revolution many of its noblest supporters, and 
martyrs who have died for the liberty of the 
people. 

In order to comprehend the attitude assumed 
in respect of the war by the German aristocracy 
of the Baltic Provinces and the lower middle- 
class democracy, compare the tone and the sub- 
stance of the two following declarations, which 
were made before the Duma on the 8th of August, 
1914:— 

The representative of the Germans, a Baltic 
noble, stated : 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 209 

" In the name of my political friends, I have 
the honour to declare that the German popula- 
tion of the Baltic Provinces, which has always 
been composed of faithful subjects, is ready 
always to rise in defence of the throne and the 
Fatherland. We shall not content ourselves with 
voting for the military measures proposed to us, 
but, following the example of our ancestors, we 
are ready to sacrifice our lives and our property 
for the unity and the greatness of Russia." 

The delegate of the Estho-Lettish group ex- 
pressed the latter's attitude as follows : 

" One of the first blows struck by the enemy 
was struck at part of the country which I repre- 
sent. This was at Libau. But the German 
sovereign was greatly mistaken if he believed 
that this blow would find any echo in the hearts 
of the inhabitants, or incite them to demonstra- 
tions hostile to Russia. On the contrary, the 
population of the Baltic Provinces, in which Letts 
and Esthonians form the vast majority, replied 
to the German fire by a deafening shout : ' Long 
live Russia ! ' And it will be the same m future, 
amid the severest trials. There is not a man 
among the Letts who does not understand that 
all we have realized could have been realized 
only under the segis of the Russian eagle, and 
that the accomplishment of all we still hope for 
is possible only if the Baltic Provinces, in the 
future as in the past, form an integral part of 

14 



210 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

our great Russia. This is why we see, at the 
present moment, in our country, such mental 
enthusiasm, and such a desire to take part in the 
defence of our dear country. These great days 
have proved that neither race, nor language, nor 
creed can prevent us, Letts and Esthonians, from 
being ardent Russian patriots and from standing 
side by side with the great Russian people to 
encounter the insolent enemy. 

" Into the sea of blood in which the tyrant 
of Europe, the tyrant who has his home in Berlin, 
wished to bathe, the Letts and the Esthonians will 
if need be shed the last drop of their blood, so 
that this man, the perpetual menace of peace, 
may not only bathe himself in that sea, but be 
drowned therein. 

" In these great days we shall prove that we 
are capable, not only of enthusiastic patriotism, 
but also, in domestic affairs, of that self-control 
which is indispensable to the success of our arms 
on the field of battle. We have many accounts 
to settle with the Germans of the Baltic 
Provinces, but we shall not choose this moment 
for settling them. When we have passed through 
these terrible times we shall present these 
accounts for your examination, and I am pro- 
foundly convinced that in the new radiance of 
the sun of peace the prejudices which some of 
you may still entertain will be dissipated. At 
the present moment there is for us Letts and 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 211 

Esthonians one object which surpasses all others : 
it is to repulse the attack of the common enemy. 

" At this historic moment I declare in the name 
of the Lettish and Esthonian deputies that we 
shall march shoulder to shoulder with the 
Russian people until the termination of the 
present conflict, which is a just and holy conflict. 
Not only our sons, our fathers, and our brothers 
will fight in the ranks of the Army, but at home 
also, under every roof, at every step, the enemy 
will encounter a desperate adversary ; he may 
deprive us of life, but from the dying themselves 
he will hear but one cry : ' Long live Russia ! ' " 

The celebrated French novelist, M. Romain 
Rolland, has published in the Swiss press an 
interesting letter sent him by a Lettish revolu- 
tionary, which deals with the question of the 
existing relations between the Germans, the 
Russians, and the Letts in the Baltic Provinces. 
I believe such " human documents " help us to 
comprehend the truth better than any abstract 
dissertations. For this reason I make way for 
the writer of this letter. He says :— 

" It would be interesting to know what those 
German writers and professors who speak of a 
holy war against barbarous Russia mean by that 
in practice. -Would they wish to come to the 
assistance of the revolutionary parties to dethrone 
the Tsar ? But these parties would proudly refuse 
to accept the aid of militarist Prussia. Would 



212 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

they liberate the neighbouring peoples oppressed 
by Russia— the Poles, for instance— by incorporat- 
ing them in the German Empire ? But every one 
knows that those Poles who are German subjects 
have suffered at the hands of the German 
Government a treatment far worse than that of 
which the Russian Poles complain with reason. 
" There remain the Baltic Provinces. Here 
for centuries the Germans have had their pioneers 
among the great landlords and the merchants 
of the cities. Although Russian subjects, they 
will doubtless welcome the German armies with 
open arms. But the majority of the population, 
of the Lettish and Esthonian peoples, would 
regard the annexation of these provinces by 
Germany as the worst of calamities. . . . The 
geographical situation of our country has brought 
upon the Letts the singular misfortune of suffer- 
ing the German yoke before the Russian. And, 
as compared with the Germans, the Russians 
appeared to us as liberators. For centuries the 
Germans kept us by brute force in a state com- 
parable to slavery. Only fifty years ago the Rus- 
sian Government gave us our freedom, but at 
the same time committed the grave injustice of 
leaving all our land in the hands of German pro- 
prietors. In spite of all, we have managed in 
twenty or thirty years to redeem from the 
Germans a portion of our soil, and to attain a 
certain level of culture, thanks to which we are 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 213 

regarded, with the Finns and the Esthonians, as 
the most advanced nation of the Russian Empire. 
" The German journals call us ungrateful . . . 
for the benefits of that culture which they boast 
of having brought us. . . . We follow the word 
Kulturtrdger ( ! ) with a mark of exclamation, 
for the actions of the Germans have made the 
word a term of derision. We acquired our cul- 
ture in spite of them, against their will. Even 
to-day it is the German representatives in the 
Duma who oppose the rare intentions of the 
Russian Government to introduce a few reforms 
in the Baltic Provinces. . . . We are subject 
to laws and regulations unknown elsewhere in 
Europe, which, established during the life of 
the feudal system, have been maintained among 
us by the efforts of the great German land- 
lords. . . . 

" Formerly, not knowing how to reconcile our 
admiration for the thought and art of Germany 
with the narrow, cruel, and haughty spirit of 
its representatives in the Baltic Provinces, we 
invented the explanation that the Germans we 
knew were a peculiar species, having little in 
common with other Germans. But the crimes 
committed in France and Belgium have proved 
us wrong. The Germans are the same every- 
where when it becomes a matter of overruling 
and suppressing all humanitarian scruples. . . . 

" It is utterly unjust always to speak of the 



214 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Russians as barbarians. Above all, the Ger- 
mans, who always employ this term in speaking 
of them, have less right than any to use it. 
The intellectual world of Russia is not inferior 
to that of Germany ; it is different, that is all . 
. . . But what makes the intellectual world of 
Russia more sympathetic than that of Germany 
is the fact that it would be incapable of justify- 
ing or approving of the barbarities of its own 
Government as do the intellectuals of Germany. 
It has often been forced to keep silent, but never 
has it excused a guilty Government. . . . 

" I do not idealize the Russians, nor has my 
people been privileged by them. On the con- 
trary, I personally have suffered more from the 
Russians than from the Germans, and my people 
know only too well the heavy fist of the Russian 
Government and the stifling breath of Pan- 
slavism. In 1906 it was the Lettish peasants and 
intellectuals who had the privilege of being 
flogged the most ; and it was they who furnished 
the greatest proportion of unfortunates to be shot, 
hanged, or imprisoned for life. And since that 
terrible year there are in the chief cities of 
Western Europe Lettish colonies of refugees who 
succeeded in escaping from the atrocities of the 
penal expedition sent into our country by the 
Russian Government. But ... at the head of 
the majority of the military detachments sent to 
chastise the country were officers of German 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 215 

nationality who had asked for this employment, 
and who displayed such zeal in shooting down 
men and burning houses that they surpassed even 
the intentions of the Russian Government. . . . 
In cases where Russian officers inflicted the lash 
the Germans gave the order for execution. 

" If we had the choice, we should prefer a 
Russian Government as the lesser ill. Our 
soldiers have left for the front filled with enthu- 
siasm . . . not to defend those who send us 
to Siberia . . . but because the war is against 
Germany, and we are capable of any sacrifice 
to prevent her annexation of the Baltic Provinces. 
. . . Panslavism is less dangerous to the inde- 
pendence of small nations than pan-Germanism. 

"... The Germans are systematic oppres- 
sors .... The Russians are less consistent ; 
they strike at times cruel and painful blows, but 
from time to time they are capable of assuaging 
the hurts they inflict ; . . . they are at heart 
more human than the Germans, who often con- 
ceal a ferocious animosity beneath an aspect of 
perfect courtesy. In 1906, when there were 
executions en masse in Russia, many officers 
committed suicide . . . but the officers of 
German blood took a joy in the performance of 
their duty. 

" I rejoice at the news of Russian victories 
. . . yet I dread a victorious Russia. . . . 
What have we to expect of victorious Tsarism but 



216 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

a frantic reawakening of the crushing ideals of 
Panslavism? . . . All our hopes go out toward 
France and England ; we should like to think 
that in one way or another they will see that 
their ally is in future worthy of them, and of the 
ideals for which they are fighting. . . . -We do 
not aspire to a political autonomy ; we desire 
only the possibility of a free development of our 
intellectual, artistic, and economic forces, with- 
out the eternal threat of Russification or 
Germanization." ' 

There are, perhaps, exaggerations in that part 
of this letter which compares the German with 
the Russian reactionaries. All reactionaries are 
equally detestable. But I quote from this letter 
because it describes the feelings of the non- 
German inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces in 
respect of the German nobility. 

VI 

Among the greatest blunders of Tsarism during 
the war we must emphasize its Finnish policy. 

In November 1 9 1 4, three and a half months 
after the beginning of the war, the Russian 
Government issued an Imperial ukase relating 
to the Finnish problem, the tenor of which was 
as follows : — I 

^ Letter to Romain RoUand in 'Cao. Journal de Geneve, 12th of 
October, 19 14. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 217 

" His Imperial Majesty has sanctioned a pro- 
gramme of legal measures relating to Finland, 
a programme which has been drawn up by ^ 
Commission specially appointed by his Majesty 
to that effect. The Commission finds that the 
programme in question includes two principal 
groups of measures. 

" I . Measures designed to fortify the authority 
of the Government in Finland, so that the law 
may be executed and order maintained. 

" 2. Measures designed to establish closer 
political relations and economic unity in respect 
of Finland and the rest of the Empire. 

" The measures which follow are enumerated 
in the first group : — 

" Revision of the laws relating to the discip- 
linary responsibility of the authorities in Finland. 
Removal to the Imperial Courts of all causes 
dealing with offences committed by Finnish civil 
functionaries in the exercise of their duties ; 
revision of the Finnish law relating to the status 
of civil functionaries, in particular those which 
relate to their immovability, the modification of 
their oath, and their right to attach themselves 
to political parties ; the training of a staff of 
officials destined to fill vacancies in the adminis- 
tration of Finland and in particular the institu- 
tion of Chairs of Finnish Law in the Universities 
of the Empire ; the introduction of the teaching 
of Finnish and Swedish in the schools of the 



218 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Empire, and the addition of Russian to the sub- 
jects of the matriculation examination at Helsing- 
fors University ; the promulgation of a law- 
touching the application to Finland of the 
measure known as the Exceptional Law ; the 
revision of the regulations of the police and 
gendarmerie in Finland ; the promulgation of 
laws applicable conjointly to the Empire and 
Finland relating to the Press, assemblies, and 
societies ; the extension of the control of the 
Minister of Public Instruction (Russian) over 
Finnish educational institutions ; the adoption of 
measures prohibiting the introduction of arms and 
ammunition into Finland, etc., etc. 

" In the second group are enumerated the 
following measures : — 

" The settlement of questions relating to reli- 
gion and the Orthodox Church in Finland and 
the placing of Orthodox Church schools under 
the authority of the Holy Synod ; the extension 
to Finland of import duties equal to those 
imposed throughout the rest of the Empire and 
special measures designed to ensure to goods, 
such as sugar, meat, etc., produced in Russia, 
privileges in the Finnish market ; the promulga- 
tion of a law common to Finland and the Empire 
concerning the acquisition and loss of Russian 
nationality ; the extension to Finland of the 
activities of the Rural Peasants' Bank (Rus- 
sian)," etc., etc. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 219 

The reader will realize that this amounts to a 
veritable political and economic conquest of 
Finland, by the Russian police and officials on 
the one hand and by Russian merchandise on 
the other. 

The publication of such a " programme " of 
" legal " measures is a provocation unheard of 
even in the history of the Finnish Constitution, 
which has already had to bear many an unlawful 
blow. This provocation — above all, in time of 
war — shows an absolute lack of the most elemen- 
tary tact on the part of the Russian Government. 
One of the moderate Russian journals, expressing 
its profound amazement at this programme, 
stated that it belonged to the past rather than 
to the future. It is needless to say that the 
Finnish people, loyal during the present war as 
they were during the Japanese War, have done 
nothing whatever to merit such treatment, and 
that public opinion, not only in Finland but also 
in the neighbouring States of Sweden and 
Norway, was revolted by these reactionary 
measures . 

" This programme of Russifi cation," exclaimed 
the Stockholm Dagblad, " is the very opposite 
of the fine promises of liberty and autonomy 
made in the form of a manifesto to the 
Poles and Galicians by the Grand Duke 
Nicholas." 



220 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

VII 

The Ukrainian problem is perhaps the least 
well known, as far as the European public 
is concerned, of all the nationalist or racial 
problems existing in modern Russia. The ex- 
planation is that until recently the Nationalist 
movement of the Ukrainians was cultural rather 
than political. In the domain of their national 
culture the Ukrainians have accomplished much. 
Their literature is flourishing, and some of their 
ancient poets (for example, Shevtshenko) and 
certain of their modern authors (Ivan Franko, 
Vasil Stefanik, etc.) would adorn the literature 
of any country. Ukrainian philology and history, 
the Ukrainian arts, and other manifestations of 
the national genius of this talented people, have 
undergone a rapid development of late. 

Unfortunately, the erroneous policy of re- 
actionary Tsarism weighed heavily on the intel- 
lectual movements of the Ukrainians. The 
Russian Government opposed it by every possible 
means. Even the terms " Ukraine " and 
" Ukrainian " were prohibited, being replaced 
by " Little Russia " and " Little Russian." To 
justify this persecution Tsarism accused the 
Ukrainians of " separatist " tendencies. This 
accusation was false, for the separatist policy 
has not and could not have any hold upon 
Ukrainian society. From the economic point of 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 221 

view the Ukraine, which covers ten Governments 
of southern and south-western Russia, is closely 
bound up with the economic organism of all 
Russia— more closely even than Poland and the 
Caucasus. The cities and industrial centres of 
the Ukraine are denationalized, or rather inter- 
nationalized, for their population represents a 
great admixture of races and languages, the 
Russian language being sensibly predominant in 
current usage and in the press. A large pro- 
portion of the Ukrainian " intellectuals " have 
been profoundly influenced by Russian culture. 
The most eminent poet of the Ukraine, Tarass 
Shevtshenko, who was deported to the Far East 
by the Russian Government for his " subversive 
ideas," was not only a Ukrainian patriot, but a 
Russian patriot also, and his dream was to facili- 
tate the ties of friendship between the two 
peoples, which are brothers by birth, and to 
compose a common Russo-Ukrainian tongue 
which could be understood by both peoples. 

The Austrian Government has of late years 
shown itself wiser than the Russian. It abated 
its persecution of the Ukrainians living on 
Austrian territory, in Bukovina, and Eastern 
Galicia, granting them certain concessions in the 
sphere of public instruction and political rights, 
and the Ukrainian Nationalist movement de- 
veloped more freely in Austria than in Russia, 
The Austrian Ukrainians (the " Russiny " or 



222 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Ruthenians) founded primary and secondary 
schools, in which the teaching was in the 
Ukrainian tongue, while in Russia the Ukrainian 
children are taught in Russian, which is not 
their mother-tongue. 

This policy of the Austrian Government, which 
was designed to attract Ukrainian sympathies, 
was based upon political calculations. Austria 
wished to create a separatist movement among 
the Russian Ukrainians and an Austrian " orien- 
tation " of that movement. But the great 
mass of Russian Ukrainians failed to be 
seduced by Austria, and, in spite of all the 
injustice which they suffered at the hands of 
Tsarism, they refused the idea of separatism, 
hoping that a true national liberation of the 
Ukraine would come simultaneously with the 
liberation of all Russia and the abolition of 
the old state of affairs throughout the Empire. 

After the declaration of war the Government 
and the General Staff of Austria created a 
special organization known as the " Union for 
the Liberation of the Ukraine," whose object 
was : ( I ) to inform European opinion concern- 
ing the Ukrainian question, and ( 2 ) to provoke 
a " revolution " in Russian Ukraine which should 
" absorb " the forces of the Tsar. This Union, 
which announced itself as being in favour of 
an independent Ukraine, is in reality merely an 
ignoble agency of the Hapsburg monarchy and 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 223 

its army and police. Here are some extracts 
from proclamations issued by the said Union, 
in various European languages (German, Italian, 
English, etc.) :— 

" The unexampled provocative politics of 
Russia have plunged the whole world into 
a catastrophe which is unequalled in history. 
. . . The Union for the freeing of the Ukraine 
is to represent the national, political, social, and 
economic interests of the Ukrainian people 
in Russia. . . . Historical necessity demands as 
a sine qua noti that an independent Ukrainian 
State should arise between Russia and Europe. 
. . . The foundation of this State is necessary 
and indispensable to the vital interests of the 
Austro- Hungarian monarchy, and for the con- 
tinuous and undisturbed development of the 
German people in the monarchy and the German 
Empire. . . . The Union for the Liberation of 
the Ukraine foresees the realization of its 
endeavours in the defeat of the Russian Empire 
by the United Monarchies." ' 

From these few quotations it will be seen that 
what is really at stake is, not the independence 
of Ukraine but simply the interests of Austria 
and Germany. One of the inspiring forces of 
the Union, Herr Lewicki, a deputy to the Vienna 
Reichsrat, openly declared as much, in an article 

' See the proclamations of the Union for the liberation of 
Ukraine, in the Ukrainische Nachrichten, Vienna. 



224 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

published on the ist of October, 19 14, in the 
Berliner Tdgehlatt, in which he described the 
brilliant prospects open to Austro-German capital 
in Southern Russia in the event of its separation 
from the Russian State. These Ukrainian 
" patriots " merely wish to sell their beloved 
country to the German capitalists. 

But before selling their country they sell 
themselves. In the Ukrainian Social-Democratic 
journal Borotha (" The Struggle "), published in 
Geneva, were published scandalous revelations 
concerning the Union for the Liberation of the 
Ukraine. It appears from these revelations that 
this " Union," domiciled in Vienna, is composed 
of a few men who were some years ago excluded 
from one of the political parties of Russian 
Ukraine. Among them there was also an agent 
of the Viennese secret police. The Union, which 
calls itself an organization of the Russian 
Ukrainians, is supported financially by the 
Austrian Government, and is merely " a lackey 
of that Government, on which it is entirely 
and shamefully dependent." ' " It is only for 
purposes of advertisement that this Union calls 
itself a Russian organization ; it is really 
Austrian." 

In order to gain an influence over the 
popular masses in Ukraine and Russia this Union 
created two affiliated societies and baptized them 
' See Borotba, February 19 15. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 225 

by names which might attract the Russian and 
Ukrainian peasants and industrial workers. One 
of these, operating from Constantinople ( ! ), is 
known as the " Social-Democratic Ukrainian 
Labour Party," and is composed of a few 
Austrian agents. The other is known as the 
" Ukrainian Union of Revolutionary Socialists," 
and operates from Vienna. Its character may 
be judged from the following : " The new-born 
revolutionist and man of action, Herr Z. "—here 
follows the name of the leader of the Union — 
" gathered round himself, and his Austrian 
money, in Vienna, half a score of crooks, 
drunkards, and vagabonds, of Bukovinian or 
Galician origin, who gladly consented to play, 
in Austria, the agreeable, care -free, amusing, and 
profitable role of the Emperor's own revolu- 
tionists. , . . The Austrian Government pays 
through the nose. The Ukrainian Revolutionary 
Socialist Party in Vienna— that is to say Herr Z. 
and Company— draws the money, flourishes, and 
grows rich. It drinks heartily, keeps its 
mistresses, goes on the spree. People talk 
of two million crowns. For one small party 
that will suffice for a lifetime." i 

It is superfluous to add that the genuine 
Ukrainian revolutionists have indignantly re- 
jected the infamous proposals of the Austrian 

' See the article " A Shameful Affair," published in the 
journal Borotba^ February 191 5. 

IS 



226 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Government, and, so far from joining these 
Viennese " Unions," have unmasked their repul- 
sive features. 

But here, as my readers will see, we are 
dealing, not with a political association, but 
merely an offence against the common law, a 
simple fraud sheltering behind a " national flag." 
As for the political side of the question, it is in- 
contestable that the whole Austro-Turco -German 
propaganda in Ukraine— a movement designed to 
give rise to a separatist movement among the 
Ukrainians — has ended in a complete fiasco. The 
Ukrainian Social-Democrats have resolutely set 
their faces against the Separatist policy, pre- 
ferring the idea of the common struggle of the 
popular masses of Russia and the Ukraine 
against Tsarism and for democracy. As for the 
Ukrainian Liberals and Radicals in Russia, they 
published, at the moment of the declaration of 
war, special declarations in which they explained 
their political situation in the following terms :— 
" Owing to the dismemberment of our national 
organism between Russia and Austro-Hungary, 
certain elements of Russian society were induced 
to believe in the possibility of a so-called 
' Austrian orientation ' among the Ukrainians in 
Russia— that is, a sympathetic feeling in respect 
of the Hapsburg monarchy— and to regard them 
as an unstable element in time of international 
conflicts such as the present war. We need not 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 227 

say that such suppositions had no basis ; no 
real fact, no solid argument can be adduced in 
their support. In the ideals of the Ukrainian 
people, in their practical aspirations, and in the 
national development of that portion of the 
Ukrainian race which forms a part of the popu- 
lation of Russia, they have always imagined 
themselves as remaining within the frontiers of 
Russia and in close union with the people of 
Russia. . . . The manifestation of the national 
will of the Russian Ukrainians has never found 
its expression in hazardous political combinations^ 
and temptations of this kind have never found 
any echo among the wider strata of Ukrainian 
society. . . . Ukrainian separatism ... is a 
myth. . . . The ' Austrian orientation ' of the 
Russian Ukrainians was invented by Viennese 
politicians as a bogey. ... In the hour of un- 
paralleled trials to which our sentiment of 
nationality is now being subjected we ought to 
display an understanding of historical events 
corresponding with our national development, a 
sane political spirit and an organized national 
will, and to realize that the nation is bound by 
a thousand ties — of blood, kinship, commerce, 
and history — to a nation which is to-day fighting 
against Austro- Hungary and the German 
Empire. On crossing the frontiers the enemies 
of Russia will doubtless endeavour to win the 
Ukrainian people to their side, and, by means 



228 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of various political promises, to sow disturbance 
among them. The Ukrainians will not allow 
themselves to be tempted by this policy of provo- 
cation, and will accomplish their duties as citizens 
of Russia, in these difficult times, to the end : 
not only on the field of battle, in the ranks of 
the warlike troops, will they fight against the 
infringers of peace and the laws of humanity, but 
also as simple citizens, inhabitants of the country, 
who should, in proportion to their strength and 
opportunities, contribute to the accomplishment 
by the Russian Army of the task of unparalleled 
gravity which awaits it." ' 

' See the declaration of the staff of the Ukrainskdia Jzzn, a 
review which counts among its editors and contributors the chief 
representatives of Liberal and Radical thought in Ukraine. 



CHAPTER V 

I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries and 
Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this dread. 
The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. Why is 
the propaganda resulting from this apprehension erroneous 
and harmful? — II. The German, Austrian, and Turkish 
Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian revolution- 
aries. The noble reply of certain of these latter to the 
agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. Russian 
revolutionaries in the French Army. 

I 

The last lines of the letter of a Lettish revolu- 
tionary quoted in the last chapter, which express 
the hope that Germany will be defeated, but, 
at the same time, anxiety as to the possible effect 
of a Russian victory on the domestic life of 
Russia, suggest a very serious and interesting 
problem. It is the problem of that " dread of 
victory " which is to be observed among certain 
circles of the Russian revolutionaries and 
Socialists. 

The leader of a small Russian Social -Demo- 
cratic group, M. Lenin, who has assumed a task 
of doubtful honour and utility, the propaga- 
tion of this " dread of victory," formulates his 

point of view as follows : — 

a29 



230 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

In the actual state of affairs it is im- 
possible, from the point of view of the Inter- 
national proletariat, to say which would be the 
lesser evil for Socialism— an Austro -German 
defeat, or a Franco-Russo-English defeat. But 
for us, Russian Social-Democrats, there can be 
no doubt that, from the point of view of the 
working-classes and of the toiling mass of all 
the Russian peoples, the lesser evil would be 
a defeat of the Tsarist monarchy, which is the 
most reactionary and the most barbarous of 
Governments, and which oppresses the largest 
number of nationalities and the largest mass of 
population in Europe and Asia." ' 

" We cannot ignore the fact," says the same 
writer in another article, " that this or that issue 
of the military operations will facilitate or render 
more difficult our work of liberation in Russia. 
And we say : Yes, we hope for the defeat of 
Russia because it will facilitate the internal 
victory of Russia— the abolition of her slavery, 
her liberation from the chains of Tsarism."2 

Another Social-Democrat and Russian pub- 
licist, M. L. Martov, expresses almost the same 
opinion, but in a much more prudent form— in 
the form of a supposition :— 

' See the small non-periodical sheet, the Sozial-Demokrat^ 
published in Russian at Geneva, which is the personal organ of 
M. Lenin, October 1914, No. 33. 

^ Ibid., No. 38, February 191 5. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 231 

" The failure of Russian Tsarism in the present 
war . . . would only once more aggravate the 
contradictions of Russian life and would once 
more make immediate the problem of a radical 
reconstitution of the ancien regime y ' 

As will be seen, the Lettish revolutionary 
whose letter we reproduced expressed merely 
the dread of victory, while M. Lenin expresses 
the hope that Russia will be defeated. This 
nefarious idea was expressed in the draft of a 
resolution of which I have already spoken as 
having been found in the rooms of one of five 
Social-Democratic deputies who were arrested at 
Petrograd. The anonymous and irresponsible 
authors of this draft state therein that " the defeat 
of the Tsarist monarchy and the Tsar's troops " 
in the present war " would be the lesser evil " 
from the point of view of the Russian proletariat. 

Happily, the Russian workers in whose name 
these irresponsible persons profess to speak are 
not of the same opinion. On the contrary, it 
may be asserted that the Russian working-classes 
are resolutely in favour of the defence of Russia 
and her victory. Here are the proofs of this 
assertion :— 

The prominent German journal the Leipziger 
Volkszeitung, a Socialist organ, published the 
following letter describing the internal situation 
in Russia in the middle of October 1 9 1 4 :— 
■ See Golos, 19^4, No. 41. 



232 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" A great majority of Russian citizens, and 
among them many Social-Democrats, are con- 
vinced that Germany is waging an aggressive 
war, while Russia is defending herself against 
a German invasion. . . . The war is becoming 
more and more popular in Russia. . . . The 
present situation bears no resemblance to that 
which existed ten years ago. The war was then 
a dynastic war, while to-day we are witnessing 
a people's war. . . . The leader of the Social- 
Democratic faction in the Duma, M. Tshkeidze, 
has given expression to the following opinion : 
' Russian culture is but a small and weakly tree, 
while German culture is a mighty oak. We 
must defend the weak little tree of our culture 
from the peril that threatens it.' The attitude 
towards the war adopted by the German Social- 
Democratic Party has made a profound impres- 
sion on the Russian Socialists. The Petrograd 
Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party had intended to publish a manifesto against 
the war, but immediately following upon the news 
that the German Social-Democrats had declared 
for the war, the feeling of the Russian 
Social-Democrats was considerably modified. 
To-day the mass of the Russian workers are 
saying : ' We cannot abandon the defensive 
and allow the Germans to kill us ; we are 
obliged to defend ourselves.' The tactics of 
the German Social-Democrats have prevented 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 233 

many opponents of the war from raising their 
voices in protest. . . . The news of the fate 
of Louvain and Reims and other similar facts 
have still further strengthened the state of 
mind we have described. The working-classes 
in Russia are tranquil. The news given in the 
German newspapers concerning revolts, strikes, 
etc., is not in accordance with the facts. On 
the contrary, since the beginning of the war we 
have had no serious strike, although before the 
war broke out an implacable economic struggle 
was being waged, as your readers know, by the 
workers. A great movement was developing in 
Petrograd, and barricades had even been seen 
in the streets." 

In the report presented by the Organizing 
Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party at the conference of the Socialists of the 
neutral countries held at Copenhagen, we find 
the same statement, that, " unlike the Russo- 
Japanese War, the present war has become 
popular among the masses." In a letter from 
Russia, published in the Russian Social-Demo- 
cratic journal Nache Slovo (in Paris), we read 
that " the masses of the working-men of Russia 
are not of a Jingoist temper, but the hope for a 
' Russian defeat ' . . . would meet with no 
sympathy from them." And in the Bulletin of 
the Organizing Committee of the Russian Social- 
Democratic Party a communication from Russia 



234 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

is included, according to which " there is no 
desire that Russia should be defeated to be 
observed among the working-classes." 

And here is a trifling fact which may con- 
vince you as to the feeling of the Russian workers 
during the war. The Government gave an urgent 
order to a factory in Petrograd whose " hands " 
were noted for their revolutionary sentiments. 
The managers of the factory informed the 
workers that this order was of great importance 
to the Russian Army, and that it could, according 
to their calculations, be completed in the space 
of one month if the men would work as hard 
as possible. The men set to and completed the 
work in the space of twelve days— that is, two 
and a half times more rapidly than was asked 
of them. 

Compare this generous attitude on the part 
of the workers with the hysterical conduct of 
those few irresponsible intellectuals who are 
ready to rejoice in the defeat of their country 
when attacked by a cowardly and brutal enemy, 
and you will understand that their appeal could 
find no response among the masses, whose 
political conscience and healthy instinct has pre- 
served them from the " revolutionary " hysteria 
which has attacked the minds of a few 
intellectuals. 

But it must be said that even among the revo- 
lutionary " intellectuals " the hysterical desire 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 235 

for a Russian defeat has not encountered much 
sympathy. For example, the ideological leader 
of modern Russian Anarchism, M. Kropotkin, 
insisted on the necessity of victory over Germany. 
In a letter, published in the Russklya Viedotnosti 
(Moscow), M. Kropotkin, while attributing the 
whole immediate responsibility for the war to 
the Austro -German alliance, adds :— 

" As for the consequences which a victory of 
the Germans would have for us Russians^ one 
refuses even to think of them, so terrible would 
they be. What would become of the progress 
of Russia if Germany had her fortresses on the 
Niemen, at Riga, at Reval— a whole series of 
Metzes, destined not to protect the conquered 
territory, but to facilitate fresh aggression, and 
which would directly threaten Petrograd ? " From 
the point of view of the progress of the whole 
of Europe, the prospect of German domination 
isi still more ghastly : " No one who does not 
deliberately close his eyes can fail to understand 
why no man who has the progress of humanity 
at heart, and who does not allow his ideas to be 
obscured by interest, habit, or sophistry, could 
possibly hesitate. We cannot but desire the final 
defeat of Germany. We cannot even remain 
neutral ; under the present circumstances neu- 
trality means complicity." 

The eminent writer Georges Elechanov, the 
founder of the Social-Democratic Labour Party 



236 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

in Russia, issued a public protest against the 
obnoxious propaganda of the " dread of victory " 
which had a great influence with the Russian 
democracy and proletariat. On the 1 5th of 
October 19 14, the organ of English Social- 
Democracy, Justice, published the following letter 
from Plechanov : — 

" Dear Comrades,— For some time past there 
has been a good deal said in your journal about 
the Franco -Russian Alliance. 

" If I am not mistaken there are those of our 
comrades in England who take quite seriously 
the statements of the German General Staff, that 
in beginning this war, they desired to fight against 
Russian barbarism. 

" This argument cannot be upheld. Russian 
barbarism is the despotism of the Tsar. But 
how is it possible to believe that the Emperor 
of the Junkers has any intention of destroying 
the power of the Emperor of the ' Black 
Hundreds' ? 

"Since our Revolution of 1905-6 Wilhelm II 
has been the strongest support of his brother 
Nicholas II. In Russia everybody knows it, 
and so true is it that even at the present time- 
even during the war itself — the extreme re- 
actionary party leans toward Wilhelm . The organ 
of this party, the Russian Flag (which is known 
in Russia as the Prussian Flag), is doing its best 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 237 

to exonerate the Germans from the atrocities 
which have called forth the just indignation of 
the entire civilized world. 

"It is not for freedom that Germany has 
declared war. No, comrades ; she made war 
for the conquest of economic supremacy. That 
is the Imperialist programme which she strives 
to realize. 

" And, so far as my country is concerned, once 
vanquished by Germany it would become her 
economic vassal. Germany would impose upon 
Russia such onerous conditions as would render 
her further economic evolution terribly difficult. 
But as economic evolution is the basis of social 
and political evolution, Russia would thus lose 
all, or nearly all, the chances of bringing Tsarism 
to an end. 

" That is why there is among us only the 
extreme reactionary party which can reasonably 
hope for the triumph of Germany. 

" The Socialist world must not be led astray 
by the phraseology of the German General Staff. 
The victory of Germany means the setback of 
progress in Western Europe, and the definite, or 
almost definite, triumph of Russian despotism." i 

In this letter — brief, but remarkable for its 
clearness — Plechanov overturns the principal 

^ See the issues for the 14th of November and 26th of 
December 19 14. 



238 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

argument of the " partisans of defeat " among 
the Russian SociaHsts and demonstrates that this 
defeat, from the standpoint of those who hope for 
the internal liberation of Russia, is more than 
undesirable. 

I too have had to take upon myself the duty 
of combating the propaganda of the " dread of 
victory " and the desire for a Russian defeat. 
Having observed that this propaganda found a 
certain number of supporters among political 
emigres, I have delivered half a score of lectures 
before the Russian colonies in the principal towns 
of Switzerland, which contain large numbers of 
Russian emigres. I also expounded my argu- 
ments in the Nation, which I cannot do better 
than quote :— 

" From the psychological point of view a desire 
for a Russian defeat is intelligible and almost 
warrantable. The present system of government 
in Russia is so harsh and so severe, it excites 
so much hatred, so much indignation among 
Russian democrats, that one can understand and 
explain the psychological causes of that fear of 
a Russian victory, that desire for a defeat of 
Tsarism, which one finds in some of our revo- 
lutionists at the present moment. But while it 
is intelligible from the psychological point of 
view, this attitude may be refuted from the point 
of view of logic and politics. 

" First of all, those who believe that Tsarism 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 239 

would be crushed by a German victory forget a 
very simple and indisputable fact — that the 
present war, which is a war of the masses, of 
millions and millions of men, touches directly on 
the interests of the people, and, in case of defeat, 
not only the Government, but also the people 
would suffer from that defeat. I believe that 
the people would sufifer much more than Tsarism . 
Secondly, I hold that, from the point of view of 
the interests of the movement for the liberation 
of the Russian people, this propaganda of ' the 
fear of victory' is extremely injurious. It is 
injurious because a Russian defeat would also 
be a defeat of the French, Belgian, and English 
democracies. Russian revolutionists ought always 
to be guided, not merely by the interests of their 
own people and their own liberty, but also by 
those of other peoples and by the liberty of all 
Europe. Otherwise they would run the risk of 
falling into a ' revolutionary nationalism,' con- 
cerned only with its own country, and ignoring 
the interests of democracy in general and the 
political progress of other peoples. The propa- 
ganda of ' a fear of victory ' seems to me to be 
also injurious because it is addressed, not to the 
active sentiments of our soul, but to passive 
sentiments, and, as it were, to a ' revolutionary 
despair.' Those who favour this propaganda are 
not persons who have the moral force necessary 
for a struggle against Tsarism ; they are those 



240 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

who do not believe in the possibility of a victory 
of the people over Tsarism— a victory realized 
by efforts of the Russian masses themselves ; they 
are those who trust to external assistance, to a 
measure of liberty imported from without. That 
is why I believe that this propaganda might be 
damaging to our revolution ; instead of rousing 
the people to activity, it might inspire them with 
despair and moral weakness. 

" I say it 'might,' because, in reality, it is un- 
able to do this. As I have shown in the pre- 
ceding quotations, the mass of the people and 
the Socialist workmen in Russia do not share 
the erroneous opinion of the representatives of 
' revolutionary despair ' — and if this erroneous 
opinion still exists it is only among some small 
groups of Russian political exiles. But even 
among these latter there is a strong current of 
feeling in the opposite direction, which is repre- 
sented, for example, by a Social-Democratic 
writer well known in Russia, M. Georges Plecha- 
nov. 

" Those of us who do not share the desperate 
desire for a German victory (in the name of the 
Russian Revolution !) are often accused by our 
friendly critics of opportunism in the face of 
Tsarism. This accusation has been recently 
formulated by an English Socialist, Mr. Bruce 
Glasier, the editor of the Socialist Review. 
He mentions the abominable crimes of the 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 241 

Russian reaction, and the profound wounds with 
which it has covered the mutilated body of our 
unhappy people. You may set your mind at 
rest, Mr. Bruce Glasier ! We do not forget those 
crimes and those wounds. They are oar wounds 
and they still torture us to-day. But we wish to 
cure them ourselves. We do not^believe that it is 
possible to cure an evil by another and still 
greater evil, that the wounds caused by Tsarism 
can be cured by the blows of German Im- 
perialism. Even if one admits, as the German 
Government affirms, that the Russian Government 
has desired the present war, one cannot desire a 
German victory. Suppose, my English colleague, 
that you were living on the sixth floor of a house, 
the first floor of which was occupied by the land- 
lord. That landlord behaves badly to you, and 
you hate him. But a fire breaks out in the house. 
You even believe that the landlord himself has 
caused the fire in order to obtain the insurance 
money. Would you not, in these circumstances^ 
use all your efforts to fight the fire which may 
destroy, not only the first floor but your own flat 
as well? You must first deal with the fire, 
and afterwards settle accounts with the land- 
lord. 

" These are the simple arguments that prevent 
me from trusting to a military defeat of Russia 
as a means of winning our liberty." 



16 



242 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

II 

The propaganda of the " dread of victory " 
was compromised in the eyes of the working- 
classes of our country by the stupidities com- 
mitted by those who conducted it, and by the 
machinations of the Governments of Germany, 
Austria, and Turkey. 

Certain of those irresponsible politicians who 
declared themselves in favour of the defeat of 
their country went as far as to insist on the neces- 
sity of boycotting all work and all institutions 
having any connection with the war. The 
ridiculous question was actually asked, whether 
a " revolutionary " has the right to participate in 
the struggle against the misfortunes occasioned 
by the war — whether a Socialist has the right, 
for example, to sew shirts or knit socks for the 
wounded, etc. When the Socialist deputy from 
the Caucasus, M. Skobelev, commenced to par- 
ticipate in the organization of revictualling 
stations for the refugees in the frontier regions 
and the troops, M. Lenin wrote in his journal 
that M. Skobelev was devoid of "an elementary 
Socialist sense of honour," that he was the friend 
of Tsarism and the reaction, etc. These absurdi- 
ties being printed in the name of Socialism 
provoked a feeling of displeasure even among 
the firmest supporters of M. Lenin, and revealed 
to all the danger of his quasi -revolutionary 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 243 

hysteria. It is needless to say that the working- 
classes could not and would not respond to these 
hysterical appeals, for although an exiled poli- 
tician living in a neutral country (he publishes 
his journal in Geneva) may risk uttering such 
absurdities, the working man living in Russia 
can not only not adopt them— he cannot even 
understand them. And the Russian workers, as 
far as possible, endeavoured to aid their comrades 
who were called to the colours and the families 
of the latter. 

Moreover, the propaganda in question was soon 
discredited among the Russian revolutionaries by 
the incontestable fact that the Governments of 
the hostile countries made attempts to utilize the 
revolutionary movement in general ,and its hysteri- 
cal manifestations — that is, the desire to see Russia 
defeated— for the advantage of the Turco-Austro- 
Germanic Alliance. 

In the same journal — the SozLal-Demokrat—m. 
which M. Lenin expressed hi's desire to see Russia 
defeated, the following letter was published from 
a Social-Democratic workman of Petrograd : — 

" We could not have believed that the German 
Social -Democrats could fall so low as to associate 
themselves with their Kaiser . . . even under 
the pretext of fighting against Russian Tsarism. 
The Russian Revolution neither sought nor de- 
sired such support. The news has been circu- 
lated in Petrograd and throughout the country 



244 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

that Wilhelm II counts chiefly on the Russian 
revolution. The attitude of the German Socialists, 
or to speak more precisely, their treason against 
the international solidarity of labour, as well as the 
whole political situation, made it impossible for 
us to make any active protest against the war 
during the first days of mobilization." ' 

As my readers have already seen, the rumour 
of which this writer speaks, to the effect that 
the German Government hoped to profit by the 
revolutionary movement in Russia in its conflict 
with the Russian Army, was by no means without 
foundation, for this very eventuality was fore- 
seen by the secret report of the German General 
Staff. But this is not all. There are many docu- 
ments which prove that the German, Austrian, 
and Turkish Governments have been taking 
practical measures to attain their ignoble end. 

In certain cases the Austrian police, which after 
the declaration of war arrested numbers of 
Russian subjects domiciled in Austria, released 
those whom they knew to be revolutionaries. 
Here is a highly characteristic case, narrated by 
the correspondent of the New York Vorwdrts (a 
Jewish Social-Democratic journal) and repro- 
duced in the Russian Social-Democratic journal 
Golos : — 

" In a small village of the Austrian Tyrol lived 
a comrade (a Russian emigre) who had no pass- 

^ Sozial-Demokrat, Geneva, 1914, No. 33. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 245 

port. He was arrested, among others. During 
the interrogation he declared that he was a 
pohtical refugee, and had been obliged to leave 
Russia. 

" ' To what section of the Russian Social-Demo- 
cratic Party do you belong ? ' demanded the police 
commissary. ' To an extreme section or a 
moderate section ? ' 

" The comrade replied : ' I belong to the Ex- 
treme Left ; I am a supporter of Lenin.' 

" Thereupon the commissary became amiable 
and gave him a safe conduct through for Switzer- 
land." I 

Another instance of the same kind was related 
to me by M. Felix Kon, a well-known Polish 
Socialist. When war was declared he was in 
Lemberg. The local police arrested three Russian 
Social-Democrats who were passing through 
Lemberg on their way to Russia. M. Kon applied 
to the prefect of police, in the hope of obtaining 
their liberation. What was his astonishment 
when he learned from the prefect that the latter 
had not only of his own accord released the three 
Socialists arrested by his agents, but had given 
them railway tickets and told them of the route 
by which they would reach Russia most speedily. 

In other cases the Governments of the countries 
at war with Russia did not confine themselves 

' See Vorwiirts of New York, i8th of September 191 4, and 
Golos, Paris, 13th of October 1914. 



246 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

to a similar amiable treatment of the revolu- 
tionaries, whose sincere and disinterested activi- 
ties they hoped to utilize, but even attempted 
direct corruption. 

Here is an instance. 

The Social-Democratic Russian journal Novy 
Mir, published in New York, inserted in its 
columns the following communication from Con- 
stantinople, where there were numerous political 
refugees, especially from the Caucasus. 

" In Constantinople there are people who call 
themselves Ukrainian and Georgian Nationalist- 
Separatists, who have entered into relations with 
the Turkish and German Governments with the 
object of effecting a so-called liberation of 
Ukraine and Georgia. These gentry introduce 
themselves to the Russian emigres living in Con- 
stantinople in the name of democracy and the 
revolution, and in the name of Socialism even, 
and attempt to involve even our Social-Demo- 
cratic comrades in a dirty and hazardous affair. 
The means which these individuals employ for 
the realization of their desires are various, but 
are always inadmissible from the point of view 
of simple honesty, to say no more. We cannot 
say more for the moment. The time will come 
when the true character of these individuals will 
be revealed, as happened in the case of similar 
' nationalists ' at the time of the Russo-Japanese 
War, and we will then return to the matter. Our 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 247 

Social -Democratic comrades in Constantinople, 
directly the idea was mooted — the idea of the 
so-called liberation of Ukraine and Georgia by- 
means of Turkish and German aid — declared 
in sweeping terms, that they were opposed to 
miions of this kind, and regarded the attitude and 
the actions of these persons as shameful and 
treasonable." 

The Russian Social -Democratic emigres even 
voted a special resolution in respect of the ignoble 
propositions made to them by the German and 
Turkish agents. 

" The group of the Social-Democratic Labour 
Party at Constantinople declare that, being con- 
cerned with the struggle of the proletariat, on 
taking into consideration the present situation it 
absolutely rejects all proposals having as their 
aim the so - called liberation of Ukraine and 
Georgia and emanating from any of the Govern- 
ments to - day existing. — Constantinople, the 
15/28 September 19 14." 

The Russian political refugees who voted for 
this resolution gave it as moderate a form as 
possible, in Order to permit of its publication 
in the local press. " But," relates the Novy Mir, 
" being far from numerous, and terrorized by the 
' Nationalists,' who were supported by the hidden 
forces of the agents of the Turkish Government," 
they were not able to publish even this. 

Later on the Austro-Turco-German agents 



248 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

renewed their ignoble proposals to the political 
emigres from the Caucasus residing in Constanti- 
nople, and the latter replied that " Turkey is one 
of the least civilized and most backward of the 
monarchies of Asia. The masses of the people 
are in Turkey more oppressed and more humili- 
ated than in any other country. ... To enter 
into negotiations or to conclude an agreement 
with the Government of a country thus 
oppressed . . . would be a criminal error, 
unfitting the dignity of a Social-Democrat, 
or of a mere democrat and progressive. . . . 
Turkish policy seeks to profit by the popular 
movement against, and the discontent felt in re- 
spect of, the Russian Government in the Caucasus, 
and particularly in Georgia ... it seeks to 
ensure the profit of its egoistical and aggressive 
interests. ... At the present time a policy of 
separatism would be worse than harmful to 
the Caucasian peoples, and particularly to the 
Georgians. ... A modification of the existing 
state of afi^airs in the Caucasus, and in Georgia in 
particular, is possible only through the united 
efforts of the population and the revolutionary 
Russian people." Such was the noble reply of 
the Georgian Socialists to the Austro - Turco - 
German tempters and agents-provocateurs . 

But this is not all. The " Union for the Libe- 
ration of the Ukraine," organized under the 
auspices of the Viennese police and the Austrian 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 249 

General Staff, sent " delegates " to some of the 
Swiss towns in which Russian political emigres 
are domiciled, with the object of corrupting them 
and of obtaining their assistance in the organiza- 
tion of an insurrection in Russia during the war. 
In particular they approached a group of 
Caucasian (Georgian) Social Democrats, and 
offered them money if they would work to pro- 
duce an insurrection. But the Caucasian exiles 
in Switzerland did as did their comrades in Con- 
stantinople—refused to become the tools of the 
Hapsburg monarchy or to organize a revolt in 
Russia with the aid of Austrian or German 
money. 

" W«e, the Georgian Social-Democrats, mem- 
bers of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of 
Russia, have struggled, and shall always continue 
to strive, with all our party, against the Russian 
Government, which stifles all democratic move- 
ments in the Russian State and tramples on the 
natural aspirations of the peoples inhabiting that 
State. ... In this conflict we support all revo- 
lutionary movements, all oppositions, and, 
amongst others, the Nationalist movement when 
it is directed against the Russian Government 
and makes for liberty— if it is directed by the 
local progressive democracy and is not in any 
way contrary to the ideals and interests of the 
proletariat. But as to the proposal of an 
organization which operates by the material 



250 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

assistance and under the guidance of the Hohen- 
zollerns and the Hapsburgs and their kin, we 
declare pubhcly and openly that we do not know 
what peoples are likely to be liberated by them. 
On the contrary, one of them has destroyed a 
nation as free and progressive as Belgium ; and 
as for the history of the Hapsburgs, it is, like 
that of Tsarism, a history of continual subjection 
and enslavement of many peoples. And their 
new ally, Turkey, as all the world knows, is noted 
for a barbarous and treacherous policy in all that 
concerns the small nations. Taking all these 
facts into consideration, we firmly reject the 
proposal to form such an organization as that 
described." 

In some cases the delegates of the " Union for 
the Liberation of the Ukraine " were simply 
shown to the door by the Russian revolutionaries 
whom they dared to approach. Once, however, 
they nearly caught in their net a Caucasian revo- 
lutionary, who, after the declaration of war, was 
living in Switzerland. The agents of the Union 
provided this Russian revolutionary with a false 
Austrian (sic) passport and gave him money. 
He was then sent to Vienna, where the members 
of the Union explained to him the necessity of 
organizing an insurrection in Russia, in the 
interests of the " Russian revolution," or to put 
the matter more plainly, in the interests of the 
Austro-German General Staff. From Vienna he 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 251 

was sent to Constantinople, where Herr Parvus, a 
German Socialist journalist, gave him yet further 
instruction.' Finally the agents of the Ukrainian 
(and also Austro-Turco-German) Union invited 
the Russian to enter a " Georgian Legion " 
organized by the Turkish Minister of War with 
the object of provoking an insurrection against 
Russian rule in the Caucasus. Fortunately, the 
Russian, although these gentry had caught him 
in their treacherous net, perfectly understood 
their intentions and succeeded in escaping. He 
returned to Switzerland, where he revealed their 
ignoble machinations. 

To conclude the narration of these examples 
of political baseness, I will quote a passage from 
a letter sent me by a well-known Ukrainian 
patriot and Social -Democrat (a patriot in the 
best sense of the word), who, during the first 
five months of the war, was living in Austria. 

" A month ago," he writes, " I arrived in X " 
(here follows the name of a Swiss town), " but 
until then was in Vienna, from which I escaped 
with much difficulty. 

" Living in Vienna just now is a painful busi- 
ness. The Ukrainian politicians have nearly all 

' The part played by Herr Parvus in this affair is even more 
disgusting than that of Herr Sudekum, who undertook the un- 
grateful task of giving treacherous instructions to a French soldier 
imprisoned in Germany, and released by the German military 
authorities, so that he might return to France and there conduct 
a "peace propaganda." 



252 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

been corrupted. As for the Ukrainian and Rus- 
sian political refugees, the Austrian Government 
gave them a great deal of money for the purpose 
of organizing a revolution in Russia, thereby 
creating such depravation among my compatriots 
that my nerves could hardly support the atmo- 
sphere of Vienna." 

To complete the picture I will add that a 
Russian Social-Democrat published in the press 
a letter (over his own signature) in which he 
stated that one of the principal leaders of the 
Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was 
attached to the Viennese police service as a 
secret agent. This accusation has not been 
contradicted. 

On the 2nd of March 1 9 1 5 the Genevese 
journal La Suisse published the following, which 
gives some idea of the degree of baseness and 
stupidity of which the agents of the Austrian 
Government are capable in their fruitless 
endeavours to corrupt the Russian revolu- 
tionaries : — 

" On the Tuesday of last week one of the 
leaders of the Socialist Party of Geneva received 
a visit from an individual who stated that he 
was delegated by a Socialist Party in the East. 
A meeting was arranged for the same evening 
at the Cafe Grutli. But . . . the Genevese 
Socialist insisted on receiving further information 
as to the identity of his visitor. The latter was 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 253 

therefore forced to show his cards— or rather his 
card. 

" He was none other than an official personage, 
Captain B., the attache of a belUgerent Power, 
residing not far from Geneva. Without further 
preamble he asked to be put in touch with 
persons of influence in the Russian Socialist 
Party. 

" Foreseeing his mission, the Genevese Socialist 
resolved to see the end of the matter. A second 
interview was fixed . . . two ' persons of in- 
fluence ' in the advanced Russian party being 
present. 

" ' I am ordered,' commenced the Captain, ' to 
put myself in touch with influential members of 
the Russian Socialist Party in order to get into 
communication with the interior of Russia. These 
persons have only to establish relations with our 
confidential agents, our mercantile [s/c] attache 
at Berne. But all this is absolutely secret.' . . . 

" ' But what do you want us to do with your 
commercial attache ? We are not merchants ! ' 

" He is called a commercial attache, but he 
really deals with political questions, and can put 

you into touch with Count . But when you 

meet him you must not seem to know him. But 
this is how you will recognize them : they are 
both clean-shaven, and Count B. has fair 
hair.' . . . 

" Then he concluded : 



254 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" ' The enemies of the Russian Government are 
our friends, our Kameraden, and we are fighting 
together for civihzation.' 

" The emissary had emptied his bag. He was 
not kept waiting for his reply. 

" ' I,' said one of the Russians, ' am a pohtical 
exile. I have lived in Geneva, where I took 
refuge, for ten years. Before the war I passed 
through very difficult times. Your Government 
never thought of me then. Why does it display 
such solicitude now concerning the Russian 
political refugees in Switzerland ? ' 

" And as he received no reply, the political 
refugee continued : 

"'You say you are fighting for civilization? 
But there is one State which is certainly most 
highly civilized, and which you have invaded— 
Belgium ! There is another and more demo- 
cratic State, of which you occupy ten depart- 
ments. On the other hand, you are allies of 
Mohammed V, whose Government has persecuted 
the Armenians for more than three hundred 
years. In that case, how should you make use 
of us in order to overthrow our Government to 
the profit of your alliance? If we form an 
alliance it would be with the proletariat of your 
country, to institute a social State which would 
rid us of our tyrants and of yours.' 

" The reply of the Genevese Socialist was not 
less peremptory : 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 255 

" . . . ' You insult the Swiss Socialists by 
thinking them capable of acting the go-between 
for your Government in respect of our Russian 
comrades ; you insult them by supposing that 
they would place themselves at your disposal 
for cash. Before the war you dissolved the 
Reichsrath in order to prevent the working- 
classes of your country from protesting against 
your machinations. When at Budapest the pro- 
letariat showed itself in favour of universal 
suffrage, you had it shot down by the troops. 
It is very imprudent of you to ask the brothers 
of those same workers to conspire in favour of 
your Government. 

" ' Tell your superiors that they have made a 
grave mistake in supposing that we should place 
ourselves at their disposal, and warn them not 
to try such tricks again.' 

" Piteously Captain B. excused himself : ' You 
understand, I was ordered to do this. ... I 
am a man of straw. I am forty-seven years of 
age . . .' 

" But the Genevese and the Russians left 
the cafe, leaving the Captain to his reflec- 
tions." 

Such are the facts. In the history of modern 
political infamy they will doubtless occupy a 
place worthy of them. 

It is very natural that the Russian Socialist 
organizations to whom the Austro-Turco -German 



256 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

agents made their ignoble propositions should 
have declined them. Even if we ignore the 
shameful nature of these proposals, they were 
unacceptable, not only because their revolutionary 
sense of honour and their political conscience 
would not permit them to form an alliance with 
the monarchies of Austria, Germany, and Turkey 
against Tsarism. They wished to free them- 
selves by their own efforts, not by the aid of 
Austro-German and Turkish officers. Again, the 
majority of the Russian democrats regard the 
cause of the Triple Entente in the present war 
as a more righteous cause than that of the Turco- 
German alliance. Not to speak of the Russian 
democrats, moreover, many of the Austrian 
democrats are of the same opinion. In La Suisse 
(Geneve, 2nd of February 191 5) I read the 
following tragic story : — 

"At Saint-Imier [Switzerland] dwelt a work- 
ing-class family whose head was a young 
Austrian, Franz Fingust (born, in 1882, at Mar- 
burg, in Styria). On the 31st of January 19 14 
he killed himself, having previously killed his 
wife, aged 29 years, and his two children, aged 
7 and 20 months. 

" It was by agreement with his wife that he 
took this fatal step. Fingust, who was a thought- 
ful man and a good worker, had been called 
to the colours in Austria. In a letter addressed 
to one of his friends, the unfortunate man stated 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 257 

that he would rather die with his family than go 
to be killed in an unjust cause.'" 

How little the great majority of Russian Socia- 
lists and revolutionaries heeded the propaganda of 
the hysterical desire for a Russian defeat the 
reader may judge by the fact that a considerable 
number of the Russian political refugees in 
foreign countries enlisted, as volunteers, in the 
French Army, in order to help France to fight 
the Germans. In order to emphasize their feel- 
ings they formed, in one of the " foreign regi- 
ments " in the service of France a " Russian 
Republican company." And the soil of France 
is already red with the blood of the soldiers of 
this company. 



17 



CHAPTER VI 

I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. The 
" Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." — 

II. The rural communes and co-operative associations in the 
campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. — 

III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — IV. The 
press in Russia during the war. 

I 

While the military authorities were mobilizing 
the military forces of Russia against the foreign 
invasion, the mobilization of the social forces 
of the country was spontaneously effected, and 
those forces prepared for a great campaign 
against the misfortunes produced by the war. 
To support the wives and children of reservists 
called to the colours, to combat the economic 
disorder occasioned by a sudden dearth of labour, 
to help in the evacuation of sick and wounded, 
to organize medical relief for them, to organize 
relief for the refugees of regions invaded by the 
enemy, to assist the military authorities in the 
difficult work of revictualling the troops and fur- 
nishing them with clothing, etc.— such are the 
tasks assumed by public institutions and private 

258 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 259 

associations, some of which already existed 
before the war, while others were created ad hoc. 

The most important of these organizations are 
the " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union 
of the Cities." Ten days after the declaration 
of war a Congress of all the Russian Zemstvos 
was convoked in Moscow — that is, a Congress 
of all the local self - governing bodies of 
Governments and districts. Thirty-five Govern- 
ments of European Russia were represented 
by their delegates at this Congress, which 
elected a Central Committee, composed of 
two delegates from each Government. The 
duty of this Committee was to arrange for 
the evacuation and transport of sick and wounded 
soldiers, the organization of central depots of 
equipment and medicaments, the creation of 
medical and nursing staffs, the creation of large 
hospitals, etc. 

The same duties were assumed by the Central 
Committee of the Union of the Cities, whose 
Congress also was convoked after the declara- 
tion of war. This Committee is composed of 
delegates from the municipalities, in the pro- 
portion of ten delegates for each city having 
more than a million inhabitants, five from each 
city having more than 750,000 inhabitants, three 
from each city of 500-750,000 inhabitants, two 
from each city of 100-500,000 inhabitants, and 
one from each city having less than 100,000 
inhabitants . 



260 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

To give some idea of the amount of work 
accomplished by these two great organizations, 
it is enough to say that the Union of theZemstovs 
organized, in the space of three weeks, hospitals 
for 64,000 sick and wounded. 

The forms of activity of the public institu- 
tions and the private associations which have 
evolved during the campaign against the miseries 
of warfare are extremely varied and numerous. 
The Universities, the scientific societies, work- 
shops and factories, the secondary schools, the 
various corporations (those of the advocates, 
school-teachers, engineers, etc.), organized their 
own hospitals, ambulance - trains, etc. Collec- 
tions of money and of gifts in kind (clothing, 
tobacco for the troops, etc.) were made 
every day with unfailing success. By the 
middle of October the Union of the Zemstvos 
alone was already maintaining 130,661 beds for 
wounded soldiers, thirty-five ambulance-trains, 
three ambulance corps to care for the wounded 
at the extreme front, a great linen depot, a depot 
of surgical material, a central pharmaceutical 
depot, etc The same energy was manifested 
by the Union of the Cities. 

II 

But the most remarkable fact in the reassuring 
picture of social activity in Russia during the 
' See the Sovremenny Mir, Petrograd, December 19 14. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 261 

Great War is the fact of the efforts made by 
the people themselves. 

The war broke out just when the work of 
the peasants in their fields was at its heaviest. 
The call for reservists deprived the countryside 
of hundreds of thousands, nay, millions, of 
workers, who were so necessary to the gathering 
of the harvest, the thrashing of corn, and the 
autumn sowings. Grain being the greatest 
wealth of Russia, the situation might have been 
extremely difficult had not the Russian peasantry 
proved itself equal to the occasion. 

Immediately after the departure of the 
reservists those who were not called to the 
colours took upon their shoulders the heavy 
agricultural tasks abandoned by those who had 
left for the front. 

In those regions of Russia where the rural 
commune, or mir, still exists the latter replaced 
by its collective forces the individual forces of 
the reservists who had been forced suddenly to 
leave their peaceful labours for the labours of 
war and the harvest of death. The mlrskie 
skhody (the assemblies of the members of the 
rural commune) in many villages voted special 
resolutions concerning the relief and assistance 
of families whose members were called to 
the Army. 

The skhod of the village of Lipnitza (in the 
district of Sevsk) unanimously decides that the 



262 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

agricultural work in progress in the fields of 
the reservists shall be terminated by the mir, 
as well as the work of the autumn sowing ; neces- 
sitous families will receive from the mir wood 
for fuel, and this wood is to be delivered at 
their houses by the m//'— that is, the peasants 
who have not gone to the war will cut the wood 
and haul it from the forest to the izbas in which 
the families of reservists dwell ; and the poorest 
families will receive gratuitously grain sufficient 
for their needs, provided by other members of 
the commune by means of a special collection. 

The skhod of one of the communes of the 
Government of Riazan decided to take all neces- 
sary measures to ensure that " not a single strip 
of land belonging to a reservist shall remain 
untilled." 

In the district of Saratov the corn belonging 
to reservists was harvested and carried into their 
barns by the mirs, which also undertook the work 
of sowing their lands. 

In the Government of Oufa the inhabitants 
of forty-three villages— Russian and Bashkir 
villages— founded a " confraternity " to assist the 
families of the soldiers in their agricultural 
labours and also with pecuniary support. 

It is the same in those regions where the rural 
commune does not now exist. 

The peasants of many of the villages of the 
Government of Vitebsk took upon themselves all 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 263 

work not terminated by the reservists. The same 
in the Governments of Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, 
Moghilev, Kherson, etc. 

In one volost (canton) of the Government of 
Poltava the peasants not called to the colours 
assembled on the day appointed in the fields 
belonging to the families of soldiers and com- 
pleted the necessary labours there and then. 

The skhod of the village of Alexandrovka, in 
the district of Ackermann (Bessarabia), decided 
to leave its own tasks then and there in order 
first to complete the work remaining to be done 
on the fields of reservists. And so that the 
latter should not worry about their aban- 
doned fields the same skhod sent them the 
following letter : " Identifying itself with the 
destinies of the dear defenders of our country, 
the commune of Alexandrovka has decided to 
gather the harvest in the fields of the reservists 
called to the colours, and to beg them to accept 
the assurance that their families will not be left 
without support." 

According to the calculations made by a 
statistician, the labour gratuitously furnished by 
the peasants in aid of the families of their fellow- 
villagers who have left for the front may be 
expressed in money, approximately, by a figure 
of 1 6 millions of roubles. " This was," he says, 
" the greatest material sacrifice of all those which 
were made by the various groups of the Russian 



264 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

society and people during the first weeks of the 
war." I To appreciate this sacrifice at its true 
worth we must remember that the rural popula- 
tion is the most indigent portion of the Russian 
population. 

In addition to this assistance " in kind," in 
the form of agricultural labour, the populations 
of the Russian countrysides organized relief and 
assistance for the families of soldiers. 

The skhod of the village of Fominki, in the 
Government of Vladimir, decided to distribute 
gratuitously seed-corn to necessitous families of 
soldiers. The skhod of the Shungenskaia Volost, 
in the Government of Kostroma, imposed on all 
the inhabitants of that volost a tax of one rouble 
per head in order to organize a relief fund for 
the benefit of wives and children of reservists. 
Similar cases were reported from every corner 
of the Russian Empire. 

The mutual credit organizations and the co- 
operative societies also participated in the work 
of relief and assistance. In the district of 
Moghilev the skhods placed at the disposal of 
the relief committees the entire revenue of the 
credit deposits and deposited savings for the year 
1 913, and also 1,300 roubles in cash. In the 

' See the review Yejeniessiatshny Journal, Petrograd, Sep- 
tember 1914 ; this number contains an article describing 
the activities of the peasants during the war, from which I cite 
the above facts. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 265 

district of Lipetsk the assembly of the repre- 
sentatives of the " credit confraternities " decided 
to provide the families of soldiers with the 
sums necessary to purchase corn. In one of 
the districts of the Government of Kharkov the 
" credit confraternities " gratuitously lent agri- 
cultural machinery to the families of reservists. 
The local union of the co-operative societies 
of Kuban recommended its members to estab- 
lish special groups of " guardians " for those 
households deprived of their workers by the mobi- 
lization^ these guardians replacing the reservists 
in the fields. In some regions the co-operative 
societies not only lent agricultural machinery 
to the families of soldiers, and the necessary 
implements for the tilling of the soil, but even 
bought these machines especially for employment 
in the fields of reservists. Many co-operative 
societies have perfectly organized the agricultural 
labour of the district, with the assistance of their 
non -mobilized members. 

Sometimes the co-operative societies created 
hospitals for the wounded, workshops for pre- 
paring linen, etc. 

The Federative Union of the Co-operative 
Societies of Russia and the People's Co-opera- 
tive Credit Bank in Moscow addressed the Presi- 
dent and deputies of the Duma in a message 
expressing their hope that " in the organization 
of relief for the families of reservists mobilized 



266 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the Zemstovs will accept, as their useful col- 
laborators, the 30,000 co-operative societies 
existing in Russia, as these are the popular 
economic organizations with which the people is 
most familiar." 

In citing these facts the Russian publicist who 
published them in one of the Petrograd reviews 
continues :— 

" War gives rise to brutality, hatred, and dis- 
cord ; but it also unites mankind. . . . All for 
each, each for all — in this memorable year of 
miseries that touch the whole people— this call 
is heard as loudly as the clarion calling to battle. 
The cities and the new forces of the country- 
side are awakening. On the field of battle 
yonder, where the great conflict is developing, 
the struggle for the safety of our country and 
of European liberty, for their salvation from the 
yoke, from the ' mailed fist ' of the haughty 
Prussian Junkers ; and here, behind the army, 
the peaceful struggle goes forward for the 
preservation of the economy of labour. Every- 
where men who yesterday lived and acted in 
a state of separation are beginning to under- 
stand that their destiny is closely bound up with 
the destinies of their neighbours, of their village, 
their province : of Russia, Europe, and finally, 
of the entire world ! " ' 

^ Yejejnessiatshny Journal, Petrograd, September 1914. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 267 

III 

The war has had a great influence on the intel- 
lectual youth of Russia. And of this influence we 
must distinguish two aspects. 

On the one hand, the war has diverted the 
interest and attention of our Russian youth from 
the questions which were vital to them before 
the war. Questions relating to economics, to 
matters of professional and corporative interest, 
or affecting university life, are forgotten and re- 
placed by other problems concerning the war 
and external politics. 

A great proportion of the Russian students 
were drawn into the whirlwind of patriotism 
which swept across all Russia during the first 
days of the war. The force of this whirlwind 
appeared sometimes even too much for the youth- 
ful minds of these students, and some of them 
were for some time poisoned by a kind of intel- 
lectual chauvinism. For example, a large group 
of students of the University of Petrograd voted 
a protest against the document signed by German 
scientists which treated Russian culture as a 
" base " form of culture. But in this protest 
the students fell into another exaggeration, in- 
serting in the text of the resolution an assertion 
devoid of meaning, to the effect that " the 
Russian people is humiliated in that which con- 
cerns its national situation, even on its own soil." 



268 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

This assertion may be interpreted to mean that 
the " True Russians " are humihated in Russia 
itself by " aliens "—that is, Jews, Poles, etc.— 
which is untrue. A group of students of the 
University of Moscow organized a " patriotic " 
demonstration in the streets of the city, with 
national flags, the portrait of the Tsar, and the 
singing of the National Anthem. This demon- 
stration was terminated in a pogrom of the 
German shops and warehouses in Moscow. 

But these excesses of " patriotism " at once 
provoked numerous protests from the majority 
of the students. The representatives of the 
University students of Moscow published in the 
city Press an open letter, in which they con- 
demned these so-called " patriotic " manifesta- 
tions, declaring, with indignation, that " for 
the first time the word ' pogrom ' has been 
coupled with that of student." But it is by no 
means astonishing that there are, at this moment, 
individuals among the University youth of Russia 
capable of expressing their " patriotism " by the 
pillage of German goods ; this is merely the 
result of the policy of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction, which during the years of reaction 
made every possible effort to plant in the grow- 
ing minds of the students reactionary ideas which 
have favoured the creation of " True Russian " 
organizations among the students. 

But we may believe that the majority of the 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 269 

intellectual youth of Russia is free from such 
" patriotism." Immediately after the anti- 
German pogroms in Moscow dozens of 
students' organizations in that city declared 
that " the organized youth of the University has 
always been and will always be the representa- 
tive and the guardian of pan-human ideals and 
will remain faithful to the teaching of the best 
minds of Russian society." ' 

At the University of Petrograd also were found 
students who protested against the baser mani- 
festations of chauvinistic " patriotism," and who 
reminded their colleagues that the external enemy 
must not make them forget " the enemies within " 
whom Russian democracy has to fear. 

This is one aspect of the attitude assumed by 
the intellectual youth of Russia during and in 
respect of the war. 

Another aspect of the problem is the practical 
activity of the students during the war. 

On the 8/21 October an Imperial ukase 
was issued which gave the Minister of War the 
right to call to the colours those students who 
had a legal dispensation from military service 
during the term of their University studies. The 
Government created special military schools (the 
course of study being abbreviated) which a 

' See the interesting article by M. Kleinbort, " Youth and the 
War," pubUshed in the great Russian review, Sovremenny Mir, 
in November 1914, p. 74 (Petrograd). 



270 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

portion of the students called to the colours were 
obliged to enter, in order to pass the examina- 
tion for the grade of officer after six months' 
study. Others might be called up as soldiers. 
" The first impression produced by this ukase 
was that three-quarters of the entire mass of 
students would be called to serve, mostly as 
simple soldiers. But not a shadow of discon- 
tent or depression was visible : the whole youth 
of Russia had but one wish, that the orders of 
the ukase should be accomplished as soon as 
possible. At Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, 
Kharkov, Kazan, Riga— everywhere the students 
marched through the streets, proclaiming that 
they would not hold back when the people, the 
Russian people, was shedding its blood on the 
field of battle for the future of Russia." ' 

But more remarkable still and more touching 
is the part which the students of both sexes 
are playing in the campaign against the suffering 
caused by the war. The students, most of whom 
are themselves extremely poor, give all they can 
from their slender resources towards the work 
of relief for the families of reservists, aid to the 
wounded, and the creation of hospitals, etc. But 
both male and female students give even more 
in the shape of their own personal services. The 
students of the Technological Institute at Petro- 

' "Youth and the War," Sovremenny Mir, November 19 14, 
p. 72 (Petrograd). 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 271 

grad pass whole days in the work of repairing 
mihtary motor-cars, etc. The students of the 
Polytechnic Institute at Riga prepare chemical 
products and various articles required by the mili- 
tary hospitals. A very large number of students 
of both sexes are employed as nurses and bearers 
and dressers, working at the extreme front and 
at the various forwarding stations. There are 
cities where the whole work of unloading the 
hospital trains is done by the University students, 
who show themselves, not only adequate to a 
very heavy task, but full of devotion and ten- 
derness towards the poor wounded soldiers. 

IV 

A few words as to the Russian Press and the 
literature of the war. 

From the literary point of view we observe 
in Russia what was remarked in other belligerent 
countries, notably, that the poets and novelists 
are not proving themselves equal to their task, 
and the best of their poetical production appears 
miserably inadequate in comparison with the 
grandeur of events. A dozen or two theatrical 
pieces were written by Russian dramatists on 
warlike subjects a short time after the declara- 
tion of war, but these plays, all full of a false 
patriotism and chauvinism, do not reveal much 
talent in their authors, being commonplace and 



272 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

insignificant productions. The drama of Belgian 
life during the war entitled " King, Law, and 
Liberty," written by the well-known writer 
Leonid Andreev, was no exception to these 
literary platitudes , 

A far greater service has been rendered to 
Russian letters by those of our writers who have 
confined their efforts to those of the simple mili- 
tary correspondent and have gone to the front, 
there to observe and describe the bloody task of 
the troops. Among its military correspondents 
the Russian Press includes several names well 
known to the public. 

Unhappily, the Government, as we know, 
suppressed at one blow the whole of the " Left " 
press, as it existed on the outbreak of war, while 
the " Right " and reactionary press was free to 
continue its disastrous work of poisoning the 
mind of the people. Special enterprises were 
created by the reactionaries, often with assistance 
from the authorities, for the purpose of providing 
the people with " national and patriotic " litera- 
ture during the war. What this "literature" 
is you may judge by the following quotation from 
a " popular broadsheet " on the war, distributed 
gratuitously by the reactionaries. Explaining 
the causes of the war, the author of this sheet 
finds them in the fact that Germany possesses 
a Constitution ! Wilhelm II, he says, is good, 
extremely good. " He always wished to become 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 273 

an autocrat, and if he were an absolute monarch 
he . . . would make Germany glorious in the 
domain of peaceful work." But in Germany 
there is a Constitution and a Parliament, and 
the Constitution and parliamentarianism are the 
cause of the war, which " once again shows the 
disadvantages of a constitutional and republican 
government." 

Citing all these imbecilities, and stating that 
they are distributed in great quantities (by the 
hands of the priests, who distribute them in the 
churches, etc.), a Russian scholastic review 
declares that " such a manner of informing the 
people as to the war can serve no useful purpose 
and may do much harm." ' 

I cannot pass over in silence the propaganda 
which during the war has been conducted by the 
chief and official organ of the Russian reaction, 
the Russkoie Znamia (" The Russian Flag "), 
published by the Central Committee of the Union 
of the Russian People, otherwise known as the 
"Black Bands." 

In the middle of October— that is, ten weeks 
after the outbreak of war— ^his " True Russian " 
organ published an article full of praises of the 
German system of government and the Hohen- 
zollern monarchy. 

" Germany is the incarnation of a national 

^ See the Russkaya Shkola (" The Russian School"), Petrograd, 
December 1914, p. 21. 

18 



274 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

power, thanks to these sane and healthy prin- 
ciples on which the administration of the States 
is based," says the Russkoie Znamia. " The 
monarchist principle has found in Germany a 
brilliant exemplification." The dynasty of the 
Hohenzollerns " incarnates in itself and propa- 
gates lofty principles which are precious to 
humanity." Its enemies do not love it because 
they regard it as " the most capable of the 
realization of the monarchical principle as an 
ideal." " May these principles remain wholly 
intact, for they are sane and healthy and make 
for the welfare of the world." The Russkoie 
Znamia not only does not wish to see the power 
of the Hohenzollerns destroyed, but declares, on 
the contrary, that " if Germany changes the 
government of one of her neighbours from a 
republic to a monarchy, such a change will be 
by no means regrettable from the point of view 
of humanity, order, and tranquillity in Europe 
and the successful life of nations." 

Such " True Russian " ideas were expressed 
by the organ of the Extreme Right on the 
morrow of the occupation and devastation of 
Belgium and the invasion of a portion of France 
by the German troops, and at a moment when 
Russian soldiers were dying in defending Russian 
soil against the German invader. 

Comment is superfluous. 

This reactionary propaganda is the more harm- 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 275 

ful in that the interest felt by the populace in 
the " printed word " has enormously increased 
during the war. 

"Every village to-day has its 'political club.' 
If you go to the office of the communal adminis- 
tration at nine o'clock in the evening you will 
find there a crowd of moujiks, old and young, 
and of boys. The clerk or some old soldier who 
can read will be reading aloud from the news- 
paper, which the schoolmaster has given him. 
He reads loudly and distinctly. . . . Everybody 
listens attentively. . . . After the reading . . . 
a most animated conversation ensues, which often 
leads to the most impassioned discussions." 

" The number of journals printed is increasing. 
Despite the obstacles offered by the censorship 
and the police, new journals are springing up 
where none as yet existed. . . . Some perish 
ingloriously — the martyrology of the Russian 
Press is long — but others occupy the place of 
their deceased brothers and continue the work 
for the Fatherland. Already it is impossible to 
check this powerful impulse in the direction of 
the printed word. ... At the railway-stations 
men and women and children push their way into 
the carriages and beg the passengers to give them 
their newspapers. Who are these people? They 
are the men employed on the railways and the 
inhabitants of the neighbouring villages." » 

^ See " The War and the Press " in the Russkiya Viedomosti^ 
4th of December 1914 (Moscow). 



276 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

The aged peasants who cannot read borrow 
the school-books of their children and grand- 
children and try to teach themselves. 

" The peasants read the newspapers every 
evening and on every holiday. They meet in 
groups in the house of one or another of their 
number, and try to project their minds, unaccus- 
tomed to the printed idea, into distant parts and 
foreign countries. That portion of the map 
which represents the seat of war is quite black 
now ; every day the horny lingers travel from 
Lemberg to Cracow, from Warsaw to Berlin and 
back." I 

So the war, we realize, has given a great 
impulse to the intellectual life of the people. 

' Russkaya Shkola, December 19 14, p. 15. 



CHAPTER VII i 

I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present 
war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and 
its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason 
in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting 
better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he fought 
against Japan. — The " liberation idea " and the war. 

I 

All the facts presented in the preceding chapters 
of this book will enable the reader already to 
feel something of the profound difference between 
the moral condition and the military valour of 
the Russian Army in the present war and the 
condition of our Army in the war against Japan. 
All observers and students of Russian life 
unanimously declare that the manner in which 
the people regards the present war has nothing 
in common with its conception of the war of 
1904. The Russo-Japanese War was a distant 
war, which did not affect the vital interests of 
the popular masses, while the war against 
Austria, Germany, and Turkey is close at hand. 
The Russo-Japanese War was regarded as an 

277 



278 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

adventure on the part of the upper classes, an 
offensive war, and an unjust war ; while the 
present war, in the eyes of the masses, is a just, 
defensive war. 

This difference was perceptible from the begin- 
ning of the mobilization. When the recruits of 
1 9 14 were called up for medical examination 
there were among them no malingerers attempt- 
ing to escape military service. 

" All have become fit," says a provincial 
journal, the Zaouralsky Kray, describing the 
medical examination of the class of 1 9 1 4 from 
the region of Ural. " Formerly, when a youth 
was exempted from service he ran off at the top 
of his speed and got drunk to express his delight . 
To-day he is exempted, but he grumbles : ' Why 
am I not good enough for the war? I am no 
worse than others. They have taken Peter 
and Ivan — am I less fit than they ? ' Formerly 
he fled like a goat ; to-day one has to explain to 
him why he will be of no use to the Army." 

Another provincial paper describes the depar- 
ture of the troops from a village in the Goivern- 
ment of Yaroslavl : — 

" This year the departure of the recruits from 
the villages has been effected in an extraordinary 
atmosphere. . . . There was not a single 
drunken man among the recruits, and no painful 
scenes took place when the new soldiers took 
leave of their relatives. They marched off in 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 279 

orderly ranks, accompanied to the outskirts of 
the villages by the whole of the inhabitants. 
' Bear yourselves well, for Russia and the world of 
peasants ! ' cry the old men. ' Come back heroes 
—we will cover you with flowers ! ' cry the young 
girls." 

The mobilization and concentration of the 
Russian Army was effected much more rapidly 
than was expected, which is explained, not only 
by the suppression of the sale of vodka but also 
by the attitude of the people, who understood 
the gravity of the moment and the necessity of 
making the greatest possible effort against so 
powerful and dangerous an enemy. 

The condition of complete sobriety observed 
during the mobilization has continued during the 
war. Here is a reference to the state of tem- 
perance which prevails even among the higher 
officers on the field of battle, a description from 
the pen of M. Ludovic Naudeau, military corre- 
spondent of the Journal. This description is the 
more interesting as M. Naudeau was with the 
Russian Army in Manchuria in 1904-5 and was 
able to make a comparison between what he 
saw then and what he saw in 1 9 1 4 : — 

" Ah ! Where is it, that uproarious restaurant - 
car which formerly, at the time of the Manchurian 
War, used to stop near the place where the 
General Staff was to be found? Where is this 
travelling restaurant, from which a pleasant 



280 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

gaiety emanated even in the darkest hours, while 
more than once feminine voices mingled with 
the talk of the warriors ? . . . Where are those 
bottles, capped with gold or silver, which were 
opened so joyfully, so merrily, yonder in the land 
of the yellow men, while the Japanese guns were 
raging? Gone is the copious drinking, the 
libations, and the ingenuous gaiety." 

However, the suppression of alcohol and the 
sobriety of the troops were not enough to ensure 
the victory of Russia over a powerful adversary. 
The composition of the higher command of the 
Russian Army was somewhat defective, as the 
promotion of generals and lesser officers in 
Russia depends too often, not on their military 
capacities but on their relations and their political 
convictions. For instance, during the first inva- 
sion of Prussia by the Russian Army the com- 
mand of the left wing of that army was confided 
to General Rennenkampf, a " True Russian " of 
German origin, who was famous, not for his 
military talents but for the cruelty with which he 
suppressed the revolutionary movement of 1905 
in Siberia, where he shot down the " suspects " 
by dozens without trial, took " hostages," and 
in general behaved like ... a German officer 
in a conquered country ! And this is what 
a Swiss journal (the Geneva Tribune) has to 
say of the Russian defeats in Eastern Prussia : — 

" The first Russian invasion threw two armies 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 281 

on to Prussian soil, which numbered together 
650,000 men. General Hindenburg defeated 
them in a series of rapid actions. ... Of the 
two splendid armies of Generals Samsonov and 
Rennenkampf nothing was left but shapeless ruin. 
The jealousy of Rennenkampf in respect of his 
colleague assisted the strategy of Hindenburg : 
General Tiger, as the Japanese nicknamed 
Rennenkampf, could ill support the intellectual 
superiority of Samsonov. He left him alone at 
grips with the Germans, although they were not 
far apart and he must have known that 
Samsonov's army had to deal with a powerful 
enemy. Samsonov died a glorious death at the 
head of his troops." ' 

Another prominent Swiss Journal, La Gazette 
de Lausanne, discussing the causes of the second 
defeat of the Russians in Eastern Prussia, made 
a statement to which I would direct the most 
serious attention of my readers : — 

" The most plausible explanation of the rela- 
tive weakness revealed by the staff of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, is 
probably to be found in the intrigues of the 
German party in Petrograd. It is by no means 
impossible that the German General Staff should 
be secretly informed of the strength and 
weakness of the positions of the enemy, the dis- 
tribution of his troops, and his plans of action. 
^ La Tribune, Geneva, 20th of February 1915. 



282 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

" To those who feel amazement at the idea 
that treason could exist in Russia, where no war 
has ever been more popular, let us recall the 
fact that a certain number of high officials detest 
the liberalism of the Western nations, in whose 
triumph they see a menace to their privileges ; 
that Prussia and Prussian ' order ' is their ideal, 
and that they dread a Prussian defeat as a 
catastrophe. 

" When we form opinions on things Russian 
we must never lose sight of the abyss which 
divides the great Slav nation from the interests 
of certain of those who govern it." » 

II 

How far the supposition expressed by the 
Gazette de Lausanne was well founded we may 
judge by the following official statement, issued 
by the General Staff of the Russian Commander- 
in-Chief on the 3rd of April i 9 1 5 : — 

"As a result of information respecting the 
actions of Lieutenant-Colonel Miassoiedov_, inter- 
preter to the staff of the loth Army, this officer 
was placed under observation. 

" Directly this observation had confirmed the 
suspicions entertained as to the criminal character 
of the actions of the said officer, who was in 
touch with the agents of a hostile Power, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Miassoiedov was arrested, 
' Gazette de Lausanne^ 1 6th of February 191 5. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 283 

and at the same time other persons were arrested, 
not belonging to the Army but suspected of the 
same criminal activities. 

" The preliminary examination established the 
guilt of Lieutenant-Colonel Miassoiedov in a 
most positive manner ; he was therefore sent 
before a court-martial to reply to an accusation 
of espionage. The court found him guilty and 
he was hanged. 

" The examination in respect of his accom- 
plices is proceeding, and as the guilt of each 
prisoner is established he will be sent before 
the competent tribunal." 

To complete the picture, I may add that 
Colonel Miassoiedov (of the gendarmerie) was 
one of the chief officers of the Russian political 
police, an organizer of provocation, one of the 
" Russifiers " of Finland, and, in general, one 
of the " pillars " of the Russian reaction. As 
for his accomplices, it is said that they were 
mostly agents or ex -agents of the political 
police. There is nothing surprising^ in this. 
On the contrary, it is very natural that the 
unclean trade of an agent-provocateur, who 
betrays and sells the revolutionists of his own 
country, should be doubled by the unclean 
trade of a spy, who betrays and sells his own 
country . 

One of the members of the Duma, M. 
Kerensky, addressed the following courageous 



284 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

declaration, in respect of the Miassoiedov affair, 
to the President of the Duma :— 

" M. LE President,— 

" By order of the mihtary authorities some 
officers of the gendarmes and officials of the 
Department of the Police have been arrested.' 
They are accused of high treason and of relations 
with the enemy. Treason has made itself a nest in 
the Ministry of the Interior. Russian society had 
already, for some considerable time, uneasily fol- 
lowed the activities of this department, based 
as it is on a system of provocation which is in- 
evitably sapping the Governmental organism and 
corrupting the powers of the State. The Duma 
also had more than once drawn attention to the 
serious danger which arises out of this system, 
and had expressed its suspicion of the Ministry 
of the Interior, at the same time condemning the 
entire domestic policy of the Cabinet. 

" Then the war broke out. All Russia, in a 

supreme effort of its popular forces, has risen 

to accomplish one common aim— to repulse the 

aggression of the enemy. Only the Ministry 

of the Interior, acting in agreement with the 

Ministry of Justice, is continuing its destructive 

activities with unusual energy, and is irritating 

and loosening the bonds of society. By the 

' The Department of Police is occupied principally in the 
persecution of revolutionaries, and, in general, persons whose 
political opinions are "suspect " or "subversive." 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 285 

arrest of Bourtzev the Government at one blow 
extinguished the enthusiasm of large numbers 
of persons, and also betrayed its manner of in- 
terpreting its own declaration concerning ' the 
forgetting of internal dissensions.' And it was 
with very good reason that the members of the 
Duma, during the session of the Budgetary Com- 
mittee of that body— recalling the arrest of 
Bourtzev and of the Social-Democratic Labour 
deputies, the campaign against the Press, and 
the policy of the Government in Poland, Finland, 
and Galicia — hinted that these acts of the Govern- 
mental authorities visibly revealed the character 
of a hostile obstruction which was calculated to 
militate against a happy termination of the 
external conflict. The most startling manifesta- 
tion of the destructive action of the Government 
was the publication of a lying official declaration 
that a portion of the members of the Duma 
desired the defeat of the Russian armies. Mean- 
while, in the very heart of the Ministry of the 
Interior, calmly and confidently, a solid organiza- 
tion of the real traitors is at work. The 
suspicion involuntarily presents itself that the 
Ministry of the Interior is consciously endeavour- 
ing to divert the attention of Russian society to 
a false trail. Russian society is well aware that 
the directing circles of the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry of Justice are deeply 
involved in that considerable political movement 



286 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

which regards it as imperiously necessary that 
a close union with the Berlin Government should 
be re-established as speedily as possible, that 
Government being the most powerful ally of our 
internal reaction. For this reason Russian 
society finds it hard to believe that these adminis- 
trative departments can possibly disclose in its 
full extent this organization of traitors, whose 
traces were — by chance— discovered by the mili- 
tary authorities. The intervention of Russian 
society itself is necessary, and it alone can claim 
the needful authority. The State Duma must 
do its utmost to protect the nation from a hideous 
stab in the back. In the name of my electors 
I beg you, M. le President, as the official repre- 
sentative of the Duma, to insist on the immediate 
convocation of the State Duma in order that it 
may address to the Government an interpellation 
concerning the existence of high treason in one 
of the central administrations of the Government, 
and also accomplish its duty, which is to exercise 
an unrelaxing control over the actions of the 

Executive at a moment so exceptional. 

« 

" A. Kerensky, 

" Member of the Duma., 

"The 25th of February (nth of March, new style) 191 5." 

Unfortunately, M. Kerensky's demands were 
without result. 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 287 

The Miassoiedov affair reveals a few more 
characteristic details. In the first place, Colonel 
Miassoiedov was once before accused of military 
espionage — two years earlier, by M. Gutshkov, 
sometime President of the Duma. But the 
Government, with which Miassoiedov was a 
persona grata, was not willing to risk the con- 
sequences of the charge brought by M. 
Gutshkov, who was even challenged to a duel 
by Miassoiedov, who declared his honour to be 
attainted. Investigation established the fact that 
Miassoiedov enjoyed intimate and personal rela- 
tions with Wilhelm II. The latter, during his 
visits to his estate of Rominten, in Eastern 
Prussia, used to invite Colonel Miassoiedov, then 
the chief officer of the Frontier Guard at Wir- 
ballen, a few miles distant from Rominten, to 
visit him. And we need not suppose that the 
German Emperor disdained to direct the activities 
of the traitor who sold his Government and his 
country. We have here yet another interesting 
fact for the biographers of Wilhelm II. 



Ill 

As for the troops, they have shown themselves 
in this war, as I have already said, equal to the 
greatness of their task. The German Social- 
Democratic " comrades " who have so quickly 
forgotten the hymns of praise which they sang 



288 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

in 1905-6 in honour of the "noble" Russian 
people who were ready to die for liberty, and 
who have now plunged the dagger of treason 
into the back of European democracy and the 
Russian revolution, are to-day writing that the 
Russian Army is merely a mob of " stolid 
brutes " (the expression is that used by 
Vorwdrts). But this amiable appreciation— 
especially on the part of the " comrades "— 
has no correspondence with the reality. It is 
true that the Russian soldier is not so well 
educated as the German soldier, who " carries 
in his knapsack "—as Herr Gerhardt Hauptmann 
informs us — " the works of Goethe, Nietzsche, the 
Bible, etc." There are certainly illiterates in 
the Russian Army. None the less we may assert 
that in the present war the Russian soldier 
appears to us, not as a beast of burden but as 
a man who understands for what cause he is 
fighting and dying, and who believes that cause 
is a just cause. 

And here I must say a few words of a very 
important and very interesting trait observed by 
many witnesses who have been in contact with 
the Russian troops during the war. It is that 
the " idea of liberation " is very prevalent among 
the Russian troops. For many the present war 
is not only a just war and a defensive war, it 
is also a war of " liberation." The impression 
produced by the brutal aggression of great 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 289 

Austria against little Serbia, by the crushing of 
neutral Belgium by the German Army, by the 
cruelties committed by German officers upon the 
civil populations of Belgium, Erance, and Poland, 
by the treacherous attack of Turkey, which is re- 
garded in Russia as the hangman among nations 
—all this has greatly contributed to this mental 
state of the Russian soldiers, who believe 
sincerely that they are dying for an ideal of 
liberation. And here is a touching story which 
illustrates this simple faith :— 

In one of the hospitals of the Caucasian 
Army a Russian non-commissioned officer lay 
in the next bed to some Bagdad Arabs, prisoners. 
" . . . He writes verses. I will not" — says the 
military correspondent who tells the story — 
" speak of the literary quality of these verses. 
They are very defective in form and very ordinary 
as to substance. . . . But one half -stanza is 
notable for its curious simplicity :— 

Here is Mount Ararat. It has a brooding look. . . . 
One would think it was waiting to be set free. 

"What do you think of that? It is very 
delightful. A non-commissioned officer, coming 
from the Russian plains, feels a need of setting 
Mount Ararat free ! Poor, feeble Ararat, sixteen 
thousand feet in height ! . . . When I explained 
to the hospital doctor the poetical dream of his 
sympathetic patient, the doctor remarked : ' Oh, 

19 



290 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the idea of a liberation is widely diffused among 
our soldiers.' " ' 

Another soldier of the Caucasian Army ex- 
plained the necessity of abstaining from vodka 
and the suppression of the drink traffic in the 
following manner : " A drunken man can't set 
anybody free ! " 

While stating that the Russian soldier is 
fighting in the present war far better than he 
fought ten years ago, I ought at the same time 
to state that the errors of the domestic policy 
of Tsarism are shackling his heroic impulse. By 
not proclaiming a political amnesty Tsarism has 
retained in the background of the Army which 
is marching against the enemy the prisons and 
penal settlements, which are very living tombs, 
in which are suffering the noblest of Russia's 
sons. By failing to suppress the racial and 
religious restrictions the Government continues 
to poison the moral atmosphere in which the 
country is living during the war and which the 
army is breathing as it fights. These errors 
diminish the successes of the Army by weakening 
the moral of the Army. 

We have seen also that the German Socialists 
are mistaken in regarding the Russian soldier as 
" stolid." On the contrary, in this war they 
are animated by feelings which are perhaps 
ingenuous, but which are generous in the 
^ See the Jij/sskoie S/ovo, January 191 5, Moscow, 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 291 

extreme. Are they indeed " brutes," as 
Vorwdrts asserted? I have searched the news- 
papers (Austrian and German amongst others) 
for information as to the attitude of the Russian 
soldier in the presence of civil populations. I 
have, I do not deny, found a few cases— very 
few, but very disgusting— of violence committed 
upon civilians by the Cossacks. But I must 
add that such actions happily are few and ex- 
ceptional, as is proved even by the enemy's press. 
Thus, for instance, the Danzers Armeezeitang, 
a paper edited entirely by Austrian officers, pro- 
tests, in its issue of the 15th of October 1914, 
against the false accusations brought against the 
Russian soldiers by the Austrian press, and 
stated :— 

" The ' Muscovite hordes ' are in reality armies 
of brave and valiant soldiers. ... In isolated 
cases the Red Cross has not been respected, and 
we sometimes hear of pillage, but on the whole 
we have before us an honest and chivalrous 
enemy." 

Alas ! the populations of Belgium, France, and 
Poland cannot say of the Prussian officers and 
soldiers what this Austrian military journal finds 
itself compelled to say of the Russian Army. 

The declaration of the Danzers Armeezeitang 
is all the more precious in that it may be re- 
garded as confirming the testimony of a well- 
informed observer, M. R., a Ukrainian patriot 



292 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

and writer. M. R., who has no Russophile ten- 
dencies and does not conceal his dislike of the 
Russian occupation of Bukovina and Eastern 
Galicia, lived in Austria during the first five 
months of the war. • . 

" Generally speaking," he tells us, " the 
Russian troops have behaved better, in Buko- 
vina and Galicia, than the Austrian soldiery. 
The Russians did not drink (with very rare 
exceptions), and paid for what they took to 
supply their needs from the local population, 
while the Austrians did drink and did not pay." 

According to a statement published in the 
French and Swiss press, the German journals 
found themselves obliged to contradict the 
rumours relating to Russian atrocities. Notably, 
Vorwdrts on the 23rd of March declared 
that the official inquiry opened in Eastern 
Prussia established the non-existence of the 
atrocities of which the Russians were accused. 
These accusations were based merely on the 
gossip of soldiers published in a Konigsberg 
newspaper. 

I explain this relatively correct attitude on the 
part of our soldiers by attributing it to the effects 
of the generous and humanitarian propaganda 
which the democratic parties have for so long 
conducted among the Russian peasants and 
industrial workers. It is incontestable that the 
German soldier has a better general education, 



IN THE BLOODY FRAY 293 

and that he has passed through the PubHc 
Schools. But the Russian soldier has passed 
through the school of the Revolution. I believe 
the influence of the latter is perhaps more pro- 
found. 



PART III 
AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER I 

I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the 
problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. The 
possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Are 
they necessary to Russia ? 

I 

I WRITE these words " after the war " at a 
moment when the war is not only not finished, 
but when no one can say how long it will last. 

None the less, I will try to reply to this ques- 
tion : What shall we find after the war ? What 
will its effects and results be on the life of the 
Russian State and the Russian people, or rather 
the Russian peoples? 

Let us begin by considering the possible 
territorial changes. 

Let us venture on a very likely supposition — 
that the war will end in a complete victory of 
the Allied troops over the armies of Germany 
and Austria and Turkey. What territorial acqui- 
sitions will in that case be possible and desirable 
for Russia ? 

To reply to this important question we will 
refer to an ofScial document of not too recent 

297 



298 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

origin, but which has lost none of its actuality. 
This is the report of General Kuropatkin, which 
was presented by him to the Tsar in 1900, and 
was reproduced in his " Memoirs " on the Russo- 
Japanese War. There we find an interesting 
analysis of the Russian frontiers from the strate- 
gical and political point of view, and a review 
of the possible modifications of these frontiers. 

The present frontier between Russia and 
Turkey was established after the Russian 
victories of 1877-8. It coincides with the 
natural boundaries, and " not only protects our 
possessions against the attempts of Turkey but 
constitutes an advantageous point of departure 
for our march towards the principal point of 
Asia Minor and the only fortress of serious value 
on the whole of the route until Scutari is reached 
—the fortress of Erzeroum. Thus the existing 
frontier between Russia and Turkey may be 
considered as being fully satisfactory and 
demands no modifications." ' 

The political frontier between Russia and 
Austria does not coincide with a natural frontier, 
and from a strategical point of view it would 
be perhaps desirable for Russia to push it back 
to the Carpathians, towards the west, incor- 
porating the whole of Galicia in the Russian 
Empire. But first of all we must consider 
whether such an addition of territory and of 
' Memoirs, Russian edition, p. 57. 



AFTER THE WAR 299 

population is necessary for Russia ; whether 
we should be stronger after this addition, or 
whether we should perhaps create for ourselves a 
source of weakness and anxiety ? To this question 
General Kuropatkin replies in the negative. 

" The separation of Galicia from Austria when 
Galicia has for so long lived her own life isolated 
from us can only be effected by violent and 
therefore unhealthy means. Not only the Polish 
population but also the Russian (the Russiny 
or Ruthenes) is without any desire to be incor- 
porated in the Russian State. . . . Despite the 
painful economic situation of the population of 
Galicia, despite the monopolization of land by 
the Jews, despite the taxes, which are heavier 
than in Russia, despite the relative inequality 
of the rights of Poles and Ruthenians, the popu- 
lation of Galicia is justified in considering the 
level of its culture as higher than that of the 
neighbouring populations of Russia. The Slav 
population of Galicia believes that its incorpora- 
tion in the Russian State would be a retro- 
grade step, not a step in advance. ... If we 
allow ourselves to be tempted by the idea 
of enlarging our possessions as far as the natural 
frontier of Galicia, we should without doubt 
create an unending source of anxiety for our- 
selves. . . . Galicia occupied by us might 
become a new Alsace-Lorraine." ' 

' Mevwirs Russian edition, pp. 54-5. 



300 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

General Kuropatkin applies these considera- 
tions also to the idea of the conquest of Eastern 
Prussia. " Possessing the two banks and the 
mouths of the Vistula and the mouth of the 
Niemen, we should occupy a highly threatening 
position towards Germany and should consider- 
ably improve our frontier from a military point 
of view. But these advantages would be far 
from compensating for all the disadvantages of 
such an enlargement of the frontiers of Russia. 
We should be confronted by a new Alsace- 
Lorraine problem, but in an aggravated form. 
. . . The population of Eastern Prussia will 
always be hostile to us on account of the 
superiority of its culture and its ties with the 
population and the historical past of Germany." ^ 

Moreover, the violent occupation of Galicia 
and Eastern Prussia by Russia would involve a 
perpetual menace of a fresh conflict with Austria 
and Germany, who would never reconcile them- 
selves to the loss of these provinces. 

All these considerations led General Kuropat- 
kin absolutely to negative the idea of any 
augmentation of Russian territory at the expense 
of Germany and Austria. 

I can but agree with his attitude, adding a 
few more reasons for so doing. 

As far as the interests of the great masses of 
the Russian people are concerned the enlarge - 

' Memoirs, Russian edition, p. 51. 



AFTER THE WAR 301 

ment of the frontiers would represent no advan- 
tages. The territories of Galicia, Bukovina, and 
Eastern Prussia cannot constitute a " basis of 
colonization " for the peasants of Russia, because 
these provinces are more thickly populated than 
Russia itself. Asia Minor, again, would not 
constitute a possible colony, firstly because it has 
a fairly dense population, and secondly because 
its soil and climate are not such as are familiar 
to Russian agriculturists. The Russian people 
has nothing to gain from these countries, and 
would gain nothing save the hatred of the natives, 
who would greatly object to their violent sub- 
jection by Russia. The annexation of Galicia 
and Eastern Prussia might even create diffi- 
culties for the Russian agriculturists, as these 
two countries are agricultural par excellence and 
would compete against the rural economy of the 
rest of the Empire. As for Russian industry, 
it has no need of Eastern Prussia or Galicia or 
Anatolia. It has before it the vast home market 
of the Empire, which is by no means supersatu- 
rated—it is not even saturated— from the point of 
view of consumption. 

What the masses of the Russian peoples need 
is^ not the conquest of new territories but a pro- 
found transformation of the internal government 
of the life of the people and of the political and 
economic conditions of its existence. 



302 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

II 

But there is one special factor in the prospect 
of a victory of the Allies which is of great 
importance to Russia and to all the other Powers. 
This is the question of the possession of the 
Dardanelles and Constantinople. 

In discussing this question we must reject all 
arguments of a religious and historic order, which 
are merely the verbal and metaphysical em- 
broidery of the economic and political aspirations 
of the Russian Nationalists. The sacred duty 
of planting the Orthodox Cross on the dome of 
St. Sophia at Constantinople, of re-taking from 
the Turk the heritage of the Byzantine Emperors, 
etc.— all this is merely a stringing together of 
words that have no concrete meaning. If the 
Orthodox Russian Church has been able to do 
without St. Sophia for so many centuries, it can 
do without it in the future ; and the Russian 
monarchy can very well do without Byzantium. 

If, rejecting all these empty words, we address 
ourselves to the analysis of the true interests of 
Russia, we shall see that the possession of the 
Dardanelles and Constantinople is not necessary 
to her. 

Turkey is not necessary as a market for Russian 
produce, which is exported thither in far smaller 
quantities than English, Austrian, German, Greek 
and Bulgarian goods. In demanding possession 



AFTER THE WAR 303 

of Constantinople Russia cannot base her claim 
on the possession of the Turkish market by 
Russian commerce, which occupies one of the 
lowest places in that market. But the problem 
of the Dardanelles has for Russia a great im- 
portance in another sense : the Straits form the 
principal outlet for Russian cereals. Erom this 
point of view Russia is bound to take an interest 
in the question of the possession of the Straits 
and of Constantinople. But we must not forget 
that there are many other Powers and States 
whose economic interests are as closely bound up 
in this question as those of Russia. In 1909-10, 
for example, of the total tonnage of vessels enter- 
ing the port of Constantinople, 41-7 flew the 
British flag, 17-7 the Greek, 9*2 the Austrian, 
and only 7 per cent, the Russian. The unde- 
niable fact that the commercial interests of many 
States are involved is a sufficient argument to 
oppose the possession of the Straits and of Con- 
stantinople by Russia by the idea of neutraliza- 
tion, which would be the more advantageous as 
it would cause the minimum prejudice to Turkey. 
Needless to say, the Balkan States— Roumania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia— ought to share, with 
the Great Powers, in the administration of the 
neutralized Straits and capital. 

Such a solution would possess the further ad- 
vantage that it would eliminate one of the objects 
of disagreement between Russia and England, 



304 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

who cannot permit that Russia, possessing the 
Dardanelles, should threaten the Mediterranean, 
the Balkan States, and Asia. The neutralization 
of the Dardanelles might solve the difficult and 
complicated problem without disagreement be- 
tween the Allies and in the interests of all. 

Professor Migulin, one of the leaders of 
economic Imperialism in Russia, is of opinion 
that " the territorial acquisitions in the West 
[Galicia and Prussia] will not greatly enrich 
Russia," as these regions are well populated, con- 
siderably in debt, and so far developed, from 
an economic point of view, that they might com- 
pete with Russian trade and production. But 
the same writer considers that Russia should 
appropriate " the German heritage in Turkey," 
taking, not only the Dardanelles and Constanti- 
nople but also all Asia Minor. 

In the Duma, in January 191 5, the leader of 
the " Cadets," M. Milukov, insisted that Russia 
must gain possession of the Straits and Constanti- 
nople. He repeated his words during a public 
speech made at Moscow on the 31st of January, 
in which he declared even that Russia " must 
make haste and take the Dardanelles as soon as 
possible, so as not to be behind-hand." ' 

The same declaration was repeated in the Duma 
by the representative of the Nationalists, who 

^ Quoted from the RttsskoU Slovo of the 19th of January 
(ist of February) 191 5. 



AFTER THE WAR 305 

declared: "The Straits and Tsargrad [Con- 
stantinople] must belong to us and to us only." 
M. Milukov supported him, saying that " the 
acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople 
should be assured by the aid of both diplomatic 
and military measures." 

In this case, as in so many others, the leader of 
the Russian Liberals does not express the true 
feelings and aspirations of our democracy during 
the present war, for whom the present war is 
not a war of conquest and usurpation, but simply 
a war to defend Russia and Europe against the 
brutal aggression and domination of Germany. 



20 



CHAPTER II 

I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and 
the destruction of Prussian Imperialism. — II. The defeat of 
Germany is to the advantage of the German revolutionaries 
and the Socialists of Germany and of all Europe. 

I 

In denying the necessity of an enlargement of 
the territory of Russia at the expense of her 
enemies, I wish to lay stress on the advantages 
which the victory of the Allies over Germany, 
Austria, and Turkey would signify for the 
economic and political progress of all Europe. 
But if Germany were victorious Europe would 
lie prostrate under the heavy boot of Prussian 
Imperialism. The great development of German 
industry would enable Germany to complete her 
military victory by monopolizing the European 
market and a great part of the world-market. 
German capitalism would flourish to the detriment 
of the industries of other countries, and the 
German people would grow wealthy at the ex- 
pense of other peoples. The economic progress 
of Europe, crushed under the boot of Prussia, 
would be arrested, and would assume unhealthy 
forms under the pressure of the monopolization 
and parasitism of German capital. 

306 



AFTER THE WAR 307 

To save the economic life of Europe from the 
disastrous efTect of this monopolization and para- 
sitism is the first task of the Allies now fighting 
against Germany. 

But Russia? Perhaps some Germanophile or 
Russophobe will ask me whether the victory of 
Russia would not be as disastrous to the economic 
progress of Europe. By no means. Russia is 
a semi -capitalist, agricultural country, and has 
not the technical advantages which would permit 
her to monopolize the European market, much 
less the world-market, as her industry and her 
capital are still too undeveloped and too weak 
for such a task, while Germany is the most highly 
industrialized country of Europe. 

From the social and political point of view 
the German domination of Europe would, I think, 
be equally perilous. We can well imagine what 
results this domination would have in annexed 
Belgium or crushed and humiliated France. It 
would be the triumph of Prussian absolutism over 
the democratic regimes of other nations. It would 
also involve a great set-back to the labour move- 
ment in the conquered States, for instead of find- 
ing occupation in the conflict of classes, and the 
social, professional, and political aspects of that 
conflict, the intellectual forces of the proletariat 
of the three capitalist countries— England, France, 
and Belgium — would be absorbed by the idea 
of revenge, of national defence, and of libera- 
tion from the German yoke. Nationalism and 



308 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

chauvinism would supplant international Social- 
ism in the labour movement of a great part of 
Europe. 

II 

The defeat of Germany, on the other hand, is 
necessary, not only to the progress and democracy 
of Europe, but to Germany herself. It would 
shatter the omnipotent influence of the Prussian 
Junkers, and the Hohenzollern monarchy, which 
relies on their support. It would force the 
German people to understand that it must recon- 
struct its political system and free itself from 
the absolutist militarism of which it seems at the 
present moment to be the timid and faithful tool. 
Even now I can detect symptoms of the awaken- 
ing of the German people. While at the beginning 
of the war the most popular of the political parties 
of Germany, the Social-Democratic Party, was 
absolutely obedient to the Government, after six 
months of warfare it is already beginning to pro- 
test. The Socialist deputies of the Prussian 
Landtag proclaim the necessity of concluding 
peace as speedily as possible. Karl Liebknecht, 
deputy to the Reichstag, refuses to associate him- 
self with the Prussian Government, and openly 
declares that the military cliques of Austria and 
Germany are responsible for the outbreak of the 
war. In certain important Social -Democratic 
organizations in the provinces secession has oc- 
curred owing to the attitude of the central official 



AFTER THE WAR 309 

centres. The labour organization of Charlotten- 
burg, the great suburb of Berlin, voted a protest 
against the war, and declared that the principal 
responsibility for the war rested with the Govern- 
ments of Austria and Germany. This popular 
discontent will increase as the Germans meet with 
failure on the field of battle. The German people, 
whose Government promised to take Paris in a 
month and conquer Russia before Christmas of 
1 9 14, begins to see tliat it is deceived. And, in 
spite of all its dislike of revolutionary measures, 
the German people will rid themselves of abso- 
lutism by a revolution if that absolutism is 
defeated in the war. 

But this is not all. I should wish to draw the 
attention of all European Socialists to a point of 
special interest and importance to the Socialist 
movement. 

I regard Germany as the country which objec- 
tively and technically is the most highly developed 
in its industrial and capitalist organization of all 
the countries of Europe. We may even say that 
it is too highly developed, that it suffers from a 
permanent superproduction and is suffocating 
itself under the weight of this superproduction. 
There were only two possible issues before the 
economic organism of Germany : suffering from 
a plethora of capitalism, she had either to effect 
a radical reconstruction of her whole domestic 
fabric, on a new basis, or she had to endeavour 
to hack her way toward the domination of the 



310 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

world over the corpses of other economic and 
pohtical organisms. The working-classes of 
Germany preferred the first issue before the war_, 
and even prudent writers like Karl Kautsky pre- 
dicted the not very remote possibility of a com- 
plete transformation of the economic life of 
Germany, the abolition of the capitalist system, 
and the beginning of a social revolution. The 
propertied classes and the Government would 
doubtless prefer another issue : instead of a 
change of the economic and social system of the 
country, they intended to combat its capitalist 
plethora by means of a military conquest of new 
outlets. Instead of withdrawing into itself, 
capitalist Germany breaks out upon Europe, rifle 
in hand. 

These, I think, are the economic and socio- 
logical factors which induced Germany to pro- 
voke the present war. And this explanation 
permits me to warn all European Socialists that 
they ought to desire the defeat of Germany, for 
that defeat is in the interests of Socialism in 
Germany and in all Europe. German capitalism, 
guided by the military caste of Prussia, 
endeavoured to avoid the prospect of a labour 
revolution and a Socialist transformation of 
society, and sought an issue in the international 
war and the German domination of Europe. 
Socialists everywhere ought to make every 
possible effort to bar the way to Germany 
and to compel her to return home. Then the 



AFTER THE WAR 311 

problem of the reconstruction of the entire 
economic structure of Germany, of a renewal of 
all its social bases, will once more confront the 
German people, and the German Social- 
Democratic working-men will be forced to 
repent of their treachery towards their inter- 
national comrades, and to conduct a revolution 
at home instead of going forth to kill the Krench, 
Russian, English, and Belgian workers. But 
there is only one means of bringing capitalist 
and working-class Germany to this point : the 
Allied armies must bar the way before German 
Imperialism on its errand of stupendous military 
brigandage. And this is why I believe the 
Allied armies are fulfilling a positive and pro- 
gressive role, not merely from the standpoint 
of national defence, but also from the standpoint 
of international Socialism.' 

' I will quote an observation made by George Plechanov in 
his pamphlet on the war : " Under the present conditions the 
defeat of German Imperialism will contribute considerably to the 
propagation of the revolutionary movement in the interior of 
Germany, and this will weaken the position of Russian Tsarism. 
The defeat of German Imperialism will at the same time be the 
defeat of the Right wing of the German Social- Democratic Party. 
So we cannot but say that an issue of the war which shall be 
unfavourable to Germany is extremely desirable, as regards the 
interest of revolutionary Socialism all the world over." I only 
hope this defeat of opportunism in Social-Democratic Germany 
may prove to be the only punishment its leaders will suffer for 
the abominable treachery with which it thrust the poisoned 
dagger of betrayal into the back of international labour and the 
Russian revolution. 



CHAPTER III 

I, Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from 
the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to 
the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian 
monarchies ? — II. The intrigues of the Russian reaction- 
aries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a 
separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance 
of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these 
intrigues are to be disarmed. 

I 

I HAVE already said, in a preceding chapter, that 
the present mihtary and pohtical grouping of 
the European Powers is far more advantageous 
to Russia than the alliance with the Hohen- 
zollern and Hapsburg monarchies which the 
reactionaries in Russia so desire. Imagine that 
in place of the alliance of Russia with republican 
France and democratic England we were to have 
a Holy ( ! ) Alliance of the three Emperors- 
Russian, German, and Austrian ! What damage 
they could do to the liberty and democracy of 
Europe ! What bonds might they not impose 
upon them ! And how the Russian reactionaries 
would rejoice the friends of the Prussian reac- 



AFTER THE WAR 313 

tion ! ' In 1904, at the time of the Russo- 
German " friendship," the Russian bureaucracy 
sacrificed to Germany the interests of the agri- 
cultural population and the rural economy of its 
own country by accepting the conditions of the 
Customs Treaty imposed by Germany. We can- 
not doubt that the same story would be repeated 
in 191 6 on the conclusion of the new Russo- 
German treaty. 

As far as the economic interests of Russia are 

^ In order once more to give the reader some conception of 
the hatred of the Russian reactionaries for republican and demo- 
cratic ideas, I quote the following passage : " On the 3rd of 
December 1909 the deputy Markov, a member of the Union of 
the Russian People, declared in the Duma, to the applause 
of the Right, and without being called to order by the President, 
Prince Volkonsky : " The French Revolution is the most odious 
and contemptible act of modern history. . . . The Republic 
means the reign of public men and public women" (see La 
Verite sur La liusste, by Rene de Chavagnes, Paris, 1910, p. 10). 

And of the amiability of the Russian reactionaries to their 
German and Austrian friends, the reader may judge from the 
following extract from M. Milukov's book, " The Balkan Crisis and 
the Policy of M. Izvolsky," Petersburg, 1900. In speaking of 
the tactlessness of Russian and the skill of Austrian diplomacy, 
in the Balkan affairs of 1907-8, M. Milukov says: "Baron 
von Aerenthal, an old friend of the late P. X. Schwanebach, who 
gave him, when at Petersburg, the most precise information as 
to the internal weakness of Russia, had calculated very exactly. 
Russia could not at that period occupy herself seriously with 
Balkan affairs. And Baron von Aerenthal hastened to profit by 
our weakness." M. V. Schwanebach, a State Comptroller, was 
one of the highest of Russian officials, and a member of the 
Council of Ministers, so that the reader will understand that 
this is a very grave accusation. 



314 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

concerned, the victory of Germany might be fol- 
lowed by lamentable results. It would increase 
the economic dependence of Russia upon 
Germany. A Marxist writer well known in 
Russia, M. P. Maslov, author of a great work 
on " The Agrarian Problem in Russia," ex- 
presses the supposition that in the event of a 
German victory Russia might become merely the 
colony of Germany and lose all possibility of 
independent economic development. He makes 
the deduction that all classes of the Russian 
population— peasants and artisans included— have 
much to fear from the victory of Germany. 

Another Marxist writer, Georges Plechanov, 
whose letter to Justice I have already quoted, 
wrote an interesting pamphlet on the war, which 
was published in Paris : — 

" We have reason for believing that the defeat 
of Russia in the present war would be injurious 
to the future economic development of the 
country. Why? Simply because the nature of 
the Imperialist policy involves the economic ex- 
ploitation of the conquered people by the con- 
queror. As a result of such exploitation the 
economic development of the conquering people 
is accelerated and that of the conquered people 
is hampered. 

" And as the principal forces of the liberative 
movement in Russia are born of its economic 
progress, which has destroyed the old social 



AFTER THE WAR 315 

relation and has created new classes — the 
working-class in particular — it is easy to under- 
stand that the defeat of Russia would retard her 
economic development and be injurious to the 
work of popular liberty and favourable to the 
ancien regime — that is, to the very Tsarism whose 
abolition we desire. All that hampers our 
economic development and upholds Tsarism, 
which is merely the inevitable political con- 
sequence of the fact that the Russian State is 
still undeveloped from the economic point of 
view." I 

On the other hand, as I have already said, the 
German reaction has many political interests and 
sentiments in common with the Russian reaction. 

" Everybody knows," writes Plechanov, " that 
the German Emperor was the faithful defender 
of our ancien regime. He knew well what he 
was doing in supporting it. He understood that 
the existence of this regime was profitable, not 
to the Russian people but to the German Junkers 
and Imperialists, because it facilitated the victory 
of Germany over Russia." 2 

The crushing of Prussian militarism is there- 
fore, for Russian democracy, the crushing of a 
friend and the giving of support to the autocracy 
and reaction of Russia. 

' Georges Plechanov, O vomie, " Concerning the War," Paris, 
1914, pp. 25-7. ^ Ibid., p. 30. 



316 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

II 

The Russian reactionaries well understand the 
situation created by the present war, and they 
endeavour to modify it in the direction desirable 
to them. I have already quoted extracts from 
articles in the organ of the Union of the Russian 
People, Russkoie Znamia, which, even during 
the war against Germany, is conducting a propa- 
ganda in favour of Germany by representing her 
as the symbol of order and the monarchical prin- 
ciple and by expressing the hope that she will 
crush France, and there restore an absolutist 
government. The Russkoie Znamia, in its sym- 
pathy for Germany, even went so far as to justify 
the execution of Russian students in Belgium 
(at Liege) by the Germans, for the sole reason 
that these students were of the Jewish faith. 

" These Jews had themselves fired on the 
Germans and provoked the latter to shoot them 
down," wrote this cannibalistic Russian journalist 
of the innocent death of a few youths who were 
Russian subjects. "Why did they fire on the 
Germans? Simply to provoke the Germans to 
massacre as large a number as possible of 
Belgian Christians, so that the Zionists might the 
more readily replace these Christians and trans- 
form Belgium into a Palestine ! " ' 

These filthy imbecilities are published openly 

' In X\\Q. RusskoU Znamia, 9th of December 19 14, Petrograd. 



AFTER THE WAR 317 

in Petrograd, under the eye of the benevolent 
Russian censor, the very censor who has pitilessly 
suppressed the whole of the "Left" press. 

But the intrigues of the Russian reactionaries 
go farther than the mere verbal expression of 
sympathy for Germany. They have undertaken 
a whole propaganda in favour of the separation 
of Russia from her present Allies and the con- 
clusion of a separate peace with Germany, or, to 
put it more simply, in favour of international 
treason and perfidy. 

The task of directing this treacherous cam- 
paign was assumed by Count Witte, creator of 
the monopoly of alcohol which so long poisoned 
the Russian people, and the breaker of the great 
political strike in 1905. This gentleman, in 
December 19 14, delivered a speech before the 
Assembly of the representatives of Russian 
industries convoked to deliberate concerning the 
war tax. In this speech he developed the idea 
that Russia is far less interested in defeating 
Germany than is England, who alone will be 
enriched by the war. The ideas expressed in 
his speech were reproduced and repeated by 
several organs of the press. The supporters of 
M. Witte accused England of inciting Russia, 
with the egotistical object of imposing the heavier 
burden of military effort on her while economizing 
her own resources. 

The propaganda against England and against 



318 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

France, conducted by the Russian Germano- 
philes, coincided (and this must not be over- 
looked) with an analogous and " parallel " propa- 
ganda conducted in Germany by certain journals, 
which, ceasing their call to the conflict with 
reactionary Tsarism, began to assure their readers 
that the principal enemy of Germany is not 
Russia but England, who incited both Russia 
and France to make war. 

The propaganda of treason conducted by these 
Russian Germanophiles was in obvious contra- 
diction to the public declaration of the three 
Allied Governments, whose text, signed on the 
4th of September 1914, states that " the British, 
French, and Russian Governments mutually 
engage themselves not to conclude a separate 
peace during the present war, and agree that 
when there shall be occasion to discuss the terms 
of peace no one of the Allied Powers can propose 
conditions of peace without previous agreement 
with each of the other Allies." So the French 
and English Governments have an incontestable 
right to protest against the intrigues of the 
Russian Germanophiles and to demand explana- 
tions from the Tsar's Government. Early in 
January 1 9 1 5 the Petrograd Courrler published 
the following communication :— 

" 'We are informed, from an authorized and 
well-informed source, that the Ambassadors of 
France and Great Britain have lately complained 



AFTER THE WAR 319 

to M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, of 
the disagreeable and altogether ' undesirable ' 
tone of certain organs of the press — few in 
number, it is true— and also of certain isolated 
politicians, men well known in Europe and 
America, who have declared themselves inimical 
to England. M. Paleologue and Sir George 
Buchanan observed to M. Sazonov, amongst 
other matters, that the speech of Count VVitte 
before the Assembly of the representatives of 
Russian industries had produced the most painful 
impression upon British statesmen and the British 
press. The Ambassadors declared that these 
criticisms, which have no foundation in fact and 
are expressed only because it is not possible to 
publish all the agreements existing between 
Russia, France, and England touching the 
common conduct of the war, are utilized by our 
enemies, and allow them to spread, by means 
of their agents in all parts of the world, reports 
of dissension between the Allies, whose cause 
is said to be our excessive confidence in England. 
More, these criticisms injure our common cause. 
The Ambassadors begged M. Sazonov to take 
action in order to dissipate these regrettable and 
absolutely gratuitous suspicions, which tend to 
represent England as preoccupied exclu- 
sively with herself. On his side Sir George 
seized the occasion to declare, in the name of 
Great Britain, that the latter is prepared to fulfil 



320 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

to the end, worthily and nobly, her obligations 
towards her Allies, without recoiling from any 
sacrifice either in material or in men. 

To this protest the British Ambassador added 
another and a public protest in his speech at the 
English Club (on New Year's Eve), when he 
spoke scathingly of " certain notorious Germano- 
philes who are preaching a crusade against 
England and a little band of their supporters 
who are making every effort to sow discord 
between Russia and her Allies." 

After this the Russian Government published 
an official declaration in which it stated that 
" the co-ordination of all the operations of the 
Allied armies had been perfect," and that "each 
of the parties was free from all reproach." But 
as this declaration contained no precise reply to 
the propaganda of a separate peace between 
Russia and Germany, the question was raised 
at a sitting of one of the Commissions of the 
Duma, whose members demanded to know, of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether there 
was any foundation to the rumours concerning 
the possibility of a separate peace. M. Sazonov 
on this occasion replied by a non-equivocal 
denial . 

From all this strange and perhaps not yet com- 
pleted story we may make this deduction, that 
France and England should not repose too much 
confidence in the ruling classes of Russia, for 



AFTER THE WAR 321 

they contain in their midst many enemies of the 
French and English democracies and friends of 
the Prussian reaction. But in order to safeguard 
themselves against the intrigues of these reac- 
tionary Germanophiles, the democratic elements 
of France and England and Belgium should 
count, above all, on the sympathies of the demo- 
cratic elements in Russia and should hold out the 
hand of friendship offered them. Such an alliance 
of the democracies of the three countries would 
facilitate a solution of those varied and com- 
plicated problems which confront us to-day, and 
will confront us even more urgently at the close 
of the war, in a truly democratic sense and in the 
interests of the people. 



21 



CHAPTER IV 

I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in 
Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national 
question after the war. — III. The role of the French and 
English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for 
liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? 

I 

The eminent Russian historian M. Nicolas 
Rojkov, sometime Professor of the University 
of Moscow, I contributed to the Sovremenny Mir 
for October 1914 an article dealing with the 
analogy between the present war and the 
campaign of 1 8 1 2- 1 4 . 

" Any war," he writes, " is a terrible misfor- 
tune, more especially a ' world-war.' It is the 
duty of all to whom the interests of the great 
popular masses are dear to seek to prevent war. 
. . . But when we are already confronted by 
the reality of war we should endeavour to grasp 
its entire significance. A war is a vast shock, 

* I may remark, in passing, that M. Rojkov is at present in 
Siberia, having been sentenced to "perpetual deportation, with 
deprivation of all civil and personal rights." He was condemned 
to this punishment in 1908 for participation in the revolutionary 
movement of the Russian people. 

322 



AFTER THE WAR 323 

a huge upheaval. The objective action of the 
war gives a final impulse to those forces of social 
development which are ripening, and to those 
which have already arrived at maturity, and 
accelerates the processes which were developing 
in the bosom of society before the war. We 
know that before the war a fresh and encouraging 
wind, a breeze of springtide, was blowing across 
Russia. It is very evident that after the war 
these springtide forces will not disappear, that, 
on the contrary, they will develop into a warm 
summer, a season of great activity of independent 
social forces. A defeat of the ruling classes 
of Germany . . . holds out the promise to our 
country of the prospect of a wide economic, 
social, and political development." 

But the various elements of Russian society 
are not agreed as to what constitute the most 
desirable forms of such development. Take, for 
example, the question of the economic emancipa- 
tion of Russia from German influence . The great 
capitalist-monopolists and their theoreticians are 
preaching the forced and artificial elimination of 
German competition, and foreign competition in 
general, from the Russian market, by means of 
an even stronger Protectionism than that which 
exists in Russia to-day. The Russian democracy, 
on the other hand, is against Protectionism, and 
believes that its abolition would be beneficial 
to the economic development of Russia, because 



324 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

it would impel Russian capitalism toward more 
energetic and more enlightened activities. 

We find the same disagreement in respect of 
the problem of foreign markets. The great 
capitalists wish the Government to seize this or 
that market by aid of military force, so that 
they may exploit it as their personal property, 
guarded by bayonet and cannon. The demo- 
cratic elements of Russian society consider, on 
the other hand, that Russian capital has no need 
of an external market conquered by force, 
because it is confronted with many possibilities 
of development in the interior of the country, 
and the forcible seizure of an external market 
into which Russian manufacturers could pour 
products of bad quality and very high price 
would play only a negative part in the permanent 
development of Russian industry. 

One of the causes of the present war, and one 
of the principal points of the Russo-German con- 
flict, is the question of the renewal of the Customs 
Treaty. And this is how the Council of the 
Congress of Trade and Industry (the directive 
centre of all the unions of Russian manu- 
facturers) wishes to solve this problem : " Vic- 
torious Russia," it says in its official declaration, 
" must dictate her economic programlne to van- 
quished Germany." To this economic canni- 
balism the Russian democracy replies that even 
after the completest victory of Russia over Ger- 



AFTER THE WAR 325 

many there can be no question of the dictation of 
a one-sided economic programme by the victor 
at the bayonet's point. There can only be a 
reciprocal arrangement which would conciliate 
the vital interests of the popular masses of Russia 
and Germany. There must be no exploitation of 
the German people by the Russian capitalists, but 
an economic collaboration of the two countries. 

Here is a case in point. At the last session 
of the Duma the peasant deputies put forward 
a proposal as to the necessity of introducing as 
soon as possible a progressive tax upon income. 
The majority of the Duma rejected the proposi- 
tion, although it was thoroughly justified by the 
eeconomic situation of the population and even 
by the necessities of the war. " We are paying 
a tax in blood," say the poor Russian peasants 
to the rich nobles and monopolists. " It is only 
fair that you should pay a tax in money." But 
the wealthy nobles and capitalists will not put 
aside their egoism even during the difficulties of 
a time of war, when a powerful enemy is invading 
the country. 

II 

In other domains of Russian life we find many 
similar contradictions and disagreements. What, 
for instance, do we find in respect of the racial 
or nationalist problem? 

Early in September 1914 the Commander -in- 



326 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Chief of the Russian Army addressed the popula- 
tion of Austria- Hungary in a proclamation 
wherein he solemnly declared " in the name of 
the great Russian Tsar " that " Russia, which 
has already on more than one occasion shed her 
blood for the liberation of the peoples from a 
foreign yoke, seeks nothing but the re-establish- 
ment of law and justice. 

" To you, peoples of Austria- Hungary, also, 
Russia to-day brings liberty and the fulfilment 
of your national aspirations. . . . Russia has 
but one object : that each of you may develop 
and live in prosperity, preserving the precious 
heritage of his fathers — his language and his 
religion." 

Such were the words used ; but what were 
the facts ? I will quote from the Journal le 
Geneve, a moderate and Russophile journal, in 
which we find a description of the policy of 
" Russification " pursued by the Russian bureau- 
cracy in Bukovina and Galicia after the Russian 
troops had entered those countries : — 

" Despite the criticisms of the Liberal Russian 
journals, such as the Retch, the Russkiya Viedo- 
mostl, etc., and even of some of the Conservative 
organs, such as the Golos Moskvy and the 
KoLokol, the new Russian administration, under 
the influence of the Nationalist and Clerical 
Party, has inaugurated in Galicia an extremely 
irritating policy of Russification. 



AFTER THE WAR 327 

" Eastern Galicia, inhabited by four millions 
of Ruthenians and a million and a half of Poles 
and Jews, has become the field of action of the 
Nationalist Party, which now reigns there as a 
master, . . . 

" Despite the proclamation of the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, who promised the free exercise of their 
language and their religion to the Slav peoples 
of Austria, here are the measures which the 
Governor-General, Count Bobrinsky, has taken 
in Galicia : 

" All the Ruthenian and Ukrainian journals are 
suspended ; all the bookshops closed, as well 
as the co-operative societies and intellectual 
associations, among others Prosvlta, which 
boasted 150,000 members, 3,000 libraries, and 
1,000 savings-banks. The Ukrainian National 
Museum is closed and its collections have been 
transported into Russia. 

" The University and all the schools are closed, 
until the professors and school-teachers have 
learned Russian. [This news is official and was 
published in the Voennoie Slovo of Lemberg, 
and all the Russian journals, together with the 
following ] : — 

" By an order of the 30th September 19 14 
all the Ruthenian books printed in Galicia, and 
even books of prayers, must be taken to the 
police-stations, there to be destroyed, under 
penalty of three months' imprisonment or a fine 



328 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of 3,000 roubles. Correspondence, even private, 
in the Ruthenian language is forbidden. 

" Under the pretext that the Ruthenians are 
Russians [but if they are, why Russify them?] 
and were Orthodox three centuries ago, an ener- 
getic propaganda has been organized, at the 
bayonet's point, in favour of ' Holy Orthodoxy.' 
The Galician peasants are forced to attend 
' plebiscites ' under the vigilant eye of the 
Cossacks, in order to choose between the 
Orthodox faith and that which has been theirs 
for three hundred years. 

"In September . . . the ' Russo - Galician ' 
Clerical and Nationalist Society at Petrograd 
discussed the methods to be employed to ' con- 
vert ' Galicia. 

" It decreed the necessity of removing the 
Uniat Metropolitan, expelling the Basilian monks, 
confiscating their property, and replacing them 
by Orthodox popes. 

"... While assuring the correspondent of 
the journal Kiev that it is false that violent 
means have been employed, the Archbishop 
Euloge has already transported from Lemberg 
to Kharkov more than 300 children in order 
to educate them in his religion. . . . The 
Ruthenian metropolitan of Lemberg was arrested 
and deported to Nijni -Novgorod, then to Koursk, 
for having protested. He is the head of the 
Ruthenian Uniat Church, which numbers 2,325 



AFTER THE WAR 329 

priests and 3,540,000 faithful in Galicia, to say 
nothing of Bukovina and America, where there 
are nearly a million Ruthenians. 

" The fate of the Uniat religion seems decided : 
the Governor-General, Bobrinsky, has declared 
that he recognizes only three religions— Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Jewish. 

" Twenty thousand officials employed by the 
posts, railways, etc., of the Austrian administra- 
tion, all Galicians, are to-day without employ- 
ment, plunged into the deepest poverty ; they 
have been replaced by Russians, who do not 
even know the language. The Nationalist 
deputy, Tshihatshov, demands the colonization 
of Galicia by Russian peasants, and announces 
that 300,000 Muscovite colonists have already 
been dispatched. 

" The Russian journals of the Left and Right, 
and even some Nationalist journals, criticize these 
regrettable measures." ' 

Another Swiss journal, the Lausanne Gazette,- 
equally moderate and sympathizing equally with 
the Allies, recalling the fact that Russia was 
to act the part of a " steam-roller " in the present 
war, remarks, a propos of the Russian policy in 
Galicia : — 

" There was generosity and grandeur even in 
the pose of Russia drawing the sword in favour 

■ See \hQ Journal de Geneve for the i6th of February 19 15. 
^ La Gazette de Lausanne, ist of March 191 5. 



330 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

of threatened Serbia ; but is Russia then only 
capable of generosity towards countries which 
do not belong to her?" i 

In replying to this question I will say that 
we must first of all decide which Russia we 
are discussing, because there are two Russias— 
the Russia of Tsarism, Nationalism, and the re- 
action, and the Russia of democracy, toleration, 
and progress . The latter is in no way responsible 
for the deeds of the former. The Russian 
democracy deplores the brutal actions of an 
arbitrary Tsarism and extends a brotherly hand 
toward all the oppressed, whose fate it can well 
comprehend, being itself oppressed. 

The present war proves that the union of all 



' The present work was already written when the Swiss journal, 
the Berner Tagwacht, and others, published information as to the 
conduct of the Germans in Russian Poland. Compared with their 
actions, the Russian policy in Galicia might be called " tolerant," 
for while the Russian authorities practise Russification, the 
Germans in Poland prefer to exterminate the population ; while 
the Russians suppress newspapers, the Germans suppress whole 
villages and towns. Or, as a Polish publicist has remarked, they 
destroy with far more "system " and "organization." 

As for the Austrians, they have established a true reign of 
terror in the Slav provinces of their State. They hang and 
imprison en masse those Slavs who are suspected of Russian 
sympathies, leaving the bodies hanging for weeks. . . . The 
population of Austrian Bukovina fled into Russia to escape the 
" administrative psychosis " (the expression of an eye-witness 
from whom I received a private letter) which seized the Austrian 
authorities in the Austrian provinces reoccupied by the Austrian 
troops after the temporary retreat of Russia. 



AFTER THE WAR 331 

the peoples inhabiting Russia is an actual fact ; 
and it is extremely regrettable that the Govern- 
ment should shatter this union by its measures 
of oppression and " Russification." And there 
is no doubt that when the present system of 
government has been done away with the peoples 
dwelling on Russian soil will succeed in estab- 
lishing such forms of political cohabitation and 
CO -existence as will assure to all of them the 
widest possibilities of national development. 

Ill 

But that all this may be realized more readily 
the effectual assistance of the democracies of 
the Allied nations would not only be of great 
utility, but is even a necessity. My readers will 
recall the last few lines of the letter from a 
Lettish revolutionary which I quoted in a pre- 
ceding chapter. The writer of the letter fears 
the triimiph of Tsarisra, and does not con- 
ceal the fact. But he relies on the French and 
English democracies, who will not — he hopes- 
allow Tsarism to oppress the lesser peoples. The 
same hopes are expressed by the press of other 
nationalities. The Armenian publicist M. 
Varandian, when the Novoie Vremia, the organ 
of Russian Nationalism, pronounced in favour 
of "an annexation pure and simple of Turkish 
Armenia " and its incorporation into the Russian 



332 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

State, replied that " England and France will 
also have their word to say as to the final settle- 
ment," and asked, in the name of " the great 
majority of the Armenian people," that Turkish 
Armenia shall be constituted as "an autonomous 
State under the collective protectorate of France, 
Russia, and England." The Polish democrats, 
who are justified in distrusting the promises of 
Tsarism, also appeal to the democracies of 
France and England. 

The Lausanne Gazette, in the article lately 
cited, condemns the reactionary policy of Tsarism 
as regards the Poles and Ruthenians, and ex- 
presses the conviction that " if the last word 
of settlement rests with the Triple Entente its 
diplomatists will have the right to speak plainly 
in the Congress which will establish peace. It 
is to be hoped that the delegates of France and 
England will bring pressure to bear on their 
Muscovite ally, and that their own Liberalism 
will to some extent affect their Eastern partner. 
It would be reassuring for the future should 
the present war draw Russia into the orbit of 
the great civilizing Powers of the West ; but 
for the moment, we must admit, Russian policy 
continues to draw its inspiration from Prussian 
and Austro- Hungarian methods far more than 
from French and English principles." ' 

Personally I do not put my trust in diplo- 
* La Gazette de Lausanne, ist of March 1915. 



AFTER THE WAR 333 

matists or members of Governments. I put it 
rather in the democratic masses of the Allies 
of Russia. Before the war the union of Russia, 
France, and England was of a diplomatic, 
military, and, in general, governmental character. 
The French and English Governments were con- 
cerned with the aspirations and interests of the 
Russian Government rather than with those of 
the Russian people. Thus we have witnessed 
things as strange as the systematic support of 
the Russian reaction by means of the money 
of French republicans ; or as the arrest of a 
Russian political refugee (M. Adamovitsh) by 
Anglo-Egyptian authorities, and his extradition 
by the Tsar's Government. France was giving 
asylum to Russian political refugees, and at 
the same time the Government of republican 
France tolerated the existence in Paris of a 
bureau of the Russian secret police, who 
operated unashamed and unhindered in the 
French capital. 

All these obvious contradictions are explained 
by the fact that France and England, in the 
persons of their Governments, regarded their 
alliance with Russia as an alliance with official 
and governmental Russia^ which was yet at war 
with her own people. 

But then the " world-war " came, and the 
union of the three Governments became a union 
of peoples, sealed by the red seal of their blood. 



334 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

shed in terrible abundance on common battle- 
fields. And I will not, I cannot, believe that 
all this blood will be shed for nothing, that after 
the war we shall return to the bad old state of 
things . 

The Russian people did not accept the present 
war for egoistical reasons. It had no need of 
conquests, of new territories, of the subjection 
of other peoples, of brigandage or booty. It 
accepted the war as a war for the defence of 
its own country and the defence of Europe 
against a brutal oppressor and invader. It 
accepted it because it sincerely believes that it 
ought to save Serbia, France, and Belgium ; 
because the advanced democracies of France and 
England are fighting by its side against the same 
enemy. But it hopes and desires that they wilt 
be beside it, not only on the battlefields of the 
war against Germany but also on the battle- 
fields of its painful campaign against the Russian 
reaction, the fight for liberty. 

A first step towards this true union— a Holy 
Alliance of the popular masses of the Allied 
countries— was taken by the Socialist Conference 
in London, at which were present Socialist 
members of the French and Belgian Govern- 
ments, who passed a vote of protest against the 
reactionary policy of Tsarism. Some of the 
French Conservative journals expressed their 
intense disapproval of this step. But of what 



AFTER THE WAR 335 

did they disapprove? Do they not understand 
that the attitude assumed by the London Confer- 
ence is consistent with the interests of France and 
England ? Do they not understand that even from 
a purely military point of view Russia, their ally, 
would be stronger and more capable of resist- 
ance against the common enemy were the moral 
of the Russian soldiers not depressed by the 
sad and terrible news reaching the trenches from 
the interior of the country? Can a soldier fight 
well when he knows that in the interior of the 
country which he is defending the people is in 
chains, that the most elementary rights of man 
are being violated, and that the prisons are over- 
flowing with his brothers ? No, I assert that 
even from the most strictly Nationalist and Con- 
servative point of view, from the point of 
view of those who desire nothing from this war 
but the immediate object of crushing Germany, 
the action of the Socialist Conference was useful 
and beneficial. 

As for the democratic elements of France and 
England, they should understand that the demo- 
cratization of the political system of Russia is 
in their own interests. If the Germanophile 
party in Russia wish to bring pressure to bear 
upon the Russian Government in order to 
persuade it to commit an act of treachery against 
its present Allies, who could save Russia from' 
this infamy, or France, England, Belgium, and 



336 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Serbia from this perfidious and possibly mortal 
blow? Who but the Russian democracy? 

On the other hand, the solution of the 
problems involved in the termination of the war 
will be greatly facilitated by the triumph of a 
democratic regime in Russia. The more 
thoughtful portion of the Russian people does 
not desire a policy of conquest. It does not 
desire the forcible annexation of Galicia, Prussia, 
Asia Minor, the Dardanelles, and Constanti- 
nople. With the Conference of London, it 
" wishes to see Belgium liberated and indemni- 
fied. It trusts that the Polish question will be 
solved conformably with the will of the Polish 
people, in the sense of autonomy in the midst 
of another people, or complete independence. It 
wishes all annexed populations, from Alsace- 
Lorraine to the Balkans, to recover the right 
to dispose of themselves in freedom." 

If the present war does not realize these 
desiderata, it will not be merely a " great illu- 
sion," to use the phrase of Mr. Norman Angell ; 
it will be a vast " bluff," a world-wide fraud, 
an abominable outrage and insult to all the 
millions of dead who will have given their lives 
for a cause which they believed to be just and 
noble. 

But if the realization of the great object of 
the war is to be possible the establishment of 
a democratic government in Russia is a necessity. 



AFTER THE WAR 337 

It is a practical necessity because the Russian 
democracy, if it finds itself possessed of power, 
will be able to form an agreement with the 
democracies of the Allied countries in respect 
of all the problems of the moment. Between 
Tsarism and the British Government a conflict 
in respect of the possession of the Dardanelles 
and Constantinople is a possibility ; but it would 
not be possible between the Russian democracy 
and the English democracy, as the Russian people 
has no interest in demanding the military posses- 
sion of the Dardanelles. And so with all the 
dangerous and litigious problems of international 
relations. 

IV 

The more thoughtful elements of the Russian 
people agree entirely with the declaration of the 
Conference of London, which states that the 
labouring classes of the Allied countries " do not 
desire the political and economic destruction of 
Germany," that they are making war, not against 
the German people but against its Government. 
The more thoughtful elements of the Russian 
people believe sincerely that " the victory of the 
Allies should be the victory of national liberty, 
of the unity, independence, and autonomy of the 
nations in the peaceful federation of the United 
States of Europe and the World." 

I regard the Russian people— in its lower social 

22 



338 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

strata — as one of the most pacific and non-mili- 
tary — or rather anti-militarist— peoples of modern 
Europe. I explain this, not by this or that 
" psychological " peculiarity of the Russian 
people but by the economic conditions of its 
life. The agricultural peoples are, in general, 
pacific, because they have already passed through 
the disturbed period of the warlike existence of 
hunters and nomads, and have not yet reached 
the period of insatiable and capitalistic Im- 
perialism, which busies itself with international 
brigandage. The only motive which can engender 
the desire of conquest and expansion in the case 
of an agricultural people is " land hunger," the 
lack of soil. But this motive could not impel 
the Russian people to go to war. In the first 
place, they know that it is already too late to 
satisfy this hunger at the expense of neighbouring 
States, these being for the most part more thickly 
peopled than Russia ; secondly, they know that 
they already possess in Russia great territorial 
wealth which has been monopolized by a small 
number of nobles and great landlords, and that 
to obtain the soil which is necessary to them they 
must make their demands, not of foreign peoples 
and Governments but of their own masters. In 
place of an international war of aggression they 
must fight for " land and liberty " in their own 
country. 

This is why the greatest of Russian writers, 



AFTER THE WAR 339 

Leo Tolstoy, who tried in his philosophy to 
express the " truth of the moujiks/' is the greatest 
pacifist of the modern world. This is why the 
only remarkable Russian painter of battle-scenes, 
M. Verestschagin, represented the tragic and 
mournful aspect of war in his pictures. This is 
why in the works of the best Russian writers you 
will never find hymns of praise to the ferocious 
God of Battles, but a unanimous condemnation 
of warfare. This is why the idea of a protest 
against war. against " murder," and the propa- 
ganda in favour of peace, occupy so large a place 
in the religious movements of the rural masses of 
Great Russia and her sister — Ukraine. 

As for the workers of the towns, their pacificism 
is so great that their parliamentary representa- 
tives have voted against the war credits even in 
time of war, as my readers will remember. 

This instinctive aversion to war and aggression 
does not, it is true, exclude a great capacity for 
defence. But I believe that people which is least 
aggressive is most capable of defence. We know 
that the most docile animals defend themselves 
often the most valiantly. A comparison between 
the attitude of the Russian people in the war 
against Japan and its attitude during the present 
war is the best proof of what I have said of 
the mentality of the popular masses of Russia : 
the war against Japon was for the Russian people 
a war of "other people," an aggressive and use- 



340 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

less and detestable war. The present war is a 
defensive war — disagreeable but necessary. It is 
a painful but salutary task, a heavy but inevitable 
burden ; the labour of sweeping aside a large 
and dangerous obstacle which might obstruct the 
broad highway of historic evolution. And we 
may be sure that as soon as this task is finished, 
as soon as the Russian people, with its Allies, 
has torn the bloodstained sword of Prussian mili- 
tarism from the hands of the German people, the 
Russian people will be the first to offer its sincere 
friendship to its former enemy. We may be sure 
that after the end of the present war the Russian 
people will contribute largely to the establish- 
ment of peace in Europe and the realization of 
all those measures which might ensure that 
peace. 

But this is not the only service that the Russian 
democracy may render to the world. Russia is 
a revolutionary coimtry — that must not be for- 
gotten. Having lit the great torch of the libera- 
tive movement in its own country, the Russian 
people — or rather the peoples of Russia— have 
hurled it beyond their frontiers. The Russian 
revolution of 1905 was a signal, an impulse to 
many other peoples. In Austria the working- 
classes obtained from their Government a 
measure of universal suffrage, thanks to the 
impression produced on that Government by the 
revolutionary movement in Russia. "If you do 



AFTER THE WAR 341 

not give us electoral rights we shall speak 
Russian." Such was the expression employed 
by one of the leaders of the labour movement 
in Austria during the struggle for universal 
suffrage in that country. The Russian revolution 
awoke from their secular slumber the peoples 
of the East— Turkey, Persia, and even mysterious 
China. The Russian people, which has not yet, 
alas ! been able to liberate itself, has yet rendered 
a remarkable service to the liberation of other 
peoples. 

And it is with much gratitude, and not without 
pride, that I have recently read in the work of 
Marcel Sembat, one of the organizers of the 
national defence in France, and one of the scepti- 
cal minds of that country, the following lines 
concerning Russia. 

" Russia does not appear to me as a bogey," 
writes Sembat. " On the contrary, at this dis- 
tance from Russia the Slav appears charming 
to me. . . . What, for me, is Russia? Russia, 
to me, is a revolutionary comrade ... a scien- 
tist, a scholar, with nothing of the barbarian 
about him ! Russia is a whole impassioned 
literature ; it means the heroes of Turgenev, 
Tolstoy, Gorky. I count on Russia enormously. 
I tell myself that there are in Russia the Slav 
soul, buried treasures of fraternal enthusiasm, of 
generous devotion, a great need of and a great 
capacity for loving pity. I count secretly on 



342 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

the Russian people as on one of the chief peoples 
of the Socialist Period."' 

Russia is a country of great revolutionary and 
democratic possibilities. But for these possibili- 
ties to be realized the European democracies who 
are marching side by side with the Russian people 
against German Imperialism, to fight for the 
liberty of the world, must not leave the masses 
of Russia alone and unsupported when they 
march to another war — against their own oppres- 
sors, to win the liberty of their own country. 
May the sacred union, the Holy Alliance of the 
democratic elements and the popular masses of 
Russia and the most advanced countries of 
Europe endure after the war, the end of the 
present war ! May it endure into the future ! 
^ Marcel Sembat, Faites un Rot, sition faites la Faix, pp. 80-82. 



CHAPTER V 

I. Russia and England. Their economic relations. The neces- 
sity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — 11. The 
intellectual relations between Russia and England. — Con- 
cerning certain " deviations " of English sympathies. 

I 

Finally, a few brief words as to the relations 
between England and Russia.' 

According to my custom, I will begin with 
the material and economic side of these rela- 
tions. 

The beginnings of Anglo -Russian commercial 
exchange go back to a period already remote. 
In the middle of the sixteenth century English 
merchants came to Russia for purposes of trade. 
In 1566 the Government of Ivan Grozny— the 
Terrible— addressed itself to the Government of 
Elizabeth through the mediumship of the English 

' I may permit myself to be brief in this chapter, because I 
am at present preparing a large work on " Russia and Europe," 
which will be published in English by Mr. Fisher Unwin, to 
whom I am profoundly grateful for affording me the opportunity 
to inform the English public concerning the life and history of 
my country. In this work I shall speak at length of the relations 
between Russia and England. 

343 



344 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

Ambassador in Moscow, Jenkinson, begging ber 
to send from England good artisans and crafts- 
men to assist in the development of trades and 
industries. In 1569 the English traders re- 
ceived from the Russian Government a " privi- 
lege " allowing them to establish a metallurgical 
workshop in the north of Russia (at Vytshegda, 
in the province of Vologda). In the commercial 
town of Shuia the English traders had at this 
period their own warehouses and offices. 

The general census of the population of the 
Russian Empire in 1897 numbered 7,481 British 
subjects residing in Russia at the moment of 
the census— ^of whom 3,602 were men and 3,879 
women ; 80 per cent, of these British immigrants 
were living in the cities and only 20 per cent, in 
the rural districts. A third of the whole were 
living in the capital (the same census gave 2,527 
English as living in Petersburg). The remain- 
ing two -thirds inhabited principally the great 
maritime ports. I The majority of English subjects 
residing in Russia are employed in wholesale 
trade and industry. 

According to the figures given by M. Isch- 
chanian, the Armenian economist (whose work 
on the foreign elements in the economic life of 

' The same census numbered 158,103 German subjects in 
Russia, 121,599 Austrians, and only 9,421 French subjects. See 
M. Ischchanian's book, Die ausldndischen Elemente in der russis- 
chen Volkswirtscha/t, Berlin, 191 3, pp. 62-3. 



AFTER THE WAR 345 

Russia was published in German in 191 3), the 
total amount of English capital in the industrial 
undertakings and various securities in Russia was, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, about 
£37,000,000. Taking into consideration that 
the total amount of British capital abroad is 
£3,000,000,000, we perceive that only 12 per 
cent, of this sum was placed in Russia. 

As for the commercial exchange between 
Russia and Great Britain, it is expressed by the 
following figures :— 

In 1900 the importation of Russian products 
into England attained the value of 146 million 
roubles, and the exports of British products to 
Russia attained a value of 127 million roubles. 
In 1909 the Russian imports entering England 
had already increased to 289 million roubles, 
while the British exports to Russia remained at 
almost the same level as in 1900, being valued 
at 128 million roubles. 

So the balance-sheet of Anglo-Russian trade 
is active for Russia and passive for England, 
while the Russo-German commercial exchange 
presents a very different picture and is balanced 
in favour of Germany. 

From this point of view the greatest possible 
development of trade between England and 
Russia is very desirable for the former, especi- 
ally after the war, when the relations between 
Russia and her immediate neighbours— Germany 



346 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

and Austria— will necessarily be diminished for 
a shorter or longer period. 

But we may invoke a more general reason than 
this to demonstrate the utility of wider economic 
relations between Russia and England. Eng- 
land is a Free Trade country, an enemy of Pro- 
tectionism. Germany — ^after Russia— is the most 
Protectionist country in Europe, and it is easily 
comprehensible that Russia cannot dispense with 
Protectionism in her commercial relations with 
Germany until the latter abolishes her Customs 
Tariff. But in her relations with England Russia 
can and should pursue the policy of Free Trade, 
and the abolition of Customs Tariffs. In this 
case the vast Russian market will be open to the 
products of British industry, whose competition 
will stimulate the energy and initiative of the 
Russian capitalists. At the same time, the pro- 
ducts of Russian agriculture— wheat, sugar, etc.— 
as well as the products of the petroleum industry, 
will have larger access to the British market, 
above all after the neutralization of the 
Dardanelles and the re-establishment of traffic 
on the Baltic. 

I have read lately that certain English pub- 
licists—Mr. Wells among others— are undertak- 
ing a campaign in favour of the establishment 
of a Protectionist system in England. I do not 
believe the English people will wish to repeat 
the error of the Russian Government. Our ex- 



AFTER THE WAR 347 

perience suffices to show that the Protectionist 
system is harmful to the economic development 
of modern countries, and that it constitutes a 
menace to international peace. The abolition of 
customs, the victory of Free Trade between the 
nations of the world — such must be our common 
programme in future. 

II 

The intellectual relations between Russia and 
Great Britain are far more highly developed than 
their material and economic relations. But I 
cannot in this case tell you on which side the 
balance-sheet is active ! In the domain of com- 
mercial exchange we can measure the results 
attained by tons of merchandise and by pounds 
sterling, but in the intellectual domain an evalu- 
ation and appreciation of the balance-sheet can 
only be relative. 

But I do know that in Russia the intellectual 
influence of England is already considerable. 
Certain currents of English literature have pro- 
duced a great impression on Russian letters. 
Shakespeare is no less known and loved by 
Russian readers than the classical writers of their 
own country. Children and young people are 
familiar with the heroes of Walter Scott, smile 
at the adventures of Swift's Gulliver, and weep 
over the pathetic pages of Dickens. " Byronism " 



348 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

played an enormous part in the evolution of 
Russian literature, and the two great lights of 
Russian poetry, Pushkin and Lermontov, are the 
intellectual children of Byron. 

Modern English literature is equally familiar 
and equally loved in Russia. Nearly all the 
works of the best English authors are published 
in Russia— sometimes going through many edi- 
tions. The names of Wells, Kipling, Jerome, and 
many others are very familiar to Russian readers. 

English science has also a great influence in 
Russia. Darwinism is the predominating ten- 
dency in Russian naturalism, and several gene- 
rations, not only of naturalists, scientists, and 
University teachers, but the bulk of the intel- 
lectual youth of Russia, have shaped their mental 
equipment by the aid of Darwinian studies and 
theories. 

As for the political system of Great Britain, 
it is admired above all by the Russian Liberals. 
As for the Radical and Democratic elements of 
Russian society, their attention is drawn and their 
sympathies captured rather by the republican 
regime of France than by the monarchical 
constitutionalism of England. This is explained 
by the fact that in Russia one cannot count on 
the possibility of transforming the Tsarist auto- 
cracy into a constitutional monarchism of the 
English type. The clash between the reaction 
and the democracy is too violent, the social and 



AFTER THE WAR 349 

political conflict too profound, to permit one to 
count on such a possibility. 

Among the thinking members of the working- 
classes— that is, the Socialists— a great interest 
is felt in the English Labour movement. The 
political and economic theories of Robert Owen 
and of Chartism are necessary subjects of study 
in the classes organized by the Russian workers: 
Many books and pamphlets published by the 
Socialist bookshops are devoted to the history 
of the Socialist movement in England. In 
Russian Marxism, which forms the prevailing 
current in the Socialism of our country, the study 
of the economic evolution of England occupies 
a great place, and the Russian Marxists are fond 
of saying that the true revolutionary Marxism 
constitutes a synthesis of three elements : the 
German dialectical philosophy, French revolu- 
tionary practice, and English economic evolution. 

The Russian press follows the principal events 
of English national life with great attention, most 
of the larger Russian journals having their special 
correspondents in England. The Labour press 
in Russia always has reliable information as to 
the struggles and the situation of the j)roletarian 
class in England, and I believe an English artisan 
would be greatly astonished if he could realize 
the great and sincere interest with which his 
Russian comrades follow all that affects the pro- 
letariat of England. 



350 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

In attempting a brief analysis of Russian influ- 
ence in England, I may begin by asserting that 
the literary aspect of that influence is by no 
means negligible. Not Tolstoy alone, who has 
left his visible imprint on the English thought 
of our time, but many of the classics of Russian 
literature are known and appreciated in England, 
where the modern Russian writers also are widely 
read— for example, Gorky and Tchekov. 

English interest in Russia has increased more 
particularly during the last ten years, since the 
Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905. 
The appearance of organs of the English press 
devoted especially to Russian affairs proves that 
this interest is profound and serious. It is true 
that some of these publications give a somewhat 
partial view of Russian affairs (this criticism is 
true, for example, of the Russian Supplement 
published by the Times), but others are more 
objective and are inspired, not by the views of 
the Russian Government but by the aspirations 
of the Russian masses. Such are Free Russia 
and Darkest Russia. Finally I may cite the 
Russian Review, devoted to the study of various 
problems of Russian life, two weeklies, and a 
monthly review published in English and devoted 
particularly to Russia : this is at least a be- 
ginning. 

But what is still more remarkable than the 
literary and informative interest felt for Russia 



AFTER THE WAR 351 

in England, is the active and practical sympa- 
thy displayed in certain English circles for the 
Russian people and its revolutionary struggles. 
The existence of a " Union of the Friends of 
Russian Liberty " in England, the agitation in 
respect of the arrest of the old revolutionist 
Tchaikowsky, who was literally torn from the 
hands of his jailers, thanks to the intervention 
of British public opinion, and again, the inter- 
vention of English society in the affair of Miss 
Malitzky, the propaganda directed against the 
persecution of Jews in Russia, the protests of 
the British Labour Party against the arrest and 
extradition of M. Adamovitsh in Egypt, and a 
long series of similar actions, prove that the 
British democracy sympathises with the sufferings 
of the masses in Russia, and in their great 
struggle for the destruction of the autocracy and 
the establishment of a democratic system of 
government. 

I may here recall a personal impression. In 
1907 I was among the delegates sent from Russia 
to the Congress of the Social -Democratic Labour 
Party of Russia, which cannot meet in Russia, 
being an " illegal " Congress. We went to Den- 
mark, to Copenhagen, to open our Congress. 
The constitutional Danish Government expelled 
us as though we had been dangerous beasts. We 
went to Stockholm in Sweden. The constitu- 
tional Swedish Government expelled us as though 



352 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

we had been dangerous beasts. We then sailed 
for London, where no one disturbed us during 
the four or five weeks of our labours. And when 
the Congress lacked money to terminate its 
labours and to send its three hundred delegates 
back to Russia, Englishmen were found to come 
to the aid of the Russian Social-Democratic Party 
and to lend it the necessary and very considerable 
sum of money. Expelled from two European 
countries, the Russian Socialists, delegates to the 
Congress, were well qualified to appreciate the 
warm welcome which they found in the capital 
of Great Britain. 

The sympathies of the advanced and demo- 
cratic elements of English society for the 
cause of Russian liberty is deep and sincere. 
We can only express the hope that this 
sympathy will have lost none of its strength 
after the war. 

I must here warn the democratic opinion of 
England against a change in the attitude observ- 
able of the English democracy toward Russia. 
For instance, I read, in a Russian journal, an 
extract from an article which had appeared in 
the English review published by Mr. and Mrs. 
Sydney Webb. In this article a revision was 
proposed of the opiinions held by enlightened and 
democratic circles in England concerning the 
present political regime in Russia. The author 
of the article endeavoured to convince the Eng- 



AFTER THE WAR 353 

lish democrats that they must not be more revo- 
lutionary than the Russian revolutionists them- 
selves ; that they must not judge Tsarism as 
severely as of old, because — so says the author of 
the article— the oppressed nations, particularly the 
Jews, and the democratic elements in Russia, are 
reconciled to their Government on account of the 
war. This argument is false ; no " reconcilia- 
tion " has taken place between the revolution and 
the reaction, and none could have taken place, 
for the simple reason that Tsarism is continuing, 
even during the war, its policy of oppression and 
violence in the interior of the country. Tsarism 
has not changed during the war, and the atti- 
tude of the English democracy ought not to 
change. 

Another possible modification of public opinion 
may have its source in a too great respect which 
some of its representatives entertain for the so- 
called " historic traditions " of the life of the Rus- 
sian people. An example of this kind of error is 
to be found in the interesting pamphlet by Mr. 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin."' 
There is in this pamphlet a just appreciation of 
the mentality of the Russians as compared with 
that of the Prussians :— 

" The Russian institutions are, in many cases, 
left in the rear of the Russian people, and many 
of the Russian people know this. But the 
Prussian institutions are supposed to be in ad- 

23 



354 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR 

vance of the Prussian people, and most Prussians 
believe it." i 

But the same author^ who so justly appreciates 
the institutions of Russia as outgrown by the 
Russian people, falls, a few lines farther on, into 
an archaeological sentimentalism, and sings a 
hymn of praise to these same institutions :: — 

" If the Russian institutions are old-fashioned, 
they exhibit honestly the good as well as the bad 
that can be found in old-fashioned things. In 
their police system they have an inequality which 
is against our ideas of law. But in their com- 
mune system they have an equality that is older 
than the law itself. Even when they flogged 
each other like barbarians they called upon each 
other by their Christian names like children. At 
their worst they retained all the best of a rude 
society. At their best, they are simply good, like 
good children, or good nuns." 

Concerning this too sentimental and sugary 
estimate, I will confine myself to the remark that 
it would be far better if the Russians described 
by Mr. Chesterton were to call upon each other 
by their Christian names like children without 
accompanying this infantile amiability by blows 
of the whip. I am ready to agree with Mr. 
Chesterton when, in speaking of the barbarian 
influence experienced by the Russians during 
their history, he wittily remarks : — 
' G.K.Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin," London, 1915. 



AFTER THE WAR 355 

" Whether Jonah did or did not spend three 
days inside a fish, that did not turn him into a 
merman." ' 

I am of the same opinion. But I believe that 
if Jonah could have dispensed with a somewhat 
disagreeable detention in the belly of the whale 
he would gladly have done so. And I am sure 
that the experience was neither salutary nor use- 
ful from a hygienic point of view, and that on 
issuing from the whale Jonah had, probably, any- 
thing but the look of a well-groomed and 
immaculate gentleman of fashion. 

The Russian people is anxious to emerge from 
the belly of the whale of Tsarism and reaction 
as speedily as may be. May the English demo- 
cracy aid it in its efforts ! 

' G. K.Chesterton, "The Barbarism of Berlin," London, 1915. 



CONCLUSION 

I HAVE completed my work, and on reading 
once more the manuscript of this hook, I myself 
am struck by the contradiction of sentiments 
which fills and runs through it. But what would 
you have? I have tried to be sincere in what 
I have written. And the contradictory sentiments 
which are expressed in the present work are only 
a reflection of the real contradictions of Russian 
life and its situation during the present war. 

The young Russian armies are defending the 
cause of European democracy and the world's 
progress. But they are commanded by an auto- 
cratic and timeworn power. It is a misfortune 
for us, the democrats of Russia, that the military 
forces of our country are in the hands of auto- 
cratic Tsarism ! But for the European demo- 
cracy, for the peoples of Belgium, Serbia, France, 
and England, it is none the less a lucky chance 
that the millions of Russian soldiers are obsti- 
nately and to the death resisting the aggression 
of Germany and her Allies. 

How are we to conciliate our own misfortune 
with the " lucky chance " so necessary to our 
Allies? 

356 



CONCLUSION 357 

I find a good and simple reply to this question 
in the words of a Russian mother, whose letter 
to her son, fallen on the field of battle, I en- 
countered in the press : — 

" We shall not live for ever in this world. What 
is the life of a human being? A drop of water 
in the life of glorious Russia. We shall not live 
for ever, but Russia must have a long and pros- 
perous life. I know we shall be forgotten and 
our happy descendants will not remember those 
who sleep in the graves of soldiers ; but what 
matter ! " 

And enlarging this generous thought, I would 
say : The interests of the atom must be sub- 
ordinated to the superior interests of the whole. 
In the first place the interests of the entire 
democracy of Europe, the progress of the whole 
world ; then the individual interests of Russia. 
First the interests of all Russia, then the interests 
of this or that group 1 It is the one rule, the one 
maxim, possible and applicable in these tragic 
hours of human history. 

But we may be sure that in yielding the first 
place to the interests of the whole we shall also 
gain our own portion. The triumph of the 
common cause of European democracy will at 
the same time be the triumph of our own ! 



ttbe ©tesbam pteaa 

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WOKINO AND LOKDON 



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